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financial self-help group 
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Influx Control Discriminatory apartheid laws with the intention to restrict 
Africans in their movements, settlement and work 
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Stokvel Type of financial mutual, mostly ROSCA 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions 
 
From the eighties onward, when apartheid was crumbling, more and more 
Africans migrated to Cape Town, South Africa. They did not leave their homes in 
the Eastern Cape because they liked the city like the many tourists who, not unlike 
the Dutch East India Company of the colonial past, enjoy its revitalising qualities. 
To the Xhosa migrants Cape Town was, and still is, a hostile city. People fear 
murder, rape, and theft. They do not know their neighbours and friends are scarce. 
They have no family there, either living or dead, and racist attitudes are ever 
present. The Xhosa migrants have only one motivation for plunging themselves 
into the unknown and hostile squatter camps of Cape Town and that is money. 
This ethnography concerns the way in which Xhosa migrants in the townships 
of Cape Town collectively manage their money in financial self-help groups, also 
known as financial mutuals.1 The migrants organise a myriad of groups in which 
the participants collectively save, borrow, lend, or use their hard-earned money to 
form insurances. Some mutuals consisted of only a few neighbours who met each 
month at a member’s home, with each giving about R200 to the host member until 
all members had had a turn. Other mutuals were complex arrangements where 
members saved money together, mostly for Christmas, but also issued loans to 
each other. There were also many insurance arrangements involving up to a couple 
                                                          
 
1  These arrangements are also referred to as financial self-help organisations, rotating 
credit associations, rotating savings and credit associations, accumulating savings 
and credit associations, savings associations, as well as mutual benefit associations. 
As a generic term, I will refer to these arrangements as financial mutuals. 
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of hundred members that made sure that money was available to attend the funeral 
of a relative back home, or to prevent a burial in Cape Town itself. One could join 
a group voluntarily and the social constraint of fellow members would make sure 
that not all the money would be spent but would be used for the contribution to the 
financial mutual (cf. Ardener 1995: 7; Bijnaar 1998: 343-344; 2002: 104-110; De 
Swaan 1996b: 12; Rowlands 1995: 113-114).2 
Financial mutuals were the first and often the only organisations that the 
migrants established. The squatter camps and new townships in Cape Town were 
virtually bereft of social and organised initiatives and there were no organisations 
to speak of in these new neighbourhoods. In Indawo Yoxolo – the main research 
site – it took years before the first soccer games were held. The churches were for 
the most part located elsewhere in the city and could therefore not play an 
important role in the neighbourhood. Politics were dangerous and therefore most 
people did not want to participate, not even at local level. Every ritual, such as 
funerals, initiations or ancestor worship, took place outside the city, back home in 
the Eastern Cape. Migrants therefore rarely organised rituals in the city. There 
were no alternative forms of organisation, such as participation in local politics, 
churches, soccer clubs, unions, or age groups. However, financial mutuals were an 
exception and they flourished in this social desert. The main concern of Xhosa 
migrants was money and it was around money that their social configurations 
crystallised. 
In this book I approach financial mutuals as a social configuration. This allows 
a study of what has changed for the majority of Africans in a liberated post-
apartheid South Africa, particularly regarding solidarity, trust, and consumption. 
Financial mutuals were particularly useful for acquiring an insight into the hopes 
and dreams, as well as the worries and anxieties, of poor Africans because these 
primarily have to do with money. After all, money was the reason for migrating to 
Cape Town and money was needed to maintain relations with kin back home. The 
image of migrants is often that of poor, destitute, and uprooted people. I also 
examine the flip side of that image and investigate what poor people do once they 
have some money. The migrants organised financial mutuals in order to influence 
the use of money, when it was used, and who could benefit from it. 
For at least a century, social science has occupied itself with money and social 
relations. Simmel (1990 [1900]) foresaw that money, and the kind of transactions 
associated with money, would bring about impersonal relationships. He argued 
that money allows people to engage in distant and extensive exchange relations 
that cannot be as personal and intimate as exchange relations based on, for 
                                                          
 
2  The strategy to make it more difficult to spend money and easier to save has also 
been called the illiquidity preference (Bouman 1994a: 117; Lont 2000b; Shipton 
1995: 257-259). 
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example, cattle or agricultural products which are not mitigated through money. 
This view was reflected in the approach to financial mutuals in the 1960s. Social 
change focused particularly on the transition from a peasant economy based on 
subsistence to that of a market economy. Social change, particularly that concern-
ing the economy, was strongly embedded in modernization theory. Geertz (1962) 
stood at the heart of this debate and argued that financial mutuals were a ‘middle 
rung’ between the traditional and the modern world. According to Geertz and 
many others, financial mutuals would help people to adapt to a rational and 
modern society ‘while at the same time minimizing the strain of transition and 
social transformation’ (Geertz 1962: 259). Once the migrants had adapted to their 
modern milieu they would resort to modern financial institutions, such as banks, 
and financial mutuals were expected to disappear.3 Very soon, however, studies 
such as the one by Meillasoux (1968) on migrants in Bamako, Mali, revealed some 
of the less adaptive aspects of financial mutuals. Moreover, financial mutuals do 
not disappear when people start using ‘modern’ financial institutions such as 
banks. 
Towards the end of the 20th century social change was no longer conceptualised 
in terms of transition from traditional to modern, while distinctions between 
personal gifts and so-called ‘rational’ market exchange were no longer regarded as 
fruitful avenues of research on economic change. Current research focuses on the 
way in which money is locally embedded and how its meaning is socially con-
structed. Zelizer (1994), for example, revealed how people label money and treat 
money differently depending on its source, forms of expenditure, as well as the 
social constellation in which money operates. Bloch & Parry (1989) also argue 
against a distinction between gift exchange and market exchange, as well as 
between ‘rational’ and personal forms of exchange. Instead, they propose distin-
guishing between short-term cycles of exchange and long-term cycles of exchange. 
According to them, what is exchanged, whether money or other things, is ir-
relevant. What matters is the social constellation in which exchange occurs. Short 
term cycles of exchange are characterised by individual competition while long-
term cycles of exchange reproduce the social order. 
Research into economic change examines the constant reconfiguration of social 
relations and symbolic orientations under a capitalist economy. For example, 
Comaroff & Comaroff (1990) analysed the comparisons people make between 
cattle and money and the transference of a symbolic orientation towards cattle for 
building and maintaining social relations versus money with its completely differ-
ent origin. Attention has shifted from inherent qualities of money to economic 
                                                          
 
3  Ardener (1995 [1965]) focused on the origin and spread of financial mutuals across 
the world. See also Kerri (1976) and the discussions following his article on finan-
cial mutuals and modernization. 
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change that is part of globalisation and allows for new avenues of wealth, 
(political) prestige, social mobility, legitimacy, and identification. Economic 
change is set against the insecurity that is characteristic of recent globalisation 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 1993, 1999, 2000) or, according to Guyer (1999), of a 
long-term incorporation into the colonial economy. Moreover, renewed attention is 
directed towards financial mutuals in a transnational context, the maintenance of 
transnational networks, and identity (Bijnaar 2002; Kane 2001b; Van Wetering 
1999). 
Economic dynamics are furthermore embedded in a political analysis, either of 
local political systems exposed to new sources of wealth or of the economy of a 
(post) colonial state in Africa (Bähre 2005; Bayart 1993; Hutchinson 1996; 
Geschiere 1997; Wolf 1999: chapter three). Two distinct scholarly traditions can 
be identified concerning financial mutuals, namely one related to Europe that 
acknowledges politics and the state, and another one related to the developing 
world that surpasses these issues. Historical sociology studies the rise and demise 
of financial mutuals in Europe. It is, among others, concerned with collectivisation 
processes among workers and with how guilds, unions, and churches established 
mutuals that formed the foundation of the current welfare state. These European 
workers’ mutuals disappeared due to the emergence of a social security system 
that, because it was part of the state, did not suffer from the kind of problems that 
are characteristic of collectivisation processes (some examples are De Swaan 
1996a; Van der Linden & Sluijs 1996; Van der Linden 1996). Putnam’s (1993) 
study of financial mutuals and other civic organisations in Italy has become 
particularly prominent. He argues that these organisations generated social capital, 
which in turn created the conditions for effective, responsive, and representative 
institutions. In sharp contrast to the studies on the state and the economy in Africa, 
research on European mutuals reveals more confidence in the state being able to 
take over, or build on, the social security provided through financial mutuals. 
There is a fast growing area of research on financial mutuals in developing 
countries that does not take much account of political processes. If it does, for 
example by drawing on Putnam’s (1993) idea of social capital, it paints a very 
harmonious picture. During the last decade, interest has been revived in the use of 
financial mutuals for development purposes. The contribution of financial mutuals 
to social security and poverty alleviation have been examined (Bouman 1978; 
Bouman & Hospes 1994; Adams & Fitchet 1992; Hospes 1997; Smets 2000, 
2002; Lont 2000b, 2002; Lont & Hospes 2004; Kane 2001a, 2001b). The 
empowerment of women through financial mutuals has been given particular 
attention (Ardener & Burman 1995; Lont 2000a; Ross 1990). Apart from research, 
there has been a sharp increase in development policies and projects that aim at 
copying financial mutuals. Microfinance is a major development topic and 2005 
was declared the United Nations Year of Microfinance. In the debates and policies 
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on financial mutuals and microfinance for poverty alleviation, little attention is 
paid to conflict and political processes. This is surprising, particularly in the case 
of Africa, as historical, anthropological, and political studies on economic change 
in Africa highlight conflict and political dynamics. Political issues, particularly 
state formation, have also been central to the historical studies of financial mutuals 
in Europe. 
Are financial mutuals in South Africa affected by, or part of, political pro-
cesses? How are they affected by conflict, how does conflict feature within 
financial mutuals? Or are financial mutuals able to shield themselves from the 
many conflicts that are characteristic of South Africa? Are there any links between 
state formation – in South Africa characterised by the end of apartheid – and 
financial mutuals? As will become apparent in this book, conflict and politics are 
crucial to the functioning of financial mutuals, the way in which solidarity is 
shaped, the way in which people trust each other, and the way in which the money 
generated through financial mutuals is spent. Furthermore, it will become clear that 
the state also matters to these informal, often small scale, financial mutuals. 
Financial mutuals cannot be studied in isolation from apartheid policy, nor in 
isolation from post-apartheid development projects. It will become clear that an 
approach to financial mutuals which is depoliticised and does not take account of 
conflict, and which unfortunately is at the heart of the microfinance movement, is 
unwarranted. 
For Xhosa migrants living in the ‘threatening triad’ of economic insecurity, 
violence, and volatile social relations, the conditions for entrusting money to each 
other in newly established financial mutuals were unfavourable. There was 
immense economic insecurity. Unemployment was so high that it was extremely 
difficult to manage a household and take care of children. There was the constant 
threat of physical dangers of domestic and political violence, as well as of the rapid 
spread of AIDS. Moreover, relationships with kin, neighbours, home-people 
(migrants from one area in the Eastern Cape), colleagues at work, between men 
and women, as well as towards Whites and Coloureds were volatile and often 
threatened. Often it was money, more precisely the lack of it, which complicated 
social relations. Notwithstanding the fact that it is quite common for migrants to 
establish financial mutuals in a hostile environment, it is fascinating that people 
who hardly know each other, who live in extremely vulnerable conditions, entrust 
each other with up to half their monthly salary. Financial mutuals emerged rapidly 
while other forms of organisations, such as churches, soccer clubs, choirs, failed to 
get off the ground or took much longer to become established. This raises ques-
tions such as: Why do people organise financial mutuals under such threatening 
circumstances? How do they manage to do so under such unfavourable condi-
tions? This ethnography reveals how people’s financial situations were constantly 
changing and why this made them largely dependent on others. People made 
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strong financial claims on each other or tried their best to circumvent such claims. 
This book reveals how financial mutuals were at the crossroads of the manipu-
lation of flows of money, and were therefore pivotal to the migrants’ responsi-
bilities and obligations towards others. There was never enough money since 
wages were low and job insecurity high, but through financial mutuals the mi-
grants tried to influence the flows and uses of money. Financial mutuals allow us 
to grasp the nexus of money and social interdependencies within an extremely 
threatening context. 
By studying financial mutuals and posing questions about the way they are 
organised, how participants are selected, who is trusted, and how the money is 
spent, it became clear how money dominated the lives and relations of Xhosa 
migrants living in Cape Town. Flows of money and the way such flows are in-
fluenced through social control in financial mutuals disclosed new and changing 
interdependencies. Financial mutuals reveal contestations, identifications, solidari-
ties and interdependencies rooted in the particular use of money. For Xhosa 
migrants, financial mutuals are a new sphere of exchange, a new social arena in 
which the object of desire circulates among people one barely knows. Money 
remains hidden most of the time, which complicates the study of the nexus of 
money and social relations. However, in the context of financial mutuals, money 
temporarily comes to the fore, just like the relations that participants challenge, 
build, or relegate. 
 
 
Politics 
 
This study, the choice of topic, the methodology, as well as the interpretation of 
financial mutuals, was possible because of the political changes that took place in 
South Africa since the 1980s. Apartheid had severely restricted research possibi-
lities and had a tremendous impact on the agenda of anthropologists working in 
South Africa.4 For example, anthropologists were not permitted to stay overnight 
in the area of their fieldwork and the government tried to control research by 
issuing research permits to approved projects only. It was also dangerous to 
discuss political issues, especially for informants. Wilson & Mafeje (1963), who 
wrote one of the few ethnographies on the lives of Africans in Cape Town, were 
confronted with the impossibility of carrying out research on political issues. At 
the time of their research, the two major African political organisations, the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC), were banned. 
                                                          
 
4  See Gordon & Spiegel (1993: 86-88), Hammond-Tooke (1997), James (1997: 128-
129), Kuper (1995), and Scheper-Hughes (1995: 414-415) on anthropology’s predi-
cament during apartheid. 
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The police had also imprisoned two journalists because they refused to disclose the 
sources of their information. Wilson & Mafeje (1963: 11-12) were faced with 
these problems and therefore explicitly decided to write an apolitical ethnography 
in an era of great political turmoil. 
Although the explicit avoidance of political issues was problematic, it was even 
more difficult to neglect these implicitly and define social life through an apolitical 
understanding of culture as was often done by the Afrikaner volkekunde – best 
translated as ‘folk studies’ (Hammond-Tooke 1997; Gordon and Spiegel 1993: 86-
88). Critical anthropology rejected this apolitical concept of culture that served 
apartheid ideology so well. At the core of critical anthropology was a political 
interpretation of cultural practices which, in turn, meant that cultural practices that 
did not have a political dimension were easily ignored. James (1999a, 1999b), for 
example, found that researchers were hesitant to study migrant associations during 
the apartheid era. Researchers were worried that their findings on migrant asso-
ciations would confirm apartheid notions of culture (James 1999b, 24): 
This reluctance to investigate home-based associations was particularly strong among 
anthropologists, due perhaps to their awareness that there was a disturbing similarity 
between the definitive cultural features stressed by their forebears and the concept of 
ethnic uniqueness which was used to justify the depredations of apartheid. 
Instead of ignoring apolitical organisations based on an awareness that anthro-
pological studies could be used to support apartheid ideology, there was also the 
danger of overstating the political character of organisations. It may, for example, 
be the case that Comaroff’s inspiring ethnography on the Zion churches of the 
Tshidi was influenced by the tacit political circumstances of research during apart-
heid. According to Comaroff, the church should be interpreted as a form of resis-
tance against apartheid through the alteration of Christian symbols. Schoffeleers 
(1988) argues that the political dimension of these churches was overemphasised. 
In his view, Zion churches were politically conservative, while the causes of 
suffering were dealt with at an individual level with an emphasis on healing. The 
macro-political and structural causes of suffering were generally ignored.5 
Post-apartheid anthropological research is not burdened as much with the need 
to adopt a position vis-à-vis the state. It has become more feasible to study organi-
sations that do not have an explicit political agenda, such as financial mutuals, and 
relate these to the large-scale political transformation. Furthermore, the end of 
apartheid meant that foreign researchers no longer risked being branded collabora-
tors of apartheid, and this opened up new avenues for research. Thus, the political 
transformation allowed a study of ‘invisible’ financial mutuals organised by desti-
tute, marginal, and ‘invisible’ African migrants. 
                                                          
 
5  See also James (1999a: 69-70; 1999b: 23-24) who found that critical anthropologists 
were more open to study political processes, particularly class formation. 
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Contrary to political processes in South Africa that tended to oversee financial 
mutuals, the politics of development has recently paid a lot of attention to financial 
mutuals. The success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh appears to be at the 
heart of a strong belief in the mobilisation of community relations for a market 
oriented approach to poverty.6 Recently, the belief in community and solidarity 
culminated in the declaration of the Year of Microfinance, 2005: ‘The Year’s 
overarching goal is to provide greater access to credit, savings, insurance, transfer 
remittances and other financial services for poor and low-income households in 
order to move towards more secure livelihoods and prosperous futures.’7 Financial 
mutuals are crucial to this approach. According to the UN as well as the World 
Bank, trust, solidarity, norms, and social cohesion should contribute to ‘sustainable 
social and economic development’.8 These elements should, of course, also ensure 
that the poor repay the money to the financial institutions, although this is not 
given a prominent place on the agenda. The poor being poor lack conventional 
collateral such as jobs and property that financial institutions usually demand. 
The recent ‘discovery’ of financial mutuals by development organisations, 
however, is accompanied by over-simplistic ideas about community dynamics, 
such as trust, solidarity and managing one’s money under hostile conditions. 
Moreover, little attention is paid to the political context in which financial mutuals 
are organised and whether these political circumstances are at all relevant to the 
way in which poor people manage their money. 
This book will show how vital large-scale political transformations were, and 
still are, for the establishment and use of financial mutuals. It reveals how financial 
mutuals were migrants’ attempts to hide from politics and instead hope for a better 
future based on strong relations, plenty of money and self-worth. This ethnography 
reveals how financial mutuals were islands of hope for Xhosa migrants surrounded 
by a sea of insecurity, unemployment, murder, rape and social conflict. Migrants 
de-politicised their financial mutuals and created a place where they could feel 
secure and trusted and where money was in their control. The study of financial 
mutuals thus reveals the horrors from which people tried to escape, as well as their 
dreams for the future. 
                                                          
 
6  See Rahman (1999) for a critical analysis. 
7  Press Release 18 November 2004, DEV/2492 OBV/452 ‘UN Launches international 
year of microcredit 2005’ online on  
 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/dev2492.doc.htm 
8  Cited from the World Bank website ‘Social Capital’ dated 12 september 2005, 
 http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELO
PMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,menuPK:401021~pagePK: 149018~piPK:  
 149093~theSitePK:401015,00.html 
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As so often when people try to improve their lives, financial mutuals were not 
always what they promised to be. This study goes beyond the rhetoric of solidarity, 
mutual help and companionship. Just as important for insight into the migrants’ 
lives were the conflicts within financial mutuals, among neighbours, among kin, 
and so on. The financial mutual was not only an island of hope, but also an arena 
of ambivalence. The money was insufficient to help everyone all the time, and 
trust was often an issue. Participants, moreover, used the financial mutuals to 
accumulate money and this highlighted inequality and could lead to jealousy 
among fellow members, neighbours and kin. As migrants used financial mutuals to 
solve some of their economic and social problems, they simultaneously created 
new ones. These dynamic interdependencies of migrants, and particularly those 
related to financial mutuals, are at the core of this study. 
 
 
Financial mutuals in brief 
 
‘Financial mutual’ is an umbrella term for a myriad of collective financial arrange-
ments that are mostly informal. In South Africa, financial mutuals were, and still 
are, known locally as umgalelo, stokvel, savings, gooi-gooi, throw-throw, back-to-
school, umasingcwabane, umasiphekisane, and umasingcedane. Although finan-
cial mutuals are very popular, their informal and ‘apolitical’ nature made it diffi-
cult to know much about the history and the number of participants. Some estimate 
that there were about 150,000 stokvels with an annual turnover of R1.6 billion a 
year, while other sources mention almost ten million people participating in 
800,000 stokvels with an annual turnover of R2.4 billion a year. Yet more research, 
carried out in 1991, came up with other results: about 1,344,000 people partici-
pated in stokvels in the metropolitan area alone. This was just over a quarter of the 
African urban population and the annual turnover of their stokvels was estimated at 
just over R1 billion a year. The different findings could be due to a difference in 
research periods, research techniques, research area, or an unclear definition of the 
type of financial mutuals that were studied.9 Moreover, people do not always want 
to reveal their financial situations. What did become clear, however, was that 
financial mutuals were very common and that many Africans entrusted a sub-
stantial part of their meagre income to financial mutuals. 
 
Burial societies 
Burial societies were very popular. A funeral could easily cost R5,000 or more. 
For a cleaner, employed full-time in the formal sector, this is approximately six 
months’ wages. People spent so much on funerals because they regarded it as very 
                                                          
 
9  See Hashatse (1992: 36-37) and McGregor (1989: 126) on these findings. 
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important to be buried back home in Emaxhoseni, the land of the Xhosa, an area 
roughly comprised of the former homelands Ciskei and Transkei. In order to have 
such a large sum of money available, the migrants organised burial societies. The 
burial society provided money, food, goods, and mutual assistance to a deceased 
member, or to his or her dependants.10 
As long as Africans lived close to home, close-living relatives and well-known 
neighbours could assist the bereaved and make sure that the person was buried 
properly. When in the second half of the 19th century large amounts of gold and 
diamonds were found, many Africans migrated to work as labourers and had to 
leave their families behind due to racial segregation laws. The migration process 
therefore meant that many Africans were separated from their land and families 
(Carter 1986: 345-347; Masuko 1995; Omer-Cooper 1994: 103; Vail 1989: 8-9). 
The migrants formed burial societies as a collective strategy to bring back the 
bodies of the deceased. The emergence of burial societies, therefore, was a result 
of labour migration. 
There were two types of burial societies: burial societies with a fund and burial 
societies without a fund. This distinction led to all kinds of differences as regards 
size, membership criteria, method of payment and forms of assistance. The burial 
societies that did not have a fund were mostly referred to as umasiphekisane (‘let’s 
cook’) or umasingcedane (‘let’s help’).  
The members of the umasiphekisane and the umasingcedane were always 
female neighbours and the activities of these burial societies were regarded as 
women’s responsibilities, which were sometimes laid out in terms of cooking. 
When I asked one of the founders of a umasiphekisane why there were no men, 
she replied: ‘What do men know about cooking?’ which made the other women 
laugh. The name of the organisation reflects the focus on cooking, a skill most men 
did not have, or were not acknowledged to have, and which women were supposed 
to have, even if they could not cook.11 When someone in the neighbourhood died, 
the women would collect money, such as R10, from each household and give the 
money to the grieving family. The women would also help to organise wakes, 
make tea, support the bereaved emotionally, or form a choir for the funeral cere-
mony. 
Burial societies that did have a fund were mostly referred to as 
umasingcwabane (plural oomasingcwabane), which meant ‘let’s bury each 
                                                          
 
10  In the next chapter, I show how burial societies were intertwined with the migratory 
process. Here I limit myself to an introduction of the types of societies that existed 
and how they were established. During the research I collected information on 26 
different burial societies operating in Cape Town. 
11  On another occasion I was able to join an umasiphekisane because neighbours had 
heard from my research assistant that I could cook. 
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other’.12 It was common for these burial societies to have a proper name that 
referred to ideological aspects of the organisation or the people that participated in 
it. An example of the former was Mbuthowamangwane, a burial society ex-
clusively for members of the Mangwane clan. Winterberg Funeral Club derived its 
name from the fact that the founders were all migrants who originated from the 
vicinity of Winterberg in the Eastern Cape. Other proper names highlighted the 
ideological dimension of the organisation, such as Masibambane (‘let’s hold each 
other’), Masekoduke (‘let’s go home’) and Lukhanyiso (‘a bright place’ or ‘some-
thing bright’). 
The members of most burial societies with a fund were migrants from parti-
cular regions in the former homelands of Ciskei and Transkei. Migrants identified 
with fellow migrants from the same region in the Eastern Cape and called them 
abakhaya (sing. Umkhaya).13 Umkhaya literally meant ‘the one from the same 
house’ or home-people. As will become clear in the next chapter, especially under 
apartheid, migrants in Cape Town had to live in hostels where they formed their 
own social networks and organisations around their home area. These abakhaya 
burial societies admitted men and unmarried women from that region. Married 
women were refused because a wife was considered to belong to the home of her 
husband. If she wanted to join an abakhaya burial society, she could only join one 
from her own region. 
The burial societies that consisted of abakhaya had, for example, only members 
from Tsolo, a district in the former Transkei, or only from Ladyfrere, Cala, East 
London, Encobo, or Qobo Qobo. The definitions of who was abakhaya and who 
was not were fairly flexible. For example, Masibonisane (‘let’s show each other’) 
only accepted people from the Ciskei and excluded people from the Transkei.14 
Xhosa migrants could not always choose a burial society. Many burial societies 
were only open to abakhaya or neighbours. 
Burial societies were very flexible in that the members themselves could decide 
on the rules for joining, the fees to be paid, and the type of benefits for members 
and their dependents. If members expressed concern about the regulations at a 
meeting they could also decide to change them, for example to increase the 
monthly fee a little if too many beneficiaries had died. The burial societies that I 
encountered had an average of 550 members that contributed about R20 per 
month. This money was put into a bank account. Sometimes the same amount of 
money was collected for each particular funeral. If a member died, the burial 
                                                          
 
12  In rare cases this also referred to burial societies without a fund, but in most cases 
the term umasingcwabane was automatically associated with a burial society with a 
fund. 
13  See also James (1999a, 1999b) on dancing and singing groups among female 
Tswana migrants. 
14  The notion of abakhaya is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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society, under the guidance of a committee, arranged a coffin, the transport of the 
deceased to the Eastern Cape, and transport for the family members and members 
of the burial society. They would also give money, on average R3250, to the 
berieved family. They would provide similar services – although the cash contri-
bution would be lower – if a member’s dependant died. Depending on the burial 
society this might be a parent, a grandparent, a child, or someone else living in the 
household. 
 
Imigalelo and other ROSCAs 
The term umgalelo (pl. imigalelo) is derived from the verb ukugalela, which 
means ‘to pour’ because the participants, as it were, poured money at the meet-
ings.15 Imigalelo can be classified as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations or 
ROSCAs: 
In the ROSCA, each time that savings are pooled, they are immediately redistributed 
among members in rotation, until each has had his turn and the ROSCA comes to an 
end (Bouman 1994b: 376). 
On a monthly, weekly, or daily basis, the members contributed money or 
presents to the kitty and gave the kitty to the first member. In some ROSCAs, the 
recipient also had to contribute when it was his or her own turn. Money was 
collected again during the next meeting and it was then the second participant’s 
turn to receive the kitty, and so on until everybody had had a turn. If the partici-
pants were satisfied with the arrangement, they could decide to start another cycle, 
possibly with a few new participants or different contributions. 16 
                                                          
 
15  Sometimes they were also referred to as stokvels. The term stokvel, however, 
seemed to be more popular in the Transvaal. In Cape Town, only a particular type of 
umgalelo is sometimes called stokvel, i.e. when the money is spent on the organi-
sation of a profit making party. 
16  These organisations are often referred to as stokvel. Some have pointed out that the 
term stokvel was derived from the 19th-century English Eastern Cape stock fairs 
where cattle was auctioned (Buijs & Atherfold 1995: 6; Hashatse 1992: 126; 
Lukhele 1990: 4). According to Thomas, the term was derived from ‘[a] group of 
men who would pool their money to buy a head of cattle at a stockfair’ (Thomas 
1991: 292). I did not come across historical records that supported this. It could also 
be that ROSCAs were an adaptation of work parties where neighbouring farmers 
worked on each other’s fields, especially during the harvest season. Another possi-
bility is that ROSCAs were spread in South Africa via Indian migrants with similar 
financial arrangements, such as the chit or bishi. But all these options are pure 
speculation. For more material on ROSCAs in South Africa, see Burman & Lembete 
(1995), Hellmann (1934), Kokoali (1986), Kuper & Kaplan (1944, 180-181), Mayer 
& Mayer (1974, 141), Molefe (1996), Moodley (1995), Phillips (1977 [1937], 293-
294), Ross (1990), Verhoef (2001), Wilson & Mafeje (1963: 132-136). 
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The number of ROSCA participants varied from two to a few hundred. It was 
most common, however, to have a different group of ten members that met each 
month. Such a rotation system started at the beginning of the year with everybody 
having had a turn towards the end of the year, ten months later. People often 
started the rotation again and most ROSCAs existed for a few years with alter-
ations to the rules and participants. However, there were also exceptions. In Langa, 
for example, residents founded Masakhane in the 1950s and it was still going in 
the 1990s (Bähre 1996: 22-24). 
On average, the participants contributed R200 to a monthly ROSCA and R60 
to a weekly ROSCA. There were also ROSCAs with much higher contributions, 
like a ‘BMW 518 Stokvel’ where 50 members each contributed R1,000 per fort-
night. The members each received R50,000 in turn and purchased a BMW 518 
(Webb 1989: 27). This ROSCA was an exception that indicates that ROSCAs 
were not only for the poorest of people. Most Africans, however, could hardly 
dream of owning a car. Some ROSCAs also exchanged goods instead of money, 
such as bottles of brandy or other presents. 
The participants would discus who would get which turn. Some members 
expected to need cash at a particular time of the year and preferred a certain 
month. If several participants wanted the same turn, and that was often the first 
turn, the turn was allocated more or less according to seniority. The oldest 
member, who was often also the organiser, could choose.17 Once the ROSCA had 
already started, it was also possible to exchange turns with the consent of the other 
members. 
The ROSCA members mostly met at the recipient’s home, and sometimes at 
the workplace. Large ROSCAs had to arrange a classroom or church building 
because not everyone would fit into the small shack of one their fellow members.18 
Some ROSCAs had very short meetings where the members rushed in and out, 
often handing over envelopes with the contributions from absentees. Some 
members felt that the meetings were a waste of time and were notorious for their 
absenteeism. Other ROSCAs turned their meetings into long and elaborate social 
events. They started with a prayer to ‘open the organisation’ and the women would 
stay afterwards to drink tea or lemonade and talk about organisational matters, 
gossip about neighbours, and express their worries about family issues. Contrary to 
what Hellman (1934) encountered in the past, the participants would not drink 
alcohol. The belief was that financial matters were too serious and should not be 
                                                          
 
17  Contrary to the findings of Buijs & Atherfold (1995: 42), women often preferred to 
have the first turn of the ROSCA. 
18  Only one umgalelo had no meetings. It consisted of three members who worked for 
different companies. They used to meet during their lunch breaks but, due to a re-
scheduling of their timetables, they could not meet each other anymore. Instead of 
meeting, they brought the money to the recipient or let someone bring it for them. 
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mixed with alcohol. In the rare instances that I saw a member drinking alcohol, it 
was done more or less secretly because the other members objected.  
Most ROSCA money was spent on consumer items, such as a refrigerator, 
radio, iron, television, or other ‘clothing for the house’, as furniture was sometimes 
referred to. Some also used it to pay their debts or pay for parties and initiation 
ceremonies. 
 
 
 
Photo 1.1  The money collected by umgalelo members 
 
 
Grocery Clubs and other ASCRAs 
Christmas was the most expensive time of the year. During the summer, around 
December, most Xhosa migrants tried to visit their family and friends in 
Emaxhoseni. Migrants were worried about these visits because they might return 
to Cape Town to find that someone else had taken their job, and because the visit 
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home cost money. A single trip by minibus to the Eastern Cape cost about R360. 
Furthermore, one could not arrive empty handed. After all, parents, brothers, 
sisters, extended family members, and even friends were waiting for the migrant to 
return with money or presents. The economic situation in most parts of the Eastern 
Cape, after all, was depressing. Old people and their dependants could hardly sur-
vive on a government pension of about R450 a month, which was sometimes not 
even paid due to corruption and mismanagement. 
For the migrant and his or her family, it was embarrassing to arrive home 
empty handed. Presents and money were the only way one could show that the 
many lonely months in Cape Town had not been in vain. Most migrants, however, 
received only a low income as a domestic worker or unskilled labourer and were 
often unemployed. This contrasted sharply with the image that relatives and 
migrants maintained of a prosperous life in Cape Town. Many people in the 
Eastern Cape, of course, knew better because they themselves had migrated in the 
past. However, the image of a rich life in Cape Town was supported by the claims 
made by returning migrants. In order to live up to these expectations and to 
comply with some obligations, the migrants had to save money throughout the 
entire year. 
The Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRA, see Bouman 
1994b: 376-377) helped migrants to save. Mostly neighbours and sometimes col-
leagues or friends formed a group and made monthly contributions. The money 
was deposited into a bank account and members were able to borrow money. An 
important difference with the ROSCA was that the ASCRA had a fund that needed 
to be managed. By the end of November or beginning of December, the members 
divided all the ASCRA money so they could afford a respectable visit to 
Emaxhoseni.  
Most of the time, female neighbours formed an ASCRA and, to a lesser extent, 
female colleagues, friends, church members, or men in general. The size of the 
group varied from ten to forty-two members, of which the larger groups tended to 
be divided into smaller subgroups. The subgroups took turns borrowing money 
from the organisation, meaning that not everybody could borrow simultaneously. 
ASCRAs usually started at the beginning of the year, in February. The 
meetings were mostly held on a Saturday or Sunday at the end or the beginning of 
each month, just after the members had received their wages. The contribution was 
often R50, and this was referred to as ‘stage money’, just like in the ROSCA. After 
the stage money had been collected and recorded by a secretary, people paid the 
interest on outstanding debts. 
Once all the money had been collected, it was time for the members to borrow 
again. In a vast majority of ASCRAs, it was obligatory to borrow money in order 
to ‘make the money grow faster’. Some ASCRAs forced their members to borrow 
at least R100 a month, while others limited the loan to ensure that members were 
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not burdened with a debt they could not repay. In some ASCRAs, the members 
had to return the loan by the end of the month, while others forced the member to 
borrow the money for three months, or even allowed them to repay the money any 
time before the end of the year. In the meantime, the members had to pay interest, 
which was usually 20 percent per month. 
The interest rate might seem high, but it was relatively low compared to other 
available sources of credit such as moneylenders or ‘cash loan companies’. More-
over, the interest was to the benefit of the members who divided the money among 
themselves before the end of the year. Some members did not even contribute 
interest. They used the ASCRA loan to give a loan to a neighbour or colleague, 
who then became responsible for the interest. The neighbour or colleague had to 
repay the loan and the interest to the member who in turn brought it to the 
ASCRA. The member remained responsible for paying the ASCRA. 
All but one of the ASCRAs opened a group account, such as a savings account 
or a thirty-two-day notice, at one of the banks in Cape Town or Bellville. The 
treasurer deposited the money and had to show the deposit slip at the next meeting. 
Once the money had been deposited, the ASCRA would not withdraw it to use for 
loans to members. 
At the end of the year, that is at the end of November or in early December, it 
was time to divide the money.19 Outstanding debts were settled or deducted from 
the share. Half of the ASCRAs simply divided the cash, while the other groups 
used the bulk of the money to shop at wholesalers such as Makro and Metro. They 
bought groceries together in bulk. This was not only cheaper (less transport costs 
and better prices), but also less time consuming, and more fun. The women were 
mostly very excited about what each member would receive when the groceries 
were divided. 
 
 
Studying townships 
 
For the Xhosa migrants in Cape Town, it was extremely difficult to be in control of 
their own lives. In the apartheid days, the state severely limited their freedom and, 
after apartheid, violence and poverty made life difficult and a constant struggle. 
The liberation from apartheid has not led to a liberation from violence and desti-
tution. For the Xhosa migrants it was still a constant struggle to gain some control 
over their actions, bodies, relations with others and money. 
Safety issues, as well as the sharp divisions still felt in South Africa today, 
made it a challenge to carry out research in the townships of Cape Town. The 
study of relations among Xhosa migrants meant that I had to engage in volatile, 
                                                          
 
19  One ASCRA was among slightly more affluent residents of Langa (Bähre 1996: 32). 
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constraining, and unpredictable relations myself. Although it was difficult to 
establish relations with Xhosa migrants in the townships, it was the only way to 
examine their lives in a meaningful way. The fieldwork experiences were vital for 
understanding the lives of Xhosa migrants in Cape Town (See also Jenkins 1994; 
Van de Port 1998, 1999; Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1991). 
Although the dangers and insecurities are undeniable there is also a tendency to 
exaggerate them. Drawing on his research experience in Belfast, Sluka writes: 
Fieldwork is possible even in the most dangerous contexts. Anthropologists should not 
select themselves out of research in such contexts on the basis of stereotypes, media 
images, or inadequate information concerning the dangers involved … The dangers are 
often exaggerated, and in most cases they are not insurmountable (1995: 290-291). 
Because of the violence in South Africa, especially in the townships, I con-
stantly needed to address safety issues. Information on political structures, party 
alliances, taxi associations, and development projects was crucial. Knowledge 
about alliances, tensions, and reputations of people and places could be used to 
avoid violence as much as possible. A difficult aspect of threats and dangers was 
its invisibility. The anxieties, fears, and stereotypes that are so vivid and alive 
among many Whites did not help (see also Sluka 1990: 120). I became intimidated 
by the many warnings that I could not do research in the townships, as well as by 
comments and jokes such as ‘do you have an AK-47?’, when I told Whites about 
my research plans. Although I was frequently advised to buy a gun by those not 
familiar with research in the townships, I refused for several reasons. First, a 
weapon is valuable and one increases the risk of becoming a victim of robbery if a 
weapon is spotted. Second, being untrained the weapon could be used against me. 
Third, I might be tempted to stay in a potentially dangerous situation because of 
the false sense of security it provided. Fourth, it would impede the establishment of 
trust and might make it difficult for people to be honest to me. People sometimes 
told me that they had assumed that I carried a gun and were surprised that I did not 
have one, because ‘all Whites carry a gun’ when they are in the townships. The 
absence of a weapon was part of being a different kind of White person, and made 
me less threatening and more trustworthy. 
Generally, Whites and Africans had different understandings as regards the 
risks and dangers, and how one should manage these. Whites frequently seemed to 
suffer from an all encompassing paranoia and anxiety brought on by an amorphous 
enemy. When visualised, this amorphous evil was mostly an unknown and hostile 
male African. Contrary to Whites, Africans tended to keep quiet about violence. If 
violence was discussed, it was in a ‘matter of fact’ way with a focus on the places 
and situations to be avoided. This was based on a detailed topography of places, 
times, and situations that were considered to be dangerous. This knowledge was 
much more valuable to me than the information I received from Whites. After all, 
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the Africans lived in the townships and had to deal with violence much more 
frequently and were therefore much better informed about the risks. 
It took time to read faces, acquire the habit of looking at people inside cars, 
register those around me, and learn to spot someone who was armed. I could not 
have done this without the constant support of my research assistant Edith 
Nokwanele Moyikwa. At the start of the research, a visit to the townships lasting a 
few hours exhausted me. This was due to the intensive looking, listening, and 
moving that is part of fieldwork in a volatile situation. Eventually, I got used to it 
and after my return to the Netherlands I had to unlearn habits that were justified in 
South Africa, but are regarded as signals of paranoia if one lives in a safe place, 
such as the Netherlands. 
Green aptly describes the combination of presence and absence of dangers 
when carrying out research in a potentially dangerous situation: 
While it is true that with repetitiveness and familiarity people learn to accommodate 
themselves to terror and fear, low-intensity panic remains in the shadow of waking con-
sciousness. One cannot live in a constant state of alertness, and so the chaos one feels 
becomes infused throughout the body. It surfaces frequently in dreams and chronic 
illness (Green 1995: 109). 
It might sound banal, but it only takes a few minutes to commit a murder, and 
afterwards life goes on as usual. Even in a violent place like South Africa’s town-
ships, violent acts are mostly short and rarely take place when you are present. 
Therefore, alertness was a much more dominant condition than a short-lived fear 
or terror related to an immediate threat. Whenever I felt uncomfortable or ill at 
ease, or had just experienced a nasty fieldwork situation, I would refrain from 
doing any research for a day. I tried not to rationalise it away because I could not 
find a logical reason, except that people might pick up on my anxiety and act on it. 
The body language of fear and feeling uncomfortable can be read by others and 
may increase the risk of being victimised, while body language which shows 
confidence, comparability and respect towards others contributes to one’s feeling 
of safety (cf. Williams et al. 1992: 350). 
Because of the political dynamics and high occurrence of violence in the 
townships of Cape Town, I invested a lot of energy in establishing the research 
circumstances that minimised risks as much as possible. I could not rely on public 
transport, such as buses, trains, and so-called taxis, which are minibuses with fixed 
routes. For these reasons, it was essential for me to have a car. I did not work 
without my research assistant, Edith, and the furthest I walked without her was 
about fifty meters. To increase safety and receive information, we walked around a 
lot in the neighbourhood. By walking around we were able to start many fruitful 
conversations, exchange gossip, and engage in small talk with those we met on our 
way. This way, I was more visible than I would have been if I had only driven 
around the neighbourhood. My constant visibility helped to take away some of the 
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suspicions that people must have had and it showed that I was a different kind of 
White person, because Whites generally tend to move around by car only.20 
These safety measures inevitably restricted my participation in the lives of the 
Xhosa migrants. I could not reside in the township and instead lived with my 
girlfriend in the White upper-class suburb of Newlands and drove back and forth 
every day. I had planned to live with my research assistant’s family in Indawo 
Yoxolo for some time, but their shack was quite small. I eventually bought build-
ing material for an extra room and lived there for two weeks and had planned to 
stay there more often for a week or so, but violence caused me to abandon these 
plans. Many nights, at times even every night, shooting could be heard right 
behind the shack and it was not unimaginable that a stray bullet would pierce a 
window, a metal sheet, or a piece of cardboard. Nevertheless, my two-week stay in 
Indawo Yoxolo had a positive effect. The neighbours considered it as another sign 
that I was genuinely interested in their lives. For me, it became clearer how 
difficult it is to be surrounded by danger all the time. 
My participation at festive occasions was furthermore limited because of 
drunken people and, once again, the risk of violence. There is this romantic idea in 
anthropology that a great way to connect with people and be accepted by them is 
by getting drunk together. However, it was horrible to attend a graduation cere-
mony where men and women had been drinking beer and brandy for the past 36 
hours. On another occasion, I joined some men drinking beer in a tavern. I ended 
up at the house of a neighbour of a friend of mine whose drunken son had fought 
in Angola for Poqo, the PAC’s (Pan African Congress) armed wing. He felt that he 
had to kill me: ‘One settler one bullet!’, he screamed. He had an argument with his 
drunken mother about killing me and eventually we ended up going through heroic 
pictures of him and his comrades in the battlefield. Sure, we connected at some 
level, but it was just too dangerous to repeat. I never again drank alcohol during 
the research, except when it was ritually prescribed, in which case it would have 
been offensive not to drink a glass of brandy or beer. I also avoided the illegal 
drinking halls known as shebeens, especially in neighbourhoods where customers 
hardly knew each other. 
I learned a bit of Xhosa through language courses and I could exchange 
greetings and talk on a very limited number of topics. My comprehension of the 
language was insufficient for a conversation, yet people often expressed their 
gratitude that a White man was trying to learn some Xhosa in order to greet people 
respectfully. It could make feelings of hostility or threats disappear, and people 
                                                          
 
20  One exception was a White building contractor working in Indawo Yoxolo. He 
would at times bike between building sites that were only a few hundred metres 
apart. Eventually, and not to the surprise of the residents of Indawo Yoxolo, he was 
robbed and killed. Some residents believed that this was organised by some of his 
workers who knew that he was carrying a large sum of money to pay the salaries. 
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often laughed at my clumsy attempts to say something. Sometimes it is useful for 
an anthropologist to look foolish, especially because many migrants often 
struggled with their English. 
The risks and dangers of fieldwork in the townships could be divided into four 
categories: a) being an object for politically motivated threats, b) becoming a 
victim of robbery, car hijacking or assault, c) becoming a victim of hatred against 
Whites, and d) being an ‘unlucky bystander’. In order to limit these risks, I had 
what I would call ‘social shields’, or levels of protection. First, I was associated 
with the University of the Western Cape and people could identify me with a local, 
previously non-white university instead of an unknown Dutch university. Second, 
I was associated with a network of people that formed the political opposition to 
the Big Five (see Chapter 3). The opposition was well informed about the political 
struggles in the area and could warn me if necessary. Third, many neighbours, 
often involved in financial mutuals, knew me well. I made an effort to get 
acquainted with a lot of residents in a particular street and tell them what I was 
doing and who I was. I knew all the residents living in the street in which my 
research assistant Edith lived. This contributed to my safety and enhanced the 
research in general. Finally, Edith’s household functioned as a safe ‘harbour’ 
where I could wait inbetween interviews or meetings, write field notes, have 
coffee, and hear the latest gossip. At one time in Indawo Yoxolo, the political 
network and the safety of the household collapsed and I temporarily had to 
abandon the research. I then focused more intensely on interviews and meetings in 
other parts of Cape Town. Only after the social relations had been somewhat 
restored and the immediate threat of violence was gone could I carefully build up 
the research activities in Indawo Yoxolo again. At other times, Edith and I had to 
leave a meeting because of the hostile atmosphere and aggression, as well as stay 
away from meetings that we felt could be dangerous. 
 
 
Outline 
 
A constant theme throughout the book is the role of money as regards the shifting 
and fragile relations of Xhosa migrants. Financial mutuals should be studied as 
part of post-apartheid society and the question that needs to be asked is if and how 
financial mutuals should be considered as a reaction to, or part of, the many 
threats, insecurities, and anxieties of migrant life. I will, moreover, reflect on the 
relevance of these experiences for the analysis of social situations; how experience 
elucidated interdependencies among migrants, neighbours, kin, and fellow parti-
cipants of financial mutuals. 
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Photo 1.2 The serviced area of Indawo Yoxolo 
 
 
The next two chapters examine the impact that large scale economic and 
political processes had on the type of relations that are fundamental to financial 
mutuals, namely kin, neighbourhood relations, and identification with fellow 
migrants (abakhaya). Chapter two explains the transformation of a subsistence 
economy into a colonial and postcolonial capitalist economy with distinct autho-
rities over old and new sources of wealth. Under the colonial as well as apartheid 
economic regime, flows of money emerged that led to a reconfiguration of inter-
dependencies, particularly of kin, neighbours, and fellow migrants. By examining 
these struggles for (financial) resources it becomes clear why financial mutuals 
emerged the way they did. Chapter three examines the presence of the post-
apartheid economy in Indawo Yoxolo through an all-encompassing development 
project. Vast amounts of resources were distributed through a national state-driven 
development project that again led to a reconfiguration of local relations in which 
financial mutuals had to operate.21 These two chapters make it possible to 
conceptualise financial mutuals within the threatening triad of violence, economic 
insecurity, and volatile relations.  
Chapters four, five and six concern the three core dimensions of financial 
mutuals, namely solidarity, trust, and eventually spending the money, mostly on 
                                                          
 
21  The objection against concepts such as ‘reconfiguration’ and ‘transformation’ to 
describe economic transformation is that these tend to assume that there is a parti-
cular fixed state that is followed by a process towards a new fixed state. 
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consuming. Chapter four highlights the dynamics of solidarity on which inclusion 
and exclusion are based. For financial mutuals to be established one had to coope-
rate with people one hardly knew. Why and how were some people excluded? 
Rumour and values were pivotal for exclusion, but people did not always agree 
with each other, or had diverging interests or ambivalent relations. What do the 
limits of solidarity say about identification with fellow migrants? These questions 
will be examined in chapter four. Chapter five examines trust among members of 
financial mutuals who live in a society where there are many reasons not to trust 
one another. Why do members trust each other and what are the limits to trust? 
After all, the mutuals had no legal foundation. Violence, economic insecurity and a 
climate of distrust made it difficult to give a lot of money to the financial mutual. 
Chapter six reveals the dynamics of consumption that are fundamental to the 
establishment of financial mutuals. Virtually all the money was used for con-
sumption and hardly ever for housing and even less frequently for business 
purposes. It was puzzling that poor people spent so much money on refrigerators, 
stoves, cooking utensils, funerals, and initiation parties. The dynamics of keeping, 
receiving, and giving consumer products had an impact on the kind of relations 
maintained inside and outside the financial mutual. This chapter reveals why 
consumption uncovers a disharmonious world hidden behind the image of finan-
cial mutuals as warm, cosy, and sweet women’s groups. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The (post)colonial economy  
and social relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to locate financial mutuals within society, one must consider the impact 
that capitalism, the apartheid state, and the post-apartheid state have had on the 
Xhosa economy and the constitution of social relationships. Indeed, pre-colonial 
Xhosa society was also subject to change and problematic relationships,1 but the 
introduction of money concomitant with the arrival of colonialism and capitalism 
led to particularly drastic renegotiations of relations (see Beinart 1982; Hunter 
1933). In an environment in which new sources of income had been generated, 
migration was first and foremost about cash. The demographic shift which resulted 
altered kin and neighbourhood relations while new and innovative relations, such 
as financial mutuals, emerged. The historicity of money and relationships needs to 
be examined first, since it shows how financial mutuals emerged. 
The political economic change was one from a kin-ordered mode of production 
to one in which the capitalist mode of production became important. A kin-ordered 
mode of production meant that kinship relations were central to social labour: ‘Put 
simply, through kinship social labor is “locked up”, or “embedded”, in particular 
relations between people. This labour can be mobilized only through access to 
people, such access being defined symbolically’ (Wolf 1982: 91). Due to capitalist 
                                                          
 
1  See Wolf’s central argument (1982). 
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expansion, the capitalist mode of production started to play a major role. 
Capitalists were in control of the means of production while labourers had to sell 
their labour power to capitalists, often at a low price (Wolf 1982: 77-78). These 
modes of production did not necessarily present different types of society, or 
evolutionary stages. Instead they should be regarded as ‘constructs with which to 
envisage certain strategic relationships that shape the terms under which human 
lives are conducted’ (Wolf 1982: 100) 
Among the Xhosa in South Africa, three types of relations were most clearly 
affected by economic change, namely kin, abakhaya, and neighbours. First, I will 
briefly highlight the incorporation of the Xhosa people into the colonial and apart-
heid political economy. Second, the impact on relations among kin, neighbours, 
and abakhaya will become clear. How did migration change relations or lead to 
new ones? How could particular types of relations offer the social constraint 
necessary to accumulate large sums of money? 
 
 
Earning money 
 
As early as 1777, Xhosa worked in the Cape Colony as domestic and agricultural 
servants, and sometimes as slaves. In return, they were paid in ‘beads, brass-ware 
and brass plates, and sometimes in articles of clothing’ (Gardner 1835: 174 cited in 
Cock 1980: 174). Slavery was abolished in 1834, but the many economic and 
political pressures forced Xhosa men and women to start or continue working as 
wage labourers or offered them new economic opportunities. The colonial con-
quest by the British army in the mid-nineteenth century forced many Xhosa off 
their lands and led to the foreign control of Xhosa chiefs. The occupation of land 
and subjugation of chiefs made it increasingly difficult for them to survive on land 
and livestock. The spread of lung sickness among cattle in 1855 contributed to a 
further collapse of the Xhosa economy and society ‘killing two-thirds of the stock 
in some areas and virtually wiping out the herds of even cattle-rich chiefs’ (Ross 
1999: 51). For most, it became impossible to maintain a subsistence economy. 
The rise of a millenarian prophecy in the mid 1800s revealed, as well as further 
intensified, the already desperate economic situation. According to a young girl 
named Nongqawuse, the ‘end of the world’ as they knew it could be stopped. She 
prophesised that their lives would change for the better if they destroyed the 
harvest and remaining cattle. Only total destruction would cause the Whites to 
leave, grain pits to fill up, and herds of cattle to return. Her prophecy led to the 
mass destruction of cattle and grain in 1857 and caused a tremendous human 
tragedy (Ross 1999: 51-52; see also Peires 1989). According to historical sources, 
between 20,000 and 40,000 Xhosa died of starvation and incidences of canniba-
lism have even been reported (Cock 1980: 202; Ross 1999: 52). 
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Natural disasters, especially the droughts of 1876 to 1878 and 1912 (Cock 
1980: 203; Beinart 1982: 75-78), and rinderpest epidemics resulted in a continued 
destruction of the Xhosa subsistence economy. Beinart (1982) described how in 
Pondoland the 1912 drought and East Coast fever spread by ticks brought about 
the deaths of cattle on a huge scale. In roughly five years (from 1911 to 1915) the 
number of cattle plunged from almost 280,000 to just over 54,000. A main source 
of income was thus lost and the use of cattle for the establishment of conjugal and 
affinal relations must have been under serious threat. To prevent further spread of 
East Coast fever, the movement of cattle was severely restricted and cattle dipping 
was introduced. In 1915, a cattle dipping tax of five shilling was introduced, but 
regular cattle dipping was only enforced in around 1920. These measures 
(restricted movement and the dipping of cattle) resulted in an increase in cattle 
numbers, which in turn caused different problems. The increase in the number of 
cattle, combined with the restrictions on transport for cattle to other markets, led to 
a decline in the price of cattle by the end of the decade. The decreasing income 
levels must have been felt even more harshly due to the taxation per homestead 
which had already been introduced in 1895. Due to the vulnerability of agriculture, 
failure of cash crops, starvation of cattle, and taxation, young men decided to leave 
their homes and work in the mines, cities, or White-owned farms (Beinart 1982: 
36, 75-78, 94, 173). In the first half of the 20th century the scale of labour 
migration was already massive:  
According to the 1936 Census Report, about 54 percent of the adult male population of 
the reserves was absent … over half the Keiskammahoek [a district in the Ciskei] popu-
lation consisted of those too old, too young, or too ill to earn wages (Bundy 1979: 225). 
Whatever was left of land and cattle was further threatened by apartheid’s 
‘betterment schemes’ that started in the 1930s (Wilson & Ramphele 1994: 220). 
‘Betterment schemes’ were a euphemism for forced villigisation: ‘the movement 
of people into villages, the excising of old lands and the demarcation of new fields, 
the establishment of grazing camps, and nothing more’ (McAllister 1996: 13). 
Particularly in the former Ciskei, I came across villages that at first glance 
appeared to be remote, picturesque, subsistence-based communities, but which 
were actually rural slums created through betterment. During a funeral in such a 
small and remote village, I asked a resident how old the village was, to which he 
replied: ‘Oh, this village is very old. It was built in the early 1960s.’ 
Apart from the loss of land and cattle, new consumption patterns also made it 
more attractive to engage in wage labour. Colonial authorities purposefully 
attempted to incorporate Africans into the colonial economy by introducing new 
consumer products (Burke 1996). They regarded Africans as a potential market for 
goods like soap and clothing and attempted to ‘civilise’ them by promoting desires 
that were thought to have been absent during the pre-colonial past. The new 
consumer products could only be purchased with cash obtained through wage 
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labour, which was to the advantage of colonial authorities in search of cheap 
workers (Burke 1996: 83-90).2 
To give an example of the loss of livelihood that finally occurred, in the early 
1980s in the Libode district of the Transkei more than half the population had no 
cattle at all, while only 10 percent owned more than ten animals (Wilson & 
Ramphele 1994: 72).3 An African female wage labourer expressed the increased 
reliance on cash in the following way: ‘We [Africans] can cope. You can put a 
black person in the forest and just leave water with him or her. We can manage 
because there is a lot we can do. But now we are chained without money’ (Cock 
1980: 109). 
Conquest incorporated Xhosa into the colonial and postcolonial economy and 
simultaneously marginalised them within this economy: wages were low and 
working conditions were horrible. Furthermore, legislative measures introduced as 
early as 1828 restricted the free movement of Xhosa in order to regulate the flow 
of African labourers (Cock 1980: 204). Migrants in Cape Town initially lived 
scattered across the city’s poorest areas. However, by the end of the 19th century 
they were forced to live away from Whites in townships on the outskirts of Cape 
Town (Cole 1987: 5; Ross 1999: 97-98). 
Influx Control, as these policies on the restriction of African movement and 
labour were called, forced Africans to live in a few reserves which, in 1926, 
comprised no more than 13 percent of South Africa (Ross 1999: 88). The Urban 
Areas Act of 1923 restricted the number of Africans allowed to reside in urban 
areas by deporting ‘those who were habitually unemployed, those who had no 
honest livelihood, and those who were idle, dissolute, or disorderly’ (Davenport 
1969 in Wilson 1972: 160). Between 1954 and 1985, Cape Town was governed by 
yet another policy restricting African movement, namely the Coloured Labour 
Preference Policy. It had to make sure that the city would be virtually unoccupied 
by Africans: ‘The intention of the Department of Native Affairs was to phase 
Africans out of the Western Cape … and incorporate Coloureds by giving them 
labour preference’ (Goldin 1987: 87). 
The implementation of the racist labour policies depended to some extent on 
the demand for labourers. From 1968 to 1974, an increased demand for labour led 
to a loosening of the enforcement of these policies. During the economic recession, 
                                                          
 
2  It seems that Burke overemphasises the power of colonial authorities in the trans-
ference of taste. In addition to force, one can imagine that, similarly as has been 
described among the maroons in Suriname (Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 
1991: 24) new consumer products were eagerly embraced. 
3  Based on Hendricks’ ‘preliminary notes on land and livestock in Libode’. N = 
12,854. Research in 1974 in the Transkei revealed that ‘almost half the households 
surveyed owned no cattle at all’ (Leeuwenberg 1977: 2 in Bundy 1979: 229). The 
survey took place among 757 households. 
 THE (POST)COLONIAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 27 
 
repression was enforced more severely (Cole 1987: 9). Labour policy was, how-
ever, not always carried out according to an economic rationale. For example, in 
the 1960s, the government had decided that the number of Africans in the Western 
Cape had to be reduced by 5 percent per year. White farmers were upset and 
feared a shortage of skilled farm labourers. Their protests were put aside and the 
number of Africans was reduced, notwithstanding their economic necessity 
(Wilson 1972: 19-20). 
Against the background of the enforcement of legally embedded discrimina-
tion, migrant labour became pivotal for survival: ‘In 1929, 46.6 percent of the 
taxes paid by residents in Pondoland were collected outside the home district of the 
payer, showing that at least that percentage of males over 18 years were away from 
home’ (Hunter 1979: 108). In the Ciskei and the Transkei, households continued to 
depend on remittances from migrant labourers. For example, in 1982, in house-
holds with less than an annual income of R1,500, two thirds of the income came 
from such remittances (Wilson & Ramphele 1994: 62-63). War, taxation, slavery, 
the introduction of new consumer products, political domination, ‘betterment 
schemes’, in combination with natural disasters such as droughts and cattle dis-
eases, have made it inevitable, and desirable, to have money in contemporary 
South Africa. 
Together with the mines, the cities were believed to be the places to go to in 
search of money. Data on the composition of the urban population are notoriously 
unreliable and frequently contradictory. One of the causes is that many Africans 
defied apartheid legislation and lived in the city illegally. Therefore, they had good 
reason to hide from a population census.4 Government authorities also modified 
the numerical representation of Africans in Cape Town for administrative pur-
poses. It followed that those who did not officially exist did not need public 
services and, therefore, the urban African population was intentionally underesti-
mated (Lee 1999: 60). Bearing these precautions in mind, the available data 
indicate that the African population in Cape Town grew, despite apartheid legis-
                                                          
 
4  An example of these problems can be found in Wilson & Ramphele’s book (1994: 
92). They compared unemployment among Africans in Durban and Cape Town. In 
Durban’s townships, depending on the definition of unemployment, between 16 and 
29 percent of Africans were unemployed. In Cape Town, this was a remarkably low 
6 to 9 percent. At the time of the survey in 1982-3 the pass laws were still enforced 
in Cape Town, while they were not enforced in Durban. This, according to Wilson 
& Ramphele, explains the lower level of unemployment in Cape Town. They argue 
that the restrictive pass laws discouraged Africans to move to Cape Town. It could 
also be, however, that the pass laws inhibited African migrants from telling the truth 
about their illegal employment status and therefore create the false impression that 
unemployment in Cape Town was low. 
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lative efforts to prevent this.5 Because of the desperate economic situation, many 
Africans continuously tried to find employment outside the homeland at the risk of 
being caught, detained, fined, and sent back to the Bantustans. 
For African women, it was even more difficult to live in the city than for 
African men. The Bantu Urban Areas Act of 1964 ruled that women had to receive 
permission to join their husband in the city. Furthermore, if a ‘section 10 woman’ 
– a woman permitted to live in the city under section 10 of this act – were to marry 
a ‘homeland man’, the apartheid state would force her to leave the city and join her 
husband in ‘his homeland’. In the house of assembly in 1969, Froneman, who later 
became the Deputy Minister, defended the discrimination of women by arguing 
that one ‘must not be burdened with superfluous appendages such as wives, 
children and dependants who could not provide service’ (Cock 1980: 245). In 
1911, in Greater Cape Town there were almost four African men for every African 
woman, and this number had decreased to two African men for every woman by 
1951 (Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 5).6 Most women lived in the city illegally, could 
not work legally, and often had no place to stay and depended heavily on their 
husbands. Consequently, the status of women in the city was much more insecure 
than that of men (see, among others, Oliver-Evans 1993: 70-81; Ramphele 1989).  
In 1986, the Abolition of Influx Control Act put an end to numerous apartheid 
laws that restricted the movement and labour of Africans. The inability to enforce 
the pass laws and, finally, the abolition of these laws in 1986, made it easier for 
African men and women to search for a job in the city (see Robertson 1990). This 
led to a distinct transformation in the urban demographic landscape. 
                                                          
 
5  According to Monica Wilson & Archie Mafeje (1963: 2), in 1911 only roughly 
1,500 Africans (1.5 percent of the urban population) lived in Cape Town. This figure 
increased to just over 30,000 (8 percent) by 1946 and, according to Francis Wilson 
(1972: 70) 55,000 Africans were living in Cape Town by 1971. The number of pass 
law contraventions provides another indication of levels of urbanisation and the 
attempts by the state to control African migrants. The number of pass law contra-
ventions in South Africa rose from just under 50,000 in 1921 to more than 600,000 
in 1970 (Wilson 1972: 232). And ‘[I]n greater Cape Town … between 1962 and 
1967 the number of people convicted rose by over 80 [percent] from 8,434 to 
15,367’ (Wilson 1972: 164). 
6  Lee (1999: 67) shows how, in Langa, the female population decreased between 1965 
and 1970 due to the council’s policy to make Langa a township for male bachelor 
migrants. As a consequence of this policy, the male to female population ratio rose 
as high as 6.3:1 in 1970. Ramphele (1989: 399) found that in the mid 1980s the male 
to female ratio among hostel dwellers was 2:1. In the Transkei, the ratio had fallen 
from 73 men per 100 women in 1946 to 66 men per 100 women in 1974. The 
decline in the number of men and women in the age group 25-29 years was even 
stronger: from 36.1 to 28.9 men per 100 women (Clark & Ngovese 1975 in Bundy 
1979: 229-230). 
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The African urban population increased rapidly after the abolishment of apart-
heid, thus contributing to the already existing housing problems.7 Population 
growth combined with a housing shortage meant that the poverty in which most 
Africans lived slowly became visible to the Whites living in Cape Town. During 
the apartheid era, townships were, to most Whites, places one only saw from far 
off while driving along the highway. For example, Langa, the oldest township in 
Cape Town that still exists today, could only be seen in the distance when driving 
along the N2 highway. A few hundred metres of grassland used to separate the 
highway from the township. Another attempt by the apartheid government to 
conceal the poverty was to place the better houses on the side lining the highway, 
while the worst housing conditions remained in the interior areas and invisible to 
Whites passing by in their cars. In an attempt to camouflage the presence of 
Africans even further, the power station in Langa was, and still is, called Athlone 
Power Station, after the adjacent Coloured area, Athlone. In recent years, the 
townships have become more visible. In 1995, one could see how Africans used 
the grass fields between the townships and the highway to build their makeshift 
dwellings, made of corrugated iron, wood, cardboard, plastic, or other affordable 
building materials. Given this particular history it is quite ironic that, in 2005, a 
large-scale housing project started along this same N2 highway that connects the 
international airport to the city. A strip of shacks is to be demolished and replaced 
by flats which will obstruct the view that tourists arriving for the 2010 soccer 
World Cup would otherwise have of the poor housing conditions. 
Influx Control discriminated against women in particular and forced many 
women to stay in the Bantustan and rely on the remittances sent by their husbands. 
Remittances, however, were frequently irregular, insufficient, or not forthcoming 
at all (cf. James 1999a: 77; Moodie 1988: 251). After Influx Control was abol-
ished, many women left the Bantustans. While urban female-headed households 
had been relatively few in number due to apartheid policies, they started to 
increase due to the arrival of many migrant women.8 A conjugal familial unit – a 
husband and wife living together, perhaps with children – was less prevalent, and 
                                                          
 
7  Ramphele has calculated that the average bed occupancy – people sharing one bed – 
in the single sex hostels in three African townships of Cape Town (Nyanga, 
Guguletu, and Langa) in the mid 1980s was 2.8. In the hostels of Nyanga on 
average, every four residents had to share one bed among each other (Ramphele 
1989: 396). 
8  ‘Forty percent of the children had lived apart from their fathers for 48 percent of 
their lives’, reports Reynolds (1989: 35) on children living in the squatter camp 
Crossroads in Cape Town in the 1980s. In Crossroads it was relatively easy to live 
with fathers compared with the male bachelor hostels, which made it likely that 
children spent even less time overall with their fathers. 
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the absence of husbands meant that many children were illegitimate according to 
civil or customary law (Burman & Lembete 1995: 28, 46; Longmore 1959). 
The above does not provide a complete picture of the impact of the changing 
political economy and the introduction of money. My aim, however, has only been 
to delineate the general process of colonial conquest and capitalist economy (espe-
cially the introduction of money, wage labour, taxation, new consumer items, war, 
apartheid legislation), and the impact of natural disasters (drought, lung disease 
among cattle, East Coast fever). The political and economic changes had a tremen-
dous impact on the livelihoods of the Xhosa, sources of income, household rela-
tions, and conceptions of the world. They also led to financial mutuals that were at 
the crossroads of three very important types of relationships (kin, abakhaya, and 
neighbours) and money. 
 
 
Changing kinship authorities 
 
Pressure on land, the demise of cattle, and an increasing reliance on migrant labour 
put all kinds of pressures on people who depended on each other. Young men, 
women, and children could earn an income and gained certain freedoms.9 These 
new sources of income helped them to escape certain inequalities, but simulta-
neously led to new forms of oppression. Similar to Wolf’s (1999) interpretation of 
the gift giving institution of the potlatch among the North American Kwakiutl, 
new income generating activities and drastic political changes gave previously 
marginal people the opportunity to acquire status and challenge dependencies. 
A major change was that homesteads (imizi) became smaller due to land 
shortage, which in turn was brought about by foreign conquest (Beinart 1982: 98). 
In the 1930s there were people who still remembered that homesteads used to 
consist of up to twenty married men with their wives and children, while in the 
1930s a homestead had the characteristics of a nuclear family (Hunter 1933: 273). 
The introduction of the plough had made large homesteads with its many female 
labourers less essential for economic survival. When a Xhosa chief was confronted 
with a plough he expressed the changing relationship between labour and techno-
logical innovation as ‘[t]his thing that the white people have brought into the 
country is as good as ten wives’ (Hunter 1979: 202). 
The way in which hut tax and dipping tax were levied also stimulated home-
steads to become smaller. Hut tax was levied on the number of huts – with each 
wife occupying a hut – within a homestead and the head of the homestead was 
responsible for paying this tax. It put him in a precarious situation. Although he 
                                                          
 
9  See, among others, Comaroff & Comaroff (1990) on South Africa, Geschiere (1983) 
on Cameroon, and Hutchinson (1996) on Sudan. 
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had to pay the tax, also for the wives of his sons, it was difficult for him to lay 
claim to his sons’ wages. The tax made it financially more attractive for the head-
man to let his sons establish their own homesteads and let them pay their own 
taxes. From 1913-1915, the administration enforced an additional ‘dipping tax’ on 
cattle treated against East Coast fever. The dipping tax depended on the number of 
adult men living in the homestead and homesteads with few male members paid 
less tax (Beinart 1982: 98). 
In addition to reasons of tax, homesteads also became smaller because men left 
in search of jobs. People’s reliance on kin relations therefore steadily decreased, in 
a trend aggravated by forced resettlement. Instead of being able to rely on kin, 
Xhosa households were increasingly confronted with, and dependent on, neigh-
bours who were not related to them (Hunter 1979: 60; McAllister 1985: 130). 
Among other initiatives, neighbours established co-operative work arrangements, 
such as the ploughing company where they assisted each other during the agricul-
tural cycle (McAllister 2000). The dependency on neighbours was also reflected in 
ritual practices: 
The increase in [ritual] beer drinking, probably gradually from about the 1920s 
onwards, coincided with, reflected and provided normative or ideological support for 
the changing nature of rural production, in which neighbourhood and a sense of 
community replaced kinship as the major organising principle. Neighbourliness did not 
arise as a new social principle, but became more important as the kinship system 
weakened (McAllister 1997: 306). 
There are contradictions in the literature on the consequences of these changes 
for relations established by marriage. Before cash income played a major role, 
marriage took place through the transference of bridewealth (ukulobola). Accord-
ing to Hunter (1933: 263) most marriages were not arranged, and if they were 
arranged it was with the consent of the lovers. However Hunter, and others, also 
described the practice of ukutwala, which was the kidnapping of the bride with her 
parents’ consent but not necessarily with the bride’s consent (Hunter 1979: 189; 
Laubscher 1959: 266; Moodie 1988: 239).10 An older woman in Cape Town told 
me that she had been lured into marriage with a bicycle that she received for her 
birthday. She was very pleased with this marvellous gift and went for a bicycle 
ride with her brothers. It was a big shock for her when she ended up in a nearby 
village where she was forced to marry a complete stranger. 
Parental control over conjugal relations was also reflected in the control over 
marriage cattle. Hunter described how each daughter was allocated to a son. This 
practice was called ukushaka, which means ‘to link’ or ‘to put together’. The 
lobola that was received when a daughter married was allotted to this specific son. 
This meant that the marriage of a man greatly depended on the marriage of his 
                                                          
 
10  See also Hammond-Tooke (1962: 100-102) on consentient and forced marriage. 
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sister and the allotment by his parents (Hunter 1979: 122-123). However, Kuper 
argued that in the period from 1880-1930 the Xhosa were an exception in the 
region because they did not practise allotment (Kuper 1982: 36). But even if 
ukushaka was not commonly practised, lobola did enhance parental control over 
young men and women. Moreover, cattle were a constitutive element of the 
establishment of parental rights over children: lobola incorporated the wife’s 
children into the father’s patrilineage. 
The advantage of bridewealth payments was that it connected the wife’s 
parents to their daughter’s in-laws and gave them the authority to intervene in 
marital disputes: 
‘Well, if you are not lobola, what do you do when your husband mistreats you, since 
you have no home (ikhaya) to run to?’ Any home that has benefited from a woman’s 
ikhazi is bound to give her support and protection, and women frequently take 
advantage of this right by running back to their own people (Hunter 1933: 263).  
Women often had good reasons to run away from their affines. Their new 
homes were strange and many felt that the practice of ukuhlonipa, or avoidance, 
was degrading to them, even if they agreed with it from a moral point of view.11 A 
wife had to show respect by avoiding words, names, and letters that related to her 
husband’s clan. She was given a new name which, if the woman was unlucky, was 
not flattering. She had to behave respectfully towards her husband’s relatives by 
walking slowly, talking softly, often by sitting on a mat on the floor instead of on a 
chair, and through strict dress codes. 
Because of virilocal residency, a married woman was, and still is, an outsider 
within her husband’s homestead. As a relative stranger, a woman was felt to be 
dangerous (Hammond-Tooke 1962: 113; Hunter 1933: 267). Consequently, her 
affinal relations were particularly vulnerable to witchcraft. Many of the witchcraft 
allegations concerned the relation between a woman and her husband’s brother’s 
son and, according to Wilson, especially between a woman and her mother-in-law 
(Hammond-Tooke 1970: 30-31; Wilson 1952: 173 in Hammond-Tooke 1970: 30). 
Wage labour provided new forms of economic power and marginalised the use 
of cattle for the establishing of kin relations. As young people earned cash, 
parental authority over them was undermined and elderly men had less to say 
about their marriage. Young people did not depend on their fathers or a chief for 
marriage cattle and instead bought their own. Consequently, elders complained 
                                                          
 
11  For a detailed description of ukuhlonipa among the Xhosa in 1979, see Kuckertz 
(1997). A shortcoming of his structural analysis is that the author fails to note the 
contestations around this practice. For many of the women I spoke with, the practice 
of ukuhlonipa was an important reason not to get married. See also Mager (1999: 
178-179) for a critical examination of ukuhlonipa among the Xhosa in the period 
1945-1959. 
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that they were no longer respected. Although wage labour led to the financial inde-
pendence of young men, their prolonged absence during labour migration also 
made men more hesitant to set up their own homesteads (umzi) and, as an 
alternative, left their wives with their parents (Beinart 1982: 96-103; Hunter 1933: 
270; 1979: 59-60: 177). The lobola payments in cattle were replaced by lobola 
payments in money that was still spoken of as cattle. Marriage negotiations still 
made use of vocabulary steeped in cattle terms and the monetary value of 
particular beasts was negotiated (cf. Comaroff & Comaroff 1990: 209). 
At this stage, parents had some control over the marriage of their children, but 
because marriages rarely took place parental control over their children’s choice of 
partners started to weaken.12 For example, in the 1930s in East London, over half 
the children were illegitimate, both according to civil and customary law (Hunter 
1933: 273). Hunter attributed these findings to the high costs of children in a 
money economy, while children in a subsistence economy contributed through 
labour. The illegitimacy of children could also be due to the weakening paternal 
control over children due to declining flows of cattle that established or confirmed 
conjugal relations between spouses and consanguineal relations with children. 
The demise of lobola, as well as the increased physical distance between the 
homestead of the wife’s parents and that of her affines, made it difficult for a 
woman to involve her parents in a dispute. As a husband was often away working 
as migrant labourer, married women were frequently left under the control of his 
parents or brothers. Civil marriage might also have contributed to the marginalised 
position of women since it meant that marriages could take place without parental 
involvement and this may have made it very difficult for parents to intervene in 
disputes that their daughter might have with her husband and her in-laws. 
At the same time, financial autonomy also gave women new freedom to choose 
a partner and decide to marry. In general, women told me, they were reluctant to 
marry because it would subject them to affines. A boyfriend was regarded as a 
better option because he could be left much easier. This, of course, had conse-
quences for relationships between fathers and children (Bähre 2002b). As Bank 
found among the Xhosa in East London: ‘[F]atherhood is conceptualised in very 
materialistic terms – the image of a ‘good father’ is a man who can support his 
family financially’ (Bank 1997: 175).13 Unemployment, the decline of marriage 
                                                          
 
12  It might be that, similarly to the Nuer, cattle bought with money that was earned 
through labour migration was less vulnerable to claims from the extended family 
than cattle that had a ‘social origin’ (marriage and inheritance) (Hutchinson 1996: 
26, 89-90). See also Geschiere’s (1983: 629) observation that, notwithstanding 
drastic economic changes among the Maka in Cameroon, the elders were, at least 
formally, pivotal in the negotiation of bridewealth. 
13  See also Sharp & Spiegel (1985) who compare the erosion of kinship and neigh-
bourhood relations in two villages. 
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and lobola, their fears of independent women, and the man’s inability to control 
his wife’s sexual behaviour during his absence made it difficult for men to assert 
fatherhood. Women frequently had the sole responsibility over their children. 
Thus, the distribution of income between a husband and wife, or girlfriend and 
boyfriend, became increasingly contested (Bähre 2002b). 
A migrant man often had to leave his wife in the care of his brother (see also 
Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 84). This arrangement was prone to tensions because 
many migrants feared that, during their absence, their brother would sleep with 
their wives. Tensions between brothers also increased if a younger brother had to 
hand over his income to his father, which would later be inherited by the oldest 
brother (Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 84). However, as far as I could see during my 
research, many parents were so poor that nothing substantial could be inherited. 
Nevertheless, the fear of one sibling ‘stealing’ the inheritance, even if it was not 
there, was vivid. 
The tensions with – and often the absence of – brothers and fathers meant that 
migrant men had to rely more on others: 
The effect of these conflicts [between full brothers] appears to be that a man feels more 
free with his home-boys than with his brothers or parallel cousins; there are fewer 
strings attached to co-operation with them. Between sisters, and brothers and sisters, 
there are no similar rivalries, and relationships between them are easy in the changing, 
as in the tribal, society (Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 84). 
Niehaus’ (1994: 118) research among residents of the Qwaqwa district revealed 
that, ‘in Southern Africa, it is rather siblings who stay together while conjugal 
pairs are dispersed’. Spouses were often away as migrant labourers and many 
relations had broken up, which meant that support among siblings became more 
important but also more prone to conflict. 
 
 
Migrant men of one home 
 
While kinship dependencies changed, or even broke down, new social networks 
emerged. Not in the least, brutal apartheid legislation led to new relations by 
dividing Africans into two categories.14 One category of Africans was allowed to 
stay permanently in the city, while other Africans were under strict control of the 
labour bureau and were only allowed in for the duration of their employment (Lee 
1999: 16-18). African ‘migrants’ were only allowed to live in overcrowded male 
hostels and had to leave their families back home. Wilson & Ramphele (1994: 
128) provided the following description of living conditions in the 1980s: 
                                                          
 
14  Section 10 of The Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 was 
particularly important. 
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There are many men in South Africa whose address is not some street number identi-
fying a house, nor even a room number to locate where he might stay in a boarding 
house, but a bed number to identify where he may be found in a maze of concrete bunks 
which accommodate perhaps 90 men in a single room. 
The apartheid administration strengthened the regrouping of Africans. Africans 
who came from one area, which made them identify each other as abakhaya (singl. 
umkhaya) or ‘those of one home’, were forced to live in one room in a specifically 
designated barrack. Each room had its own official registration number and people 
from one particular area, such as the Umtata district in the former Transkei, were 
forced to share one room. The residents would often paint the area code of the 
licence plate, such as CCY for Umtata, on the door to indicate their place of origin 
(Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 50). In line with the logic of indirect rule, each room had 
to elect a convenor (isibonda) who was recognised by the local township autho-
rities. The convenor was responsible for managing disputes within the room and 
could be called upon for disciplinary evictions (Ramphele 1989: 396-397).15 Many 
Xhosa migrants also lived illegally in the city in overcrowded squatter camps 
where they were subjected to police harassment (see for example Cole 1987). 
Nevertheless, the clustering of ‘those of one home’ (abakhaya) in one room must 
have had an important effect on their organisations. 
Pressures from family and friends back home also strengthened these abkahaya 
identifications. For those who stayed behind in Emaxhoseni, literally ‘the land of 
the Xhosa’, there was always the fear that the migrant worker would fail to return 
with the desperately needed cash: ‘The special nightmare of Xhosa peasant 
families … is ukutshipha, absconding – the vanishing of a man in town, leaving 
his kin at home without money remittances and without news of him’ (Mayer & 
Mayer 1974: 179). For a migrant worker’s wife, it was virtually impossible to 
                                                          
 
15  In their influential book Townsmen or Tribesmen, Philip & Iona Mayer (1974) fail to 
take apartheid legislation and rule into consideration in their analysis of the differ-
ence between ‘townsmen’ and ‘tribesmen’, ‘read’ and ‘school’ people. They fail to 
mention the legal position of the convenor (isibonda) and ignore the legal distinction 
between residents and migrants under Section 10, although it must have been an 
important dimension of processes of identification and social organisation. In a dis-
cussion of their work, Bank wrote that ‘The abaqaba [‘red’, ‘traditional’] migrants 
completely rejected these urban social institutions and set out to ‘encapsulate’ 
themselves in close-knit, social networks based on their links with amakhaya (home-
mates) in town’ (Bank 1999: 397). However, this ‘rejection’ of urban social institu-
tions took place within the context of apartheid legislation that forced Africans out 
of the cities, or designated them to live in specific rooms in the barracks based on 
their place of origin. In his fierce critique of the work of the Mayers, Magubane 
(1973: 1713) wrote: ‘The “urban/tribal” antithesis must not be studied separately 
from its social context, but rather in its economic, technological and political set-
ting’. 
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make a successful claim to her husband’s wage. Therefore, whenever a migrant 
left, his neighbours and village elders stressed the importance of remittances at 
public beer drinking rituals. The speakers reminded the migrant that he depended 
on them and was leaving in order to build the homestead in a material, religious, 
social, and moral sense (McAllister 1980: 208). A migrant was told to constrain 
himself financially and abstain from relations with ‘town women’ who would 
‘“eat” his money and induce him to forget about his wife and home’ (McAllister 
1980: 211). In such a context, ‘eating’ referred simultaneously to the use of the 
migrant’s money and sex with the migrant. The pressure that was exerted at public 
beer drinking rituals contributed to the identification of fellow migrants with their 
areas. 
Men from one particular area of ‘the land of the Xhosa’ (Emaxhoseni) often 
shared one overcrowded room in one of the barracks. They ate together, cooked 
together, and made monthly contributions in order to buy groceries together 
(Mayer & Mayer 1974: 101-104; Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 49). Mayer & Mayer 
(1974) described how abakhaya in East London established a close-knit commu-
nity. New migrants were initially taken care of by their fellow abakhaya, with 
whom they could reside in the hostels. They purchased food together and unem-
ployed abakhaya could join in the communal meals in return for the performance 
of domestic tasks.16 In the event of illness and disease, the abakhaya would also 
help each other: ‘Each group of Red amakhaya (sic) ... forms a community of its 
own’ (Mayer & Mayer 1974: 99). Living and eating together in groups of home-
people established some level of social control. The social control of abakhaya 
kept migrants in line with the expectations of migrant labour, namely to save 
money for the homestead without spending it on women and alcohol in the city. 
This gave rise to the many financial mutuals that these abakhaya, living together in 
one hostel, organised. 
The migrants’ men close-knit networks constrained them from illicit behaviour, 
at least to some degree (Mayer & Mayer 1974; Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 47; see 
also Delius 1993: 130).17 A migrant man said about the social control among 
abakhaya in Cape Town: ‘Living in a flat [not among abakhaya] induces people to 
                                                          
 
16  Trustworthy elders in the hostel block were asked to safeguard money for their 
fellow abakhaya to prevent them from spending it. The money was kept in a 
goatskin purse called ufelemntwini, which means ‘die for a person’. The elder would 
have to be killed before the purse could be taken from him (McAllister & Deliwe 
1994: 51 in Bank 1999: 401). It could be, however, that the safeguarding of money 
by one elder was not a very common practice (personal communication McAllister). 
17  The extent of social control among abakhaya should not be exaggerated. For 
example, it has been estimated that in around 1970, notwithstanding social control, 
migrants in Cape Town spent about a quarter of their income on hard liquor (Wilson 
1972: 180). 
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spend too much money… I am not a bee, I cannot eat honey while still making it’ 
(Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 39). Inappropriate behaviour could easily reach the ears 
of kin in Emaxhoseni due to gossiping abakhaya. 
The inadequate reinforcement of apartheid laws on migration, the abolishment 
of many laws on migration in 1986, and the first democratic elections in 1994 
caused migration and residence patterns to transform. Many built their shacks in 
illegal settlements, or rented a shack, or space, in the backyard of someone’s brick 
house in a formal and serviced township. In 1998, for about R200 a month (but 
occasionally for twice as much), the migrant could rent a small shack and use 
electricity, water, and sanitation facilities of the main house. Subsequently, the co-
residence and organisation of abakhaya had largely ceased to exist. Apart from 
one barrack in the township Guguletu, I did not encounter abakhaya living, eating, 
or cooking together the way Wilson & Mafeje (1963) and the Mayers (1974) had 
encountered in the past. The confinements of the hostels under apartheid caused 
abakhaya and neighbourhood relations to overlap, but the democratisation process 
meant that neighbours were not necessarily abakhaya, and that abakhaya 
increasingly lived scattered throughout different parts of Cape Town. This, in turn, 
caused a decreased interest in migrants to organise among abakhaya. The national 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the post-apartheid govern-
ment also dispersed abakhaya. The RDP provided the poor with a housing subsidy 
that was allocated according to seniority: Those who lived the longest in an 
informal settlement had the first right to a housing subsidy. This made it difficult 
for migrants to influence where they lived and made it unlikely that they would 
have abakhaya as neighbours. 
At the end of apartheid, abakhaya relations became less important for the 
organisation of financial mutuals. Abakhaya relations no longer coincided with 
neighbourhood relations and therefore the vital social constraint mechanisms 
among abakhaya diminished.18 During my research I came across only one 
ROSCA and only a few burial societies organised by abakhaya. These abakhaya 
burial societies were relatively old (thirty years old or more), and were mostly 
located in the older established townships. These abakhaya burial societies were 
open to newly arrived abakhaya migrants but they were not always willing to 
travel to meetings held in another part of the city. If these relatively new migrants 
                                                          
 
18  This also explains why there were still some burial societies with a fund among non-
neighbours. If a member failed to contribute, the burial society could simply reject 
his or her claim. In contrast with Cape Town, women migrants in Johannesburg still 
organised dancing groups (kiba) with fellow home-people (James 1999a, 1999b). 
The reason for this discrepancy between Cape Town and Johannesburg could be the 
involvement of money in financial mutuals, which made social constraint necessary. 
The absence of social constraint would have fewer consequences for the participants 
of the dancing groups. 
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established burial societies they often did so in their urban neighbourhood. These 
burial societies typically had no fund and members would pool money whenever a 
member, or his or her dependant, had died. 
Although migrants no longer used abakhaya relations for the establishment of 
financial mutuals, migrants still identified strongly with abakhaya. Abakhaya 
identifications were grounded in several, not necessarily exclusive, categories. One 
was the district or region they came from, often the magisterial district (see also 
Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 47). Abakhaya burial societies were often based on 
magisterial districts. Abakhaya could also mean people who went to the same town 
to buy groceries. A migrant from Ciskei, who was a member of an abakhaya burial 
society, said: ‘First, abakhaya are the people from the same village. Second, they 
are people from the same district where you stay. These are the people who shop in 
the same town. Also, the whole Ciskei are abakhaya.’ A teenage girl, who had 
been listening to our conversation while lying on the bed, added: ‘Now the whole 
Eastern Cape are abakhaya. The Ciskei and Transkei don’t even exist anymore.’ 
Another woman argued that Ciskeians amongst each other were abakhaya because 
there were so few Ciskeians in Cape Town and so many Transkeians: ‘Yes, we do 
neglect Transkeians, but they are from behind the [Kei] river and they are therefore 
not abakhaya.’19 If migrants were further away from home, more people were 
regarded as abakhaya (see also Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 47-49): ‘If I were overseas 
[in Europe] and met someone from Jo’burg, he would also be umkhaya.’ 
Many casual conversations revolved around people establishing whether they 
knew someone from his or her area of origin. Discussions often developed around 
these mutual acquaintances. For example, Mimi and my research assistant Edith 
introduced themselves at Mimi’s umgalelo meeting. Both asked where they lived 
in Cape Town, to which clan they belonged, what their family situation was, and 
where they came from. After some time, Edith delightedly told me that she had 
shared a home area with Mimi. For some years, Edith had lived with her brother in 
a particular town in the Qobo Qobo district where she also attended secondary 
school. Edith had just found out that Mimi’s brother lived in exactly the same 
town. Both were very pleased that they found a place in Emaxhoseni (the place 
where both their brothers lived) through which they could relate to each other. 
Conversations in which people elaborated on where they used to live and go to 
school and whom they knew occurred all the time. 
Virtually all Africans, even many of those who were born in Cape Town, 
would have felt it an insult to be considered Capetonians. Instead, they identified 
with a particular region in Emaxhoseni, although some had visited this area only 
once or twice in their lives, or not at all. If one wanted to point out that someone 
                                                          
 
19  See also McNamara (1980: 317-319) on the separate interaction of Transkei and 
Ciskei migrants. 
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misbehaved, a rhetorical ‘where do you come from?’ made the point. The insulting 
answer implied by this question was ‘you come from nowhere’. You have no 
home and behave without a show of respect to others. Clearly, Cape Town was not 
recognised as a new home. 
The many moves that people had made in the course of their lives from place to 
place made abakhaya identifications personal and flexible. Instead of having one 
town or region of origin, there were often many places to which people felt they 
belonged. This started in early childhood. Under Influx Control, many children 
were forced to leave the city and were sent home (Mayer & Mayer 1974: 271), but 
it was also often the case that children grew up in Emaxhoseni after the abolition 
of apartheid laws (for example see Jones 1993: 57). Children frequently moved 
between different households, depending on whether a household had sufficient 
money to take care of the child, whether parents felt that the money they sent was 
spent on the child, and whether they felt that the child was not being ill treated 
(Spiegel 1987: 120-127). Many parents could not take care of their child because 
they had to work. Crèches, if available at all, were too expensive, far away, poorly 
facilitated, or had no qualified staff. Parents also wanted to protect their children 
against the dangers of Cape Town. They worried that their child would join a gang 
or become a victim of violence. The Mayers’ (1974: 271) findings on attitudes to 
rearing children in town still apply almost forty years later: ‘“Town is no fit place 
for a child”. Rearing children there was supposed to mean a loss of parental 
control, with disastrous consequences for the child’s morality, especially in the 
fields of sex, work, and crime.’ 
Maqashu and his wife, for example, sent one child old enough to attend school 
to relatives in the Eastern Cape. They also had a toddler, but he was easier to take 
care of and could temporarily be left with neighbours. Maqashu worked as a 
security officer and brought home about R800 a month. The family struggled to 
get by. Maqashu’s wife told us (Edith and me) that they had been unemployed for 
about six years. They survived because they were able to get food on credit from a 
local shop. They repaid the debt to the shop owner at a rate of R250 per month. 
Another R100 was spent on public transport in order for Maqashu to commute to 
work. The relatives in the Eastern Cape also needed money to buy food and 
clothing, and pay for school fees for their child. Every month the parents had to 
send R250 through postal order, which left them with only R200. Although the 
financial problems of this family were severe – they were also regarded by 
neighbours as poor – they could not have the child with them and stop sending 
money. Maqashu’s wife had to look for a job and she felt that Cape Town was a 
terrible place for children to grow up. This is only one example of how important 
relations with people in Emaxhoseni were. Children often grew up with different 
relatives in different towns where they attended different schools. 
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Upon their return to Cape Town, these moves and memories determined who 
was umkhaya. The moves between Cape Town and Emaxhoseni were also visible 
in the composition of the age pyramid of Africans in Cape Town, based on the 
1996 census. Less than 5 percent of the African population was between ten and 
fifteen years old, while the age category of fifteen to nineteen years represented 
about seven percent of the urban African population. This increase is accounted for 
by the trend by which young people of that age left Emaxhoseni in order to find 
employment in Cape Town.20 
Government institutions under apartheid regulated labour through labour 
bureaus, which limited the migrant’s opportunity to introduce an umkhaya to his 
employer (Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 51). According to a small sample that con-
cerned employment from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, about two-thirds of the 
migrants said they had found employment through the labour bureaus. Only 19 
percent found a job by word of mouth. Once apartheid and its labour bureaus were 
abolished, more people found a job by word of mouth (Oliver-Evans 1993: 39). 
The abolishment of apartheid could have led to an increase in the mobilisation of 
abakhaya in the migrant’s quest for employment. If I asked whether abakhaya 
helped each other find employment in Cape Town, this was mostly confirmed (see 
Wilson & Mafeje 1963: 51). However, when I asked them for an example – for 
instance whether they had found a job for an umkhaya, got a job through umkhaya 
relations, or knew of someone who got a job through umkhaya relations – they 
could not provide any. High unemployment made it very difficult to find a job for 
anyone and if people knew about a job, they preferred to introduce a relative, a 
neighbour, or a member of the church. The contrast between ideology (finding a 
job for abakhaya) and practice (the inability to provide abakhaya with jobs) was 
also due to abakhaya living in different areas of Cape Town, meaning that they 
were rarely neighbours. 
However, abakhaya did try to help each other a bit, for example by passing on 
messages and money during visits back home. Sometimes they were left in charge 
                                                          
 
20  Based on a 10 percent sample of the Cape Metropolitan Area component of the 
Population Census conducted by SA Stats in October 1996 (CMC 2001). The 
authors mistakenly presented the small 0-4 age group as ‘characteristic of a popu-
lation with a decreasing fertility rate’ or undercounting. In 1991, in the Ciskei the 
African population between ten and fifteen years old was 13.8 percent and the 
African population between fifteen and twenty years old 12.9 percent (SAS 1997: 
table 1.19). Such comparisons are problematic and the figures should only be 
regarded as a rough measure that indicates that a declining fertility rate was not the 
cause of the CMC findings. About the illegal squatter camp of Crossroads in the 
1980s Reynolds (1989: 35) writes: ‘In all, the children spent more than half of each 
of their lives in Cape Town… [T]hey had spent one-tenth away from their mothers 
and one-third away from their fathers.’ See also numerous contributions in Burman 
& Reynolds (1986). 
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of a child on the same taxi home, a task occasionally assigned to the driver as well. 
Abakhaya were more likely to attend a festivity or funeral of an umkhaya. Al-
though the social support migrants gave to abakhaya was limited, people did try to 
help each other and cherished the relationships with people who knew their home, 
school, or relatives. 
Common relations (such as family members, ancestry, shared acquaintances) 
and places (such as magisterial districts, shopping centres, and rivers) were 
important to migrants who had to survive Cape Town’s threatening triad. The 
hostility of Cape Town contributed to the identification among abakhaya. The city 
was a dangerous place where migrants could not feel at home. During apartheid, 
many illegal migrants tried to find a job in South Africa’s industrial areas and took 
the risk of police detention, torture, and deportation to the Bantustans. Their illegal 
settlements could be bulldozed at any time and, especially during the state of 
emergency, the powers of the state and the police were incredible. The police did 
not address crime in the African settlements, which made them even more vulne-
rable. After apartheid, police were often absent as well or, if they were on hand, 
people were afraid that they were co-operating with criminal groups. In the 
Western Cape Province, the average murder rate in 1997 was eighty murders per 
100,000 (SAIRR in Cape Times 1998). In the African townships, such as Guguletu 
and Langa, the murder rate was even higher, up to 120 to 150 murders per 100,000 
in the early 1990s (Bähre 1996: 85; Ramphele 1991: 267). In the Western Cape in 
1999, eighty-one murders and 160 rapes per 100,000 people were reported (SAPS 
2000). Many rapes, however, were not reported due to lack of confidence in the 
judiciary system and fear of public stigmatisation. A survey of 4,000 women in 
Johannesburg revealed that one in three had been raped the past year (BBC 
1999).21 
At present, the occurrence of rape and murder in Cape Town is likely to be the 
highest in the world. Although the role of the police has changed in post-apartheid 
South Africa, the risk of poor, semi-literate migrants becoming victims of one or 
more of these crimes is tremendous, and actually unavoidable. For this reason 
alone Cape Town was not regarded as a home. No-one wanted to give up hope and 
simply accept that this was the place they were going to live permanently. The 
hostility of the city contributed to the identification with abakhaya and stressed the 
relationships with home in Emaxhoseni. 
The fact that Xhosa took the hostility of the city seriously was evident in the 
preparations taken when they left the Eastern Cape. Those who were about to 
                                                          
 
21  The NGO CIET Africa carried out the survey. The Western Cape, the province in 
which this research took place, has the highest number of rapes reported in South 
Africa. In 1997 there were 170.5 rapes and attempted rapes reported per 100,000 
people, which is an increase since 1994 by 24 percent (SAIRR 1998: 28-29, 44; 
Cape Times 1998; SAPS 1998). 
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leave invoked the ancestors for assurance of their co-operation and assistance. 
They also had a special medicine, called ‘medicine for war’ (ubulawu), which 
provided protection. McAllister (1980: 215) notes that ‘ubulawu (sic) ensures good 
luck, the favour of one’s employer and protection from accidents, assaults and 
other misfortunes that might befall one at work’. The shiny and slippery sap of a 
particular aloe was used. This aloe was called intelezi, which meant ‘good fortune 
in escaping danger’, while ubutelezi meant slipperiness. As this name indicates, it 
helped a migrant to escape danger and slip out of difficult situations. Previously, 
intelezi was used to treat the army prior to battle but the new battle had become 
labour migration to Cape Town (McAllister 1980: 214-215). 
The interdependencies between migrants and their families at home were 
strengthened by the hostility of the city, the dangers of the migratory process, and 
the importance of ancestry located in the area of origin. It was a terrible ordeal to 
live in the city or to be initiated and buried in such a hostile place. Upon arrival in 
Cape Town migrants rarely organised the beer drinking ritual that would introduce 
their new place to both the neighbours and the ancestors, who in return would 
provide protection. By neglecting this ritual, they risked losing ancestral protect-
ion. Only once did I notice a migrant brewing beer and inviting his neighbours to 
this ritual. It was not a great success, however, because many neighbours felt that 
they had not been invited properly. They spread a rumour that the neighbour did 
not want them to attend in order to limit the costs of the ritual. 
At times, migrants told me about the large luxurious homes that they were 
building in Emaxhoseni. They conveyed images of large square brick houses with 
corrugated iron roofs and beautiful furniture – as opposed to the traditional round 
huts made of grass and clay with a thatched roof. These were portrayed as real 
homes and, therefore, it was useless to invest in a shack in Cape Town. 
Nofurniture, for example, used the R1,360 from her umgalelo (ASCRA) for her 
home in the Umtata district in the former Transkei. She had lived in Cape Town 
for ten years but preferred to invest her money in a four room house and nice 
furniture in Emaxhoseni. The place was empty and her children, who stayed with 
relatives in the same compound, took care of the place but did not live there. She 
still wanted to go back home: ‘I will be buried there.’ She had not introduced her 
shack in Cape Town to the ancestors through a beer drinking ritual. She wanted to 
finish her home in Emaxhoseni before buying furniture for her place in Cape 
Town. Obviously, the beer drinking ritual was never going to take place, and 
Umtata would always be her home, even if it was only as an ancestor. 
To sum up, in the 1990s the identification of abakhaya was still important but 
did not govern migrants’ lives like it did in the 1960s. It is possible that, during 
apartheid, migrants overemphasised what they were able to do for abakhaya in 
order to conceal their inability to help people. Nevertheless, significant changes 
did take place. The breakdown of apartheid meant that abakhaya were no longer 
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neighbours, which made it less likely that abakhaya relations would be used as 
support networks. Abakhaya did try to help each other out, but opportunities were 
limited. Furthermore, under apartheid the intersection of abakhaya with neigh-
bourhood relations provided a social constraint that was vital for financial mutuals. 
When apartheid ended, this form of regulation ceased to exist and relations in the 
city became more diverse. This, in turn, caused a decrease in the relevance of 
abakhaya relations for financial mutuals. 
Although abakhaya were often no longer neighbours and had loosened the ties 
of mutual co-operation, abakhaya identifications were still pivotal to the migratory 
experience. The analysis of abakhaya identifications reveals how important home 
was for the migrants in Cape Town. The identification with home had religious 
significance, especially concerning relationships with the ancestors. It also had an 
economic dimension, because the identification with home revealed the economic 
and social interdependencies between migrants and their kin in Emaxhoseni. The 
hostility of Cape Town, moreover, made it even less attractive to set up a perma-
nent life there. Labour migration, also after apartheid, was a treacherous and in-
secure experience in itself. Xhosa migrants were willing to endure it because they 
hoped to make some money, but not because they liked Cape Town. 
 
 
Female neighbours 
 
Under apartheid, the few African women in the city were usually there illegally, 
could not get employment, and depended on their men’s income and shelter. This 
dependency made women very vulnerable, especially as unmarried women com-
peted with wives or other unmarried women over men with a job and lodging 
(Ramphele 1989).22 Due to the apartheid legislation, men were initially central to 
the migratory process of women (James 1999b: 48-58). Women migrated in order 
to join their men – for social and economic reasons – or in order to earn money for 
their dependants. As James (1999b: 49-50) wrote on women who moved from the 
Northern Province to the Johannesburg and Pretoria area: 
All these women, whether married or not, relied on individual, usually male, family 
members, related either by blood or by marriage, to bring them to town and to connect 
them into broader networks after arrival. It was because female migration from the 
Northern Province was not undertaken by groups of people … that they were tied, at 
least at the start of their migrant careers, to husbands or male kin and to the home-based 
networks to which they belonged. 
                                                          
 
22  See Mager (1999) for a detailed examination of women’s position in the Ciskei from 
the mid 1940s to the end of the 1950s. For the sexual dimension of the migratory 
process in the Rand, see Bonner (1990; 1995) and in the South African mines see 
Moodie (1988; 1994). 
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After some time, James (1999b: 62-63; 1999a) described, these women did not 
want to depend only on the home-boy networks of the men, and instead estab-
lished their own groups based on home relationships. By establishing kiba groups, 
migrant women setup their own identification with ‘those of one home’ (James 
1999b: 62-63; 1999). 
The organisations that Xhosa women established, however, were quite different 
from those established by Sotho women described by James (1999b). Moreover, 
female Xhosa migrants initially joined their husbands’ burial societies in Cape 
Town and did not start to establish distinct female abakhaya burial societies. 
Unlike the Sotho women who organised activities based on their identification 
with people from home, Xhosa women in Cape Town did not do so. The differ-
ence between Sotho and Xhosa women could be due to the social constraint that 
was necessary for the formation of financial mutuals. In the Sotho women’s kiba 
groups, social constraint was less important because there was no money involved. 
Xhosa women did not organise financial mutuals with abakhaya because these 
relations did not offer social constraint, while neighbours did.  
When the apartheid laws were no longer enforced, women were increasingly 
able to migrate to Cape Town.23 Unlike the illegal migrants during apartheid, they 
were able to set up their homes independently from men. The women’s neighbours 
were only incidentally abakhaya and social constraint and trust had to be sought 
within the neighbourhood and not among abakhaya. 
Although neighbourhood relations were very important for the organisation of 
financial mutuals, they have received little scholarly attention in South Africa. In 
South Africa, critical social scientists were particularly interested in political 
struggles, as well as the uses and abuses of ‘community’ for policy purposes, as in 
the case of Thornton & Ramphele (1988: 29). The pre-occupation with political 
struggles focused on ‘community’, but ‘neighbourhood’ was implicitly considered 
apolitical and, therefore, not worthy of much attention. 
‘Neighbourhood’ as an analytical category is undervalued, despite the fact that 
it is very important to the Xhosa, also from a political point of view. During 
apartheid, for example, neighbours established street committees, organised rent 
boycotts, consumer boycotts, stay-aways, and tried to take over functions from 
local government (Seekings 1992: 217-222; Van Kessel 2000). Notwithstanding 
this role of neighbourhoods, these initiatives were easily drawn into the debates on 
‘community’. 
A distinction needs to be made between ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘community’. 
Neighbours were people with whom one interacted on a daily basis, while the 
                                                          
 
23  Although women moved to Cape Town in order to look for a job, in 1996 half of the 
African women in Cape Town were unemployed. A third of the African men were 
unemployed, while 5 percent of White males were unemployed (CMC 2001). 
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community encompassed a much larger group of people whom one generally did 
not know, except as local leaders and other prominent figures. Generally, those 
living in the same street were identified as neighbours. However, some streets 
were very long or had a sharp curve so that residents of one street were not 
necessarily neighbours. Still other streets were very short, like a dead-end street, 
and therefore the residents of that street regarded themselves more easily as 
neighbours of residents in the adjacent street. 
The neighbours’ children played with each other and formed a vital link 
between neighbours. They were sent for messages, bought eggs, bread, cigarettes, 
or alcohol at the spaza shop (local store) down the street. Children were an 
important source of information for their parents who asked them about the latest 
gossip in the street. Occasionally, there were birthday parties to which all the 
children of the neighbourhood were invited. Their mothers would come along to 
dish out cake, biscuits, and lemonade and would give presents to the beautifully 
dressed birthday child. Neighbours also asked one another for favours. It was 
common to ask a neighbour for some money, such as R10 for a taxi or paraffin for 
cooking. This was considered a loan, but both neighbours often knew that it would 
not be returned. One could perhaps return the favour whenever the neighbour 
needed some help. Neighbours also kept an eye on each other’s children or homes. 
Some even gave their door key to a neighbour who would then let visitors or a 
child into the house. Moreover, neighbours tried to help one another find jobs, 
much more than abakhaya did. 
Neighbours were well informed about the lives of those living next door. 
Corrugated iron and cardboard were far from soundproof and the small houses 
were very close to one another. Sometimes neighbours literally could overhear 
what their next-door neighbours were saying while they were inside their houses. 
Moreover, the confined space meant that many quarrels took place outside for 
everybody to observe. Neighbours visited each other, gossiped, and drank tea or 
chicory coffee, but only rarely stayed for a meal. If people visited their neighbours 
at around dinnertime, it forced the neighbour to offer them some food. It would 
have been very impolite of the host not to offer anything, but also very painful if 
he or she had hardly anything to give. There were jokes about the strategies people 
devised to avoid sharing food. One suggestion was that it was best to start eating 
one’s meat immediately, or instead hide it under the potatoes, just in case a visitor 
would arrive. Another option, I was told jokingly, was to offer a visitor one’s 
spoon: ‘Here’s my spoon. Come and share a meal with me.’ The hope was that a 
visitor would decline the offer of using the same spoon. Some visitors had the 
reputation for abusing hospitality. They would ‘accidentally’ arrive when neigh-
bours were eating. When the visitor was offered food, he or she would say: ‘No, 
I’m not so hungry, just some meat is fine.’ Mostly, however, neighbours tried to 
avoid causing embarrassment by adapting eating times or visits. I never encoun-
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tered anybody eating, except at my research assistant’s place, and during funerals 
and festivities. This was quite telling if one takes into consideration that people 
lived in a one-roomed or two-roomed house and had little opportunities to hide 
while eating. 
Neighbourhood identifications showed a flexibility that resembled abakhaya 
identifications. When I asked Edith to indicate on a map who her neighbours were 
she marked a large section covering about 110 plots, with a rough estimate of 
about 400 residents. She felt, however, that the selection was to some extent 
arbitrary because other people, who lived further away but with whom she had 
contact, were also her neighbours. Another woman told me that someone who 
lived almost on the other side of the settlement, about five to ten minutes walk 
away, was also her neighbour. They used to be close neighbours in the past and, 
after they had moved apart, they continued to consider each other neighbours. The 
identification of neighbours was thus based on a combination of social and 
physical proximity. 
Because neighbourhood identifications were fairly flexible, they formed a 
practical basis for organising groups together and there were never too many or too 
few neighbours to form a financial mutual. Neighbours established all kinds of 
financial mutuals together, except for the fairly large burial societies with a fund. 
They were a convenient group of people to work with, and moreover, joint 
activities, such as collecting money for a funeral or forming a financial mutual, 
helped to define the neighbourhood. Thus, financial mutuals were not only based 
on neighbourhood relations, but also identified people as neighbours. Financial 
mutuals were especially useful for recent migrants, since these helped them to get 
acquainted with their new area. 
Burials particularly helped to define a neighbourhood. The collection of money 
determined who were considered neighbours. The collection engaged people in 
reciprocal relations that were regarded as constitutive of neighbourly relations. In 
other words, being neighbours was realised by doing neighbourly activities. 
Noxolo, who was involved in such a collection among new neighbours, told me 
that the person whose door she could see from her own place were her neighbours. 
If she saw the entrance to their place, she could see who was walking in and out 
and what everybody was doing, which made them her neighbours. There were 
about a dozen shacks that one could see across the street from her whom she 
identified as neighbours. The residents on her side of the street were also Noxolo’s 
neighbours, although she could not see their doors. Right behind Noxolo’s shack 
was an open field. Noxolo could look across the field and the adjacent street into 
the residents’ houses, so they were therefore also her neighbours. Noxolo, further-
more, was not the only one to collect money for the funeral since women in streets 
further away also collected money and were considered neighbours of the de-
ceased as well. 
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In 1997, residents of a street in Indawo Yoxolo established a burial society 
without a fund in order to get to know each other. One of the central figures in this 
burial society was Mr Qina. He showed me a handwritten pamphlet that he had 
composed in Xhosa together with his neighbour and which was distributed in the 
neighbourhood: 
Residents, 
All who stay at this street are being asked to be present at a meeting which will be held 
at Mqwathi’s place on the day of 22 October 1997 on Wednesday 7 pm. 
It is about getting together on the days of dark clouds. 
We will appreciate your presence, 
Thank you 
Out of respect for the dead, one should avoid a clear reference to death. People 
were afraid of death and therefore referred to it as ‘the days of dark clouds’ or 
‘when something happens’. Mr Qina was quick to take the paper out of my hand. 
He was afraid that the meeting might be seen as a political meeting. As will 
become clear in the next chapter, there were many political tensions in the area that 
could damage such initiatives. Mr Qina kept the pamphlet in order to prove that he 
was not interested in political issues and had simply tried to organise a burial 
society among neighbours. 
That evening about forty people, mostly women, gathered on Mr Mqwathi’s 
plot. The meeting started when Mr Qina stood up and took off his hat out of 
respect. He gave a speech in which he made clear how humble his attempts were 
to organise a burial society: ‘We are from different areas, and in some areas we 
should do something. Some would contribute money, but that’s not what we call a 
burial society. It is not a burial society; it is just an idea for people in the street only 
… It is just for the street.’ One man immediately supported him: ‘People enjoy life 
when they are still alive and forget about it when things happen. It is a good idea 
because a person is never thrown away.’ Other men made supportive statements 
such as, ‘we are going to get to know each other’, or ‘we are all here and we don’t 
know each other, because we only get to know each other if there are problems’. 
One woman had received the pamphlet but did not really know what the meeting 
was about because she could not read. She lived one street further and left after she 
was told that she could not join because she did not reside in their street. 
Because Mr Qina had taken the initiative, he was elected chairperson. They 
also needed a vice-chairperson, a secretary, a vice-secretary and four other board 
members. These functions were far from popular and the members were elected by 
appointment. For example, Mr Cophele stood up and said: ‘I elect Mr Moya.’ Mr 
Moya, however, was not pleased to be elected and got up to say: ‘I don’t want to 
be elected. I work and I don’t have the time.’ Mr Qina, however made clear that: 
‘If we can take that excuse we all have excuses. So please, just understand that 
everyone has an excuse but we don’t want to make this meeting an excuse.’ Mr 
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Moya ended up being elected anyway, just like Mr Jonase who also protested: ‘I 
am sorry, but I am very busy. I go to church and have a lot of responsibilities.’ But 
his protest was not accepted either and another man said ‘people, accept when you 
are elected, because if we make one excuse, we take all excuses. We don’t take 
volunteers, as this is very important. We all have our problems.’ Later Mr Jonase 
again tried to make the position available to others: ‘I ask people to elect other 
people along the line and let other people do what they are doing. Everyone should 
have a chance, otherwise I will loosen myself from the ties.’ However, his efforts 
were in vain and nobody was eager to take his place. 
People became impatient and hungry as it was getting past eight o’clock. They 
decided to collect R20 after each death and cover only those who ‘stay under one 
roof’. Kin in the Eastern Cape themselves were not covered and the burial society 
did not contribute to travelling costs for attending funerals in the Eastern Cape. 
Before everyone left, the committee members stood up and introduced themselves 
by their name and plot number. This revealed how the neighbours hardly knew 
each other and that the burial society created neighbourly relations. After a prayer, 
everyone rushed home to cook dinner. 
Financial mutuals helped to establish neighbourly relations especially among 
new residents in new areas. Although feelings of solidarity and mutual support 
were important, one should not neglect the social tensions that could exist among 
neighbours. Later, in the same street where this burial society was established, I 
heard from two neighbours of an extreme case in which a child was punished. The 
child had stolen a few audiocassettes from his neighbour, who then complained by 
saying that, according to her, the child was not worth anything: if it was up to her, 
the child would be killed. After this, a group of neighbouring men had kicked and 
beaten the child to death. Because one of the men was aligned to a group of 
powerful and violent people in the area, the parents were too scared to do anything 
about it and the murder was not reported to the police. 
The concept of community, with its political history in South Africa, led to an 
underestimation of neighbourhood relationships and emphasised political life too 
much. Migrants became new neighbours who knew little about each other, which 
was in strong contrast with the situation in longer established neighbourhoods in 
Cape Town and the Eastern Cape. Especially in Emaxhoseni, neighbours played a 
central role in rituals, such as circumcision and beer drinking rituals. In neighbour-
hoods which had been established longer ago, people collected money for a com-
mon goal more often. During my fieldwork, this was done only once in Indawo 
Yoxolo, but, unfortunately, the collectors, who were associated with the powerful 
political group of the Big Five, took most of the money. Although Indawo Yoxolo 
was a new place, the neighbourhood was already playing a major role because, 
within months, neighbours were organising financial mutuals. Women organised 
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financial mutuals in the neighbourhood which, in contrast with the experience of 
migrant men in the past, no longer coincided with abakhaya relations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Three kinds of social relations were central to financial mutuals: kinship, 
abakhaya, and neighbours. These relations were not static, but changed consider-
ably over time. In this respect, the dramatic impact of colonialism and capitalism 
on the Xhosa economy can hardly be underestimated. It not only led to changes in 
the political economy, such as the introduction of wage labour, money, taxation, 
and the availability of new consumer items, but also to political changes, such as 
those brought on by war, apartheid legislation, and natural disasters that under-
mined the subsistence economy, including drought, lung disease among cattle, and 
East Coast fever. A society with a kin-ordered mode of production changed into a 
society in which the capitalist mode of production became dominant. 
The consequence of this economic change was the transformation of social 
relations. The elders’ position was challenged due to the decrease in customary 
marriages. Young men and unmarried women had greater autonomy due to the 
money they earned themselves. Dependencies between husbands and wives were 
fraught with new tensions due to no longer adhering to lobola and the prolonged 
absence of migrant men. Children increasingly became a financial burden, compe-
tition between full brothers changed, and new demands were made on newly 
available money. Furthermore, compounds became smaller and people were often 
forced to resettle in the Bantustans. Such changes meant that reliance on neigh-
bours increased and that neighbours, both in urban and rural areas, were less likely 
to be kin. 
In order to support themselves and their families, many Xhosa tried to find 
work in urban and industrial centres outside of the Bantustans. Cape Town was 
governed by the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, which resulted in a minority 
African population and a further marginalization of Africans in the city. The 
migratory process led to the establishment of a new type of relations among the 
Xhosa migrants, namely those based on the identification of abakhaya, i.e. ‘those 
of one home’. In order to understand why migrants went to cities such as Cape 
Town, one has to be sensitive to what ‘home’ meant to migrants. The male 
migrants – under apartheid it was even more difficult for women to migrate – 
identified with each other due to a shared notion of origin, which coincided with 
responsibilities towards home, such as building the homestead and a commitment 
towards the ancestors. The threatening experiences of migration made home even 
more important, and in post-apartheid South Africa as well, the threatening triad of 
violence, economic insecurity, and volatile relations did not make migrants feel at 
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home in the city. Instead, it encouraged migrants to emphasise and possibly 
romanticise the home they left in the Eastern Cape. 
Apartheid policy forced male migrants – often accompanied by ‘illegal women’ 
– from the same home to live together in one room. Abakhaya would live together, 
eat together, cook together, and exercise some social constraint over one another. 
These abakhaya/neighbours offered the social cohesion and constraints that were 
needed to form financial mutuals. Financial mutuals, at least to some extent, 
ensured that migrants did not abscond during their stay in the city but returned 
home with gifts and presents for their kin. They also made sure that, after death, 
the migrant’s body was returned home for a proper burial. 
The breakdown of the apartheid laws loosened abakhaya relations. Although 
abakhaya identifications were still important, they did not lead to the establish-
ment of financial mutuals anymore. Instead, neighbourhood relations became in-
creasingly important as a type of social relation that was independent of kin and 
abakhaya. Consanguinity no longer meant physical proximity. This was because 
the migration of women to Cape Town coincided with the further separation of 
abakhaya relations and neighbourhood relations. The end of apartheid brought 
with it a change in urban demographics from mainly single men living in barracks 
to households, often headed by females, in newly established neighbourhoods. The 
neighbourhood was central to the organisation of the migrants’ social life, in-
cluding the care of children and various forms of mutual care. The social con-
straints that neighbours offered gave women more possibilities to organise their 
money in financial mutuals. 
The structural changes in the three types of relations (kinship, abakhaya, and 
neighbour) were accompanied by new structural tensions between people who 
depended on each other. Financial mutuals played an important role in the making 
and breaking of these tensions because they influenced the allocation of money 
within the wider kinship network and because they helped to establish personal 
bonds between neighbours. This is one of the major attractions of the study of 
financial mutuals. Financial mutuals were central to the establishment, as well as 
people’s understanding, of abakhaya and neighbourhood relations in the city. 
Moreover, the study of financial mutuals revealed how, by allocating money, 
migrants tried to establish, maintain, or challenge kin relations. 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
The economy of development  
and social relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When I briefly visited Indawo Yoxolo for the first time in 1995, it was a small 
informal settlement squeezed between a large Coloured township to the south, and 
a railroad track and an African township to the north. A few dozen shacks were 
scattered between the bushes, a muddy path served as a road, the bushes were used 
as toilets, and there was no electricity or water. In order to obtain water, those 
living in Indawo Yoxolo had to ask the residents of the township next door, who 
were not too pleased with their new neighbours. There was only one kindergarten, 
accommodated in a pink shipping container and run by a few residents of Indawo 
Yoxolo. Although the kindergarten allowed women to drop their children off on 
their way to work, the mothers and staff had many complaints. There was nothing 
with which to entertain the children, and the children just sat on the floor for most 
of the day. People also complained about the government’s promise to provide 
lunch since no food was provided. 
Adjacent to these shacks, construction workers were clearing bushes and 
levelling the ground with heavy machinery. Indawo Yoxolo was part of the 
national Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an effort by the 
ANC government to try to overcome some of the inequalities and poverty left 
behind by apartheid. They intended to develop the illegal squatter settlement of 
Indawo Yoxolo into a formal township complete with electricity, toilets, water, 
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streets, streetlights, schools, public telephones, bus stops, taxi-ranks, sports fields, 
and plots for poor people to live on. 
Indawo Yoxolo presented the opportunity to examine how financial mutuals 
were established from scratch, as Xhosa migrants had just moved to the place. The 
aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides an account of Xhosa migrants 
living in a post-apartheid township, namely, the living conditions with which 
people had to contend on a daily basis and the wider socio-political context in 
which financial mutuals are embedded. Second, it reveals the presence of the post-
apartheid state, a presence most strongly felt in the realm of development. Police 
protection was virtually nonexistent in the area, leaving people to fend for 
themselves, at times with horrific consequences. At the time of my research, local 
government was weak, understaffed, and only marginally functional. There were a 
few schools, but even these were caught up in the development process. As will 
become apparent in this chapter, the post-apartheid state was in an almost ex-
clusive manner active through the development projects. This had consequences 
for the local political processes in Indawo Yoxolo as well as for the way in which 
financial mutuals were organised. 
 
 
The development dream 
 
Optimism for the post-apartheid future was very high. With the release of Mandela 
in 1990 and the first democratic elections in April 1994, many, including those 
outside South Africa, hoped for a drastic change for the better. As the Comaroffs 
wrote: ‘In South-Africa, after all, the end of apartheid held out to indulge that 
everyone would be set free to speculate and accumulate, to consume, and to 
indulge repressed desires. But, for many, the millennial moment has passed 
without palpable payback’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999: 284). Many, of course, 
realised that the ANC could not overcome the legacy of apartheid within a few 
years, but nevertheless people expected that the political changes would lead to 
redistribution. In addition, many Whites initially feared that Africans would steal 
their property. For example, someone recalled how, in the Eighties, African 
women had marched to Cape Town’s previously White suburb of Lansdown. 
These African women were walking through the streets of Lansdown and express-
ing their dreams about those houses with gardens – sometimes also with swim-
ming pools – that they were going to claim once apartheid was over. These dreams 
about the future were so real that some women were said to get into a fight because 
they both intended to claim the same house once apartheid was over. 
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Inequalities had to be abolished by redistributing resources and establishing 
development projects.1 Central to the post-apartheid era was the national 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC 1994). Poverty 
stricken Africans and, to a lesser extent Coloureds had to get improved communal 
facilities, such as sanitation, roads, better policing, and health care. More jobs had 
to be created and schools had to be improved through, for example, a national 
‘school-feeding programme’ which had to ensure that children received at least 
one decent meal a day. The government installed a special temporary RDP 
minister without portfolio, Mr Naidoo. After a couple of years, the numerous RDP 
projects were to be integrated into the portfolios of the other ministers. 
One of the most prominent features of the RDP was the housing grant for the 
poor. From 1994 to 1999, one million low-cost houses were going to be built. 
According to income, housing subsidies of up to R15,000 were made available.2 It 
was only possible to apply for a full subsidy if one earned less than R800 per 
month. This subsidy was not distributed directly in cash to the applicant. Private 
sector building companies and, in some instances, NGOs could be contracted to 
build roads, plots, electricity connections, sewage systems, toilets, and other 
facilities. If applicants were eligible for a grant they were allowed to occupy and 
own a plot in the neighbourhood developed by the RDP. Throughout South Africa, 
the variety of the structures and facilities varied greatly, depending on the costs 
involved and the priorities that were set. The main emphasis, however, was on 
public services and underground infrastructure, such as water supply, sewage 
pipes, electricity wires, streetlights, and roads. 
Because the vast majority of the population was denied the right to vote during 
apartheid, the ANC incorporated an active approach towards democratisation into 
its development plans (ANC 1994: 119-135). Under apartheid, the ANC associated 
development with government rule, racial segregation, and apartheid ideology. 
However, in the post-apartheid era, the ANC ‘soon found itself adopting the 
                                                          
 
1  See Nauta (2001) for a study of land reform in the Eastern Cape. 
2  Source: Masakhane (1995: 4). The structure of the subsidy had an awkward effect 
on the housing situation of the applicants. Those who received a full subsidy chose a 
plot with an ‘RDP house’, as the tiny, concrete one-roomed houses with a corru-
gated iron roof, one door, and two windows, and a sink were called. Those whose 
income was too high for a full subsidy would not have enough money for such an 
RDP house on their plot and instead they built a shack. Many others hoped that they 
could save enough money in the future to add to the remains of the subsidy in order 
to build a two-roomed, or maybe even a three-roomed house. This meant that some 
of the poorest, and those without much hope of improvements in their financial 
situation, would live in the better looking, but not necessarily better built, RDP 
houses. Those who were financially slightly better off, or expected to be in the 
future, lived in a shack. 
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“pragmatic” language of ‘reconstruction and development” (Crush 1995: xii in Li 
1999: 296). The RDP document stated: 
Our people, with their aspirations and collective determination, are our most important 
resource. The RDP is focused on our people’s most immediate needs, and it relies, in 
turn, on their energies to drive the process of meeting these needs ... Development is not 
about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and 
growing empowerment. In taking this approach we are building on the many forums, 
peace structures and negotiations that our people are involved in throughout the land 
(ANC 1994: 5). 
In Cape Town, the Development Planning Committee (DPC) largely carried 
out the RDP development. Within five years it wanted to develop and upgrade 
34,500 sites and improve the housing situation of more than 35,000 poor families. 
People from twenty-one informal settlements, eight areas of backyard shack 
dwellers, and residents of three hostels were supposed to benefit from this project, 
which was also accessible to another 6,200 Coloured families who were on waiting 
lists for housing (DPC 1994: 8). 
During my fieldwork in 1995, one could almost feel the energy that the 
political changes brought. Although many felt that some people’s expectations far 
exceeded the possibilities of economic improvement, they also felt that economic 
improvement was going to take place, even if it would take another generation. By 
1997, the mood had changed. Particularly better educated young Africans and 
White so-called ‘liberals’ (the term had become derogative by then) expressed 
their resentment. Many Africans felt that, although they had contributed to the 
struggle, they did not share sufficiently in the benefits, or that the ANC elite had 
abandoned the deprived masses. Although not to the same extent, destitute African 
migrants were also disappointed when they did not experience much economic 
improvement. Due to the costs of these public services and facilities, there was 
often little or no subsidy left to build a house for the applicant. Therefore, most 
houses measured only a few square metres and consisted of one room only, which 
led to many complaints about matchbox houses. Moreover, by the beginning of 
1998, only a fifth of the planned houses had been built (Mail & Guardian 1998a: 
4). The development process resembled a cargo cult in which goods would arrive 
if one performed the proper rituals. In this case, these secular rituals were built 
around democratisation, community participation, and empowerment. The case 
study of Indawo Yoxolo shows how development actually took place, how 
resources were channelled, and what the local responses to development were. 
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Development policy 
 
By the time I returned to Indawo Yoxolo, in 1997, many of the development 
projects were finished and the place had changed drastically. The pink container 
was still housing a kindergarten, and the shacks I saw in 1995 were still there, 
although later I found that some of the people had gone and new people had 
arrived. Apart from that, the place was unrecognisable. One no longer reached 
Indawo Yoxolo by turning off the paved road that led to the adjacent Coloured 
townships, driving over the curb, and following a muddy path into the bushes. 
Instead there was a paved road from which streets branched off in a herringbone 
pattern. The bushes were gone and along the streets were neatly ordered plots. 
Each plot had its own private electricity connection, toilet, and water tap. Schools 
and sports fields were under construction, there were curbs, and two public 
telephones (which were out of order most of the time). Moreover, there were plans 
to build taxi ranks, a public library, bus stops, and other public facilities.3 
The plots clearly distinguished the somewhat more established residents from 
the very new residents. Those who had moved there some time ago, for example 
half a year or longer, had put a little fence around their plots, had planted 
vegetables or shrubs that were trying to survive in the sand, or had built a shack at 
the rear of their little boxy government houses. The newer streets toward the east 
of Indawo Yoxolo still had some vacant plots. The residents had not yet built an 
extra room onto their RDP houses and the ground was bereft of vegetation. Still 
further to the east, the construction workers continued to dig and install electricity, 
sewage, and water pipes, as well as survey plots and roads. The squatter camp that 
I visited in 1995 still existed and had become a relatively small section of Indawo 
Yoxolo. Because of the absence of paved roads, curbs, and demarcated plots, it 
contrasted greatly with the rest of Indawo Yoxolo. The residents of this squatter 
area were still waiting for the housing grant that would allow them to move to their 
demarcated plot. 
Almost all the residents of Indawo Yoxolo were from Emaxhoseni. For 
example, Lennox’s home was near Umtata, the capital of the former Transkei. In 
the mid 1980s, Lennox had moved to an informal settlement near Nyanga in Cape 
Town where water, sanitation, and electricity, were absent, except for a few dirty 
and badly maintained communal facilities. When I met Lennox for the first time in 
                                                          
 
3  When I visited Indawo Yoxolo in 2005 and 2006, it had again transformed dras-
tically. It had become very crowded, more flats had been built and new residents had 
put their shacks on existing plots. In some instances, a plot that was designed for one 
dwelling had three shacks on it. By now, Indawo Yoxolo also had a police station 
which was situated in a shipping container which was less vulnerable to vandalism 
than a brick building. The police would leave in the evening and lock the container. 
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October 1997, he had moved to Indawo Yoxolo only a few months before. Lennox 
still visited Paula Park and participated in a financial mutual with his previous 
neighbours. The residents of Indawo Yoxolo were all (at least officially) from 
numerous illegal squatter camps and backyard shacks of Cape Town that had 
grown because of urbanisation and the housing shortage. 
The RDP policy had significant political consequences. The RDP had to be 
implemented by local community representative bodies that gathered in a so-called 
RDP forum. All local political organisations and community-based organisations 
were supposed to be represented in a local RDP forum. Each RDP forum was 
asked to establish development priorities according to a number of themes that 
were set out by the RDP document.4 The development projects had to be discussed 
with government structures, private enterprises, and community representatives 
before they could be implemented. Development had to take place through 
community participation and people’s involvement in democratic processes, 
instead of via a top-down approach in which policymakers would decide what was 
best for people. Since the late 1980s, due to disappointing experiences with 
structural adjustment lending, the end of the Cold War, and the dominance of neo-
liberal thought, more and more importance was attached to democracy (Leftwitch 
1994: 366). 
In Cape Town in 1991, political organisations, grassroots organisations and 
government bodies had established the Development Planning Policy Committee, 
consisting of different political parties, government institutions and community-
based organisations.5 Later it was renamed the DPC (Development Planning 
Committee) and it became part of the RDP in 1993-94.6 
The DPC also focused on community involvement in development, just like the 
RDP did. The DPC’s commitment to community participation was laid down in 
three of the nine objectives stated in the formulating phase. For example, the first 
objective was: ‘To establish a coalition of community, public sector and private 
                                                          
 
4  These themes were Public Works, Arts and Culture, Tourism and Environment, 
Public Transport, Education, Housing, Sport, Social Security, Safety, Health, Reli-
gion and Youth. 
5  The forum consisted of the African National Congress (ANC), Cape Provincial Ad-
ministration (CPA), South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO), Western 
Cape Regional Services Council (WCRSC), Western Cape United Squatters Asso-
ciation (WeCUSA), Cape Town City Council (CCC), Western Cape Civics Asso-
ciation (WCCA), Ikapa Town Council, Umzamo Development Project, Crossroads 
Town Council and at a later stage, the Pan African Congress (PAC) (DPC 1994: 1). 
6  The RDP money was insufficient to execute the development projects and, there-
fore, the DPC had secured extra funds from the Provincial Administration of the 
Western Cape and the Cape Metropolitan Council. This made it possible to raise the 
RDP subsidy for housing from R15,000 to a maximum of R17,250 for each plot and 
have more money for infrastructure and community facilities (DPC 1996a). 
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sector stakeholders in order to undertake the foundational strategic planning and 
policy-making for the project, and to agree on the Terms of Reference’ (DPC 
1994: 4). 
Instead of an RDP forum, the DPC had its Project Committee. The Project 
Committee consisted of representatives of numerous community-based organisa-
tions who had to determine the implementation and management of the projects. 
They had to inform and consult the community about the DPC plans and, most 
notably, decide on the rules and procedures for the allocation of sites and the 
implementation of the allocation process (DPC 1994: 14). Families who had lived 
the longest in a particular area were allowed to move to the new plots first. Special 
priority was given to people older than twenty-one who lived with dependents 
(DPC 1996d: 1). 
 
 
The project committee 
 
The Project Committee in Indawo Yoxolo was very powerful. The members of the 
committee functioned as intermediaries between the community, the DPC struc-
ture, and private construction companies. They controlled the list of applicants and 
decided how the rules were applied. It was very difficult to know how long the 
squatters had lived in a particular area, and that gave the Project Committee the 
space to prioritise applications. Furthermore, the Project Committee had a large 
influence on the recruitment of local labourers who were needed to build Indawo 
Yoxolo. It was a requirement that at least half of the labourers were residents of a 
particular area and it was up to the Project Committee to assist in their recruitment. 
High unemployment and widespread deprivation made the Project Committee very 
powerful.7 Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the political situation in Indawo 
Yoxolo as I found it in September 1997. 
The DPC Project Committee was made up of representatives of residents of the 
areas that were eligible for a plot in Indawo Yoxolo. Unfortunately, I could not 
determine exactly which members of the project committee came from which 
settlement. It was clear, however, that their main stronghold was in the old, 
unserviced Indawo Yoxolo that I had encountered in 1995, and that they had less 
support among the residents of the serviced Indawo Yoxolo who had already 
received their plots. The residents of the unserviced area and the surrounding 
squatter camps depended more on the Project Committee than others because they 
were still waiting for a housing subsidy. Opponents of the Project Committee 
                                                          
 
7  The development of Indawo Yoxolo with its focus on community participation can 
be understood as a project of rule. See, among others, Bähre (2001), Escobar (1991), 
Ferguson (1990), Schroeder (1999), Scott (1998). 
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referred to them as the ‘Old Committee’ because they favoured a new committee. 
They also called them the ‘Big Five’. The Big Five refers to the five powerful 
animals of South Africa’s game parks: leopard, lion, elephant, rhino, and buffalo. 
The adoption of the name Big Five for the Project Committee emphasized the 
power and danger of this group. Moreover, the name Big Five reminds one of the 
big man paradigm.8 
 
 
Figure 3.1 September 1997 
 
 
The following is a brief description of the Big Five (Bula, Zantsi, Nqase, Posa, 
and Mtontsi) and their status, as well as the rumours around these political figures. 
As I already mentioned in the introduction, it was impossible for me to get close to 
the Big Five. They were too dangerous and it was best to avoid them as much as 
possible. I once had a brief conversation with Nqase. He was known as ‘the gun’ 
of the Big Five and he was considered stupid enough to kill and get caught and 
was involved in all kinds of dirty business, outside of Indawo Yoxolo as well. He 
was not reputed to be the brain of the organisation, but it was common knowledge 
that he was willing to murder people. Nqase was a big man and around forty years 
old, possibly younger. He was always nicely dressed, had a small, trendy mobile 
phone, and one could see his gun bulging from underneath his jacket or sweater. 
Our encounter was a very uncomfortable experience. I was playing soccer with 
two kids in front of Edith’s place while teenagers were playing street theatre. The 
teenagers were preparing a sinister scene in which the young men forced 
themselves on a girl as if they were raping her. The bystanders shouted instructions 
and showed their approval or disapproval of the acting performances. Nqase 
chatted with Edith and my girlfriend Esther and I interrupted my soccer to join 
                                                          
 
8  See Thoden van Velzen (1973: 602) for a critical analysis of the big men paradigm. 
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them. We shook hands, talked a bit about the weather, made some jokes, laughed a 
bit, and after that he strolled away. To an outsider it must have looked like one of 
those ordinary conversations neighbours have all the time. But I knew that he had 
recently killed Gilbert Mabeqa, the man who had introduced me into Indawo 
Yoxolo and who was one of the key figures that opposed the Big Five. Nqase, of 
course, was also aware that I knew about his murder, and Nqase also knew that he 
and the other Big Five members had threatened to kill Edith, as well. Nevertheless 
we managed to pretend to have a friendly and open conversation about the 
weather. 
Zantsi was reputedly the most powerful and smartest of the Big Five. I was told 
by a Big Five opponent in Indawo Yoxolo that whenever the Big Five resorted to 
violence, he was ‘accidentally’ away for a visit to his home in the Transkei. Due to 
my endeavours to stay away from the Big Five, I had actually never seen him, 
except for once in the distance when he and some others drove to the Indawo 
Yoxolo squatter camp in two cars. Bula, the third member of the Big Five, was 
from Gxuwa (Butterworth), the same place Gilbert Mabeqa came from. His 
reputation was also that of a powerful man who threatened and blackmailed 
people. The remaining two members of the Big Five, Posa and Mtontsi, were not 
as powerful. Mtontsi was a small, badly dressed man who, despite his young age, 
missed a considerable number of teeth. He worked frequently for the construction 
companies and was often drunk. Posa was hardly ever seen or heard from and, 
therefore, I would often forget about him being a member of the Big Five. 
The Big Five controlled the DPC projects, as well as all the other initiatives in 
the area. This included the building of schools, the appointment of teachers, the 
distribution of RDP plots to applicants, and even the plans to build speed bumps to 
slow down traffic. They supported school teachers who took children’s lunches, 
forcing them to buy sweets and chicken feet from the women – also Big Five 
supporters – who had their little food stalls on the school grounds. The Big Five 
were also responsible for finding local labourers to work for contractors, such as 
Donald & Gromit and A&W Construction. Moreover, they co-operated with 
certain factions of the ANC and, at times, also with other political parties (National 
Party and United Democratic Movement). Their most important power base, 
however, was as the DPC Project Committee. 
Their control over the distribution of resources made the Big Five very 
powerful. As Barth wrote on leadership among the Swat Pathans: ‘Only through 
his control of this resource [land] can he attract the clients with which to inflate his 
political ego’ (Barth 1959: 7). The Big Five should be regarded as a Mafia-style 
organisation and leadership rather than as patrons or leaders of a system of collec-
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tive clientelism.9 The Big Five used violence and intimidation to maintain and 
exploit their position. They also demanded bribes before a plot was allocated to an 
applicant. Moreover, they promised to make Indawo Yoxolo a better place in 
return for their support, as one would expect from patrons. They did not, however, 
host parties or give money to people at public events, such as funerals. Although 
the Big Five provided jobs and gave some people political support, they did not 
present themselves as, nor were they considered to be, guardians of the welfare of 
the community. Their Mafia-style rule was based on intimidation, murder, and 
corruption, as well as control over the resources of the development projects. 
 
 
The opposition 
 
Politics in Indawo Yoxolo changed when more people left the informal settlements 
in order to move to their plots in Indawo Yoxolo. Those who already had a plot 
were less dependent on the Big Five. They had already been on the housing list 
that the Big Five controlled and had received their housing grants. The Big Five 
were still able to intimidate these people and gave, or at least promised to give, 
some people jobs. However, they were no longer able to threaten to withhold 
housing subsidies. 
Some of those who already received plots organised opposition to the Big Five. 
This opposition had no official name. They sometimes called themselves the ‘new 
committee’ because they considered themselves to be the legitimate successors to 
the ‘old committee’. The composition of the residents in Indawo Yoxolo had 
changed since the Big Five were in power and, therefore, the ‘old committee’ had 
to relinquish its position. The opposition wanted to elect new community leaders 
who represented all residents. Their most prominent leader was Gilbert Mabeqa, a 
former ANC ‘comrade’ who had moved with his wife and teenage daughter from 
Guguletu to a plot in Indawo Yoxolo. I call this the opposition to the Big Five 
Mabeqa’s group because of Gilbert Mabeqa’s central position. The supporters of 
Mabeqa’s group lived in the serviced Indawo Yoxolo. Mabeqa, Gxyiza, Con-
stance, Michael, and my research assistant Edith were among the most active 
people opposed to the corrupt and violent Big Five. 
Mabeqa’s group was, just like the Big Five, related to the ANC or, at least, 
certain factions of the ANC within the local and provincial governments. They had 
                                                          
 
9  Instead of relationships between individuals (patronage), collective clientelism is 
characterised by less personal relationships than a group of leaders have with the 
residents of a community (Burgwal 1995: 27-28, 144). See Van der Linden (1997) 
on the way in which housing projects in Pakistan are thwarted because of patronage 
relations. 
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unclear relations with the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), 
the civic body that succeeded the UDF. They claimed to be the legitimate SANCO 
committee in Indawo Yoxolo, but the Big Five made the same claim. The most 
important political stronghold of Mabeqa’s group was Councillor Gqoli. Mr Gqoli 
had been the only candidate at the local government elections in May 1996, for 
ward X of the Central Substructure.10 Ward X consisted of three nearby informal 
squatter camps, of which Indawo Yoxolo was one. 
The part of Indawo Yoxolo with paved streets, plots, and facilities was part of 
ward Z, which also included adjacent serviced townships. The developed part of 
Indawo Yoxolo did not fall under Councillor Gqoli’s ward but under the coun-
cillors of Z, who were unknown to the residents of Indawo Yoxolo. Because the 
councillors of ward Z were unknown, and because Indawo Yoxolo was divided 
between two wards (the developed part of ward X and the squatter camp of ward 
Z), Mabeqa’s group attempted to promote Councillor Gqoli as the legitimate 
representative of ward X and Z. 
Councillor Gqoli co-operated with Mabeqa’s group because he was concerned 
about the violence in Indawo Yoxolol but also because the RDP structure 
undermined local government. The legacy of apartheid had left local government 
in shambles. Local government had few resources, was understaffed, and had to 
change from an apartheid-style institution to a democratic one. In the meantime, 
however, local government benefited fairly little from the resources that the state 
provided for development. These resources were distributed via the distinct RDP 
organisations. The Project Committee’s control over the development project 
undermined Councillor Gqoli’s position in the local government. The Big Five did 
not acknowledge Councillor Gqoli as the legitimate councillor. Instead, they sup-
ported other councillors from the illegal squatter camps where they had previously 
lived. 
 
Future dwelling 
Mabeqa’s group tried to undermine the Big Five by challenging its relations with 
development offices, government institutions, and political parties. This was 
because the success of the Big Five was largely due to the support they received 
from these people and organisations. 
The private sector company Future Dwelling had a central co-ordinating role 
within the DPC development projects. It managed the relations with the private 
sector, subcontractors, government institutions, and provided the Big Five with 
                                                          
 
10  The local government elections in the Western Cape Province and Kwazulu Natal 
(the only provinces where an ANC victory was uncertain) were postponed for six 
months. In the Western Cape there was a political battle over electoral borders 
because the way the borders were drawn had important consequences for the 
election results and tax revenues. 
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resources. Future Dwelling knew about the complaints against the Big Five. In 
1996, the bribes for plots were discussed at a workshop involving participants of 
the RDP projects. The DPC Bulletin, which was freely distributed in the areas 
where the projects took place, reported: ‘The workshop decided unanimously that 
no payment is required in order to be considered for a site’ (DPC 1996b: 2). In the 
following issue of the DPC Bulletin, corruption was mentioned again: ‘There is no 
charge for being nominated a beneficiary in a DPC Project’ (DPC 1996c: 2; 
original italics). 
Notwithstanding the DPC’s workshops and newsletters, corruption continued. I 
heard of applicants who paid the Big Five up to R1,200 in order to be put on the 
subsidy applicants’ waiting list. Not everybody, however, was able, or willing, to 
pay these sums of money. People who did not pay had to stay in the unserviced 
squatter area of Indawo Yoxolo. The Big Five would only allow them to live on a 
plot after they had paid a bribe. In September 1997, the Big Five shot at an 
opponent who did not pay them a bribe. This man took me to his shack and told 
me that the night before a Big Five member shot through his window while he was 
asleep. 
Future Dwelling was in close contact with the Project Committee and depended 
largely on the information that the Project Committee gave them. In October 1997, 
Future Dwelling threatened to evict residents of the squatter area in Indawo 
Yoxolo. These squatters had already been allocated a plot in the serviced Indawo 
Yoxolo but refused to move to their new place. Future Dwelling wanted them to 
move the squatters away because the land was needed to build additional plots, 
roads, sewerage systems, and so on. Future Dwelling threatened to evict the 
squatters and their homes with bulldozers if they did not move quickly. They 
argued that if people failed to occupy their plots, they would not be entitled to a 
serviced plot in Indawo Yoxolo, either because they were not entitled to an RDP 
subsidy, or because they had only recently moved to the squatter settlement of 
Indawo Yoxolo. Those who had moved to the squatter settlement after the 
development projects had started were not entitled to a plot either. Either way, they 
had to be evicted from their homes, by force if necessary. 
Future Dwelling did not make any noticeable attempts to find out why the 
residents of the squatter settlement refused to move to their plots. That same 
month, seven residents tried to stop their evictions and had a meeting at the local 
council of which Indawo Yoxolo was a part. Fortunately, I was allowed to attend 
the meeting. Councillor Gqoli, Mabeqa, and Gxyiza were also present at the 
meeting, but Future Dwelling had ignored the invitation. The fear of retaliations 
was great among the seven residents. They told the councillors how the Big Five 
had threatened them and had demanded bribes before they were allowed to occupy 
their new plots. It was not that they did not want to live in the serviced area, but 
that they could not leave the squatter settlement safely. They explained that the Big 
 THE ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 63 
 
Five had shot one of the complainants and accused the fieldworker of Future 
Dwelling, Mguye, of siding with the Big Five and supporting Future Dwelling’s 
eviction plans. They insisted on a new Project Committee that excluded Big Five 
members and included some of Mabeqa’s people. The seven residents felt very 
uncomfortable about putting forward their complaints against the Big Five and 
Future Dwelling; the Big Five might have taken further action to intimidate them. 
Councillor Gqoli arranged to call the police to take a statement from those resi-
dents who had been brave enough to come forward. 
 
The school 
The Big Five also controlled the development of a library and schools, which were 
also part of the DPC. Leed Construction was going to build the library and had to 
employ local residents. The community liaison officer of Leed Construction was 
Mrs Ntshona (iindaba yoxolo 1998), who was also known to be a Big Five 
supporter. As a community liaison officer, she had an income and could offer 
residents of Indawo Yoxolo desperately needed jobs, possibly in return for bribes 
or political support. 
By the end of 1997, some of the schools were still being built and people hoped 
they would be opened after the new school year starting at the end of January 
1998. In 1997, there was only a kindergarten in a pink container and a primary 
school housed in a container and a prefabricated classroom. The primary school 
was in a terrible state because almost all the furniture and some windows were 
broken, and there was not enough space. All this made it unsuitable for teaching. 
The principal of this school was loyal to the Big Five. The parents accused him of 
stealing food from the ‘school-feeding programme’, a national presidential project 
and also a segment of the RDP. Every couple of days, a pick up truck arrived with 
bread and 12.5 litre buckets of peanut butter and jam. The parents said that the 
principal stole the buckets and sold them to his friends for only R25 each. Con-
sequently, many children had been deprived of their lunches. 
Another problem concerned the annual school fees. To be enrolled at the 
school, the parents had to pay R10 for each child at the beginning of the year. The 
teachers were supposed to give the parents a receipt and children were only 
permitted to take year-end exams if they could show this receipt. About thirty 
mothers claimed that they had paid the R10 but were not given a receipt. They had 
been completely unaware of this procedure, and heard about it only when their 
children were excluded from the exams until they had paid another R10. The 
parents were very angry and accused the principal and some teachers of stealing 
their money. 
Early on a Friday morning in October 1997, the parents held a spontaneous 
meeting with the principal. When I arrived in Indawo Yoxolo that particular 
morning, the parents, including Edith, were already at the school. They had not 
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announced the meeting in advance because the principal and the teachers would 
have hidden from the parents if they had been warned. This time, however, the 
principal was practically taken hostage by approximately twenty women and three 
men. The principal knew that attempts to escape would be dangerous and he was 
forced to listen to the parents’ complaints. When we entered the classroom, the 
principal was nervously and quietly sitting behind one of the few desks that were 
scattered around. Nqase, one of the Big Five members, had heard about the 
meeting and also arrived. Unlike the other people, Nqase did not have any children 
living in Indawo Yoxolo and, therefore, had no legitimate reason to be in attend-
ance. He was obviously there to protect the principal and he made sure people 
could see his gun. 
The parents disagreed about what they should do with the principal. Some 
women argued that the principal had to be killed because he stole food and sold it 
to his friends, he stole school fees, he was never at school, and he had refused to 
meet the parents. Some parents, however, felt that such a punishment would be too 
harsh. They wanted to bring the principal to the police and report him to the 
Department of Education. The parents in favour of killing the principal convin-
cingly argued that the police and Department of Education would do nothing. They 
felt that they had to solve the problem themselves. The principal and Nqase kept 
quiet during this discussion and the atmosphere was tense. The parents were 
excited that they were finally able to confront the principal with their frustrations. 
They screamed out allegations and complaints and this intimidated the principal 
and raised anger levels. Edith and I left the meeting because of the tense 
atmosphere. Later that morning we returned to see if the meeting was still taking 
place. When we entered the classroom, the situation had changed dramatically. 
Only a few women were left and everyone was quiet, and Nqase and the principal 
were still there. Nobody said a word and Nqase left soon after we had entered the 
classroom. One of the parents told us that Nqase had threatened to kill anyone who 
challenged him or the principal. Most of the parents had left feeling angry and 
powerless and only a few dared to stay longer, feeling just as angry and powerless. 
No further actions were taken against the principal, and Nqase protected him suc-
cessfully. 
A few weeks later, in early December 1997, the parents met with the school 
inspectors at the local constituency office. Some of the parents were Big Five 
supporters, among them was Ma Ntshona (who worked as the community liaison 
officer for Leed Construction), who attended despite the fact that she did not have 
any children in Indawo Yoxolo. Other parents, like Mabeqa and Edith, were going 
to oppose the Big Five. Mabeqa and Edith asked the inspectors and parents if I 
could attend the meeting, but I was not allowed. I had to wait in the car and Edith 
told me about the meeting afterwards. 
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The problems mainly concerned the new primary and secondary schools that 
were being built with RDP money. The schools were scheduled to be opened at the 
beginning of 1998, but there were not yet enough teachers. The officials from the 
Department of Education wanted to appoint teachers already contracted by the 
department. They wanted to appoint additional teachers only if there was insuffi-
cient staff. The parents who supported and who opposed the Big Five all felt this 
was unacceptable. They refused to have outsiders hired and insisted that the 
Department of Education appoint residents from Indawo Yoxolo. They felt that, 
because of the high level of unemployment, all the teaching positions had to be 
filled by locals and not by residents from other townships. 
There was also disagreement between the Big Five supporters and Mabeqa’s 
group. Mabeqa’s group expressed a fear that the Big Five, as usual, were about to 
take control of the hiring of additional teachers. They told the representatives of 
the Department of Education about the Big Five’s corruption, intimidation, and 
violence, and their fear that only loyal people would be given teaching positions. 
The department’s officials did not seem to be too concerned and did not take any 
action. 
To my great surprise, Edith later told me that a Big Five member had ap-
proached her. He asked her if she would like a teaching job at the school. She did 
not have the formal qualifications but was among the best-educated in Indawo 
Yoxolo because she had graduated from secondary school. Edith declined the 
offer, although it was very tempting. The Big Five had probably hoped to incor-
porate some of its opponents, but Edith told me she did not want to have anything 
to do with them. 
 
ANC 
By the end of 1997, the political situation had changed. In October 1997, the ANC 
of the Western Cape Province established a Commission of Inquiry into the alle-
gations of corruption and violence by the Big Five. Some of the complaints against 
the Big Five had reached the provincial body of the ANC and they could no longer 
be ignored.11 The Commission of Inquiry interviewed twenty-seven residents of 
Indawo Yoxolo, who testified about the intimidation, violence, and corruption. The 
residents informed the Commission about the bribes of up to R700 that they were 
forced to pay Big Five members in exchange for plots to which they were already 
entitled. They reported that the Big Five seized plots from legitimate owners and 
sold them to people who did not qualify for an RDP grant. They complained about 
the violence of the Big Five. One plaintiff stated that he had been beaten with the 
                                                          
 
11  The information on the proceedings and results of the Commission of Inquiry is 
from the Commission’s confidential report to the ANC, which was passed on to me 
by an NGO. 
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butt of a firearm and that another man had been shot. The man who was shot had 
not seen who had fired the gun, but had heard from one of the Big Five members 
that it was they who were responsible. Another man testified that one of the Big 
Five members had threatened him at gunpoint. 
The Commission of Inquiry furthermore noted that one of the Big Five had 
attempted to steal money from the German embassy. The embassy had promised 
to donate R15,000 to upgrade one of the schools in Indawo Yoxolo. When the 
teachers collected the cheque at the embassy, they received R12,800. Two Big 
Five members found out about the donation, allegedly through the principal, and 
demanded that the cheque be handed over. The teachers were scared and 
surrendered the cheque immediately, after which they informed the embassy, 
which then blocked the cheque. The Big Five were therefore unable to cash the 
cheque and Nqase forced some teachers to return to the embassy and say that the 
cheque should be unblocked. They were told to say that there had been some 
confusion and that they still wanted to cash the cheque. The embassy, however, 
was suspicious and did not issue another cheque until the teachers had written a 
project proposal. The teachers, as well as the Big Five, left it at that and no further 
attempts were made to get money from the embassy. 
The Commission of Inquiry gave the Big Five members the opportunity to 
respond to the allegations. The Big Five members blamed Councillor Gqoli for the 
problems in Indawo Yoxolo. They were unhappy with the fact that he openly 
supported Mabeqa’s faction and felt that he had no right to interfere in Indawo 
Yoxolo. They responded to the allegations of bribery by saying that they had 
collected a small amount of money from residents (R50 per household) to cover 
their administrative expenses. It was ‘for Tipp-ex and petrol’, as someone put it. 
They denied that they had been selling houses. According to the Big Five, some 
did not want their plots and preferred money instead, so accordingly they had only 
tried to help people to sell their plots and to keep an eye open for prospective 
buyers. 
The Commission of Inquiry drafted a report advising the ANC of the Western 
Cape Province on further actions. The Commission concluded that ‘comrades’ 
were frequently accused of crimes without being guilty of misbehaviour. They 
stated, however, that it was probably true that the Big Five had been selling plots, 
as this was known to happen in many informal settlements in the Western Cape, 
such as Crossroads. The twenty-seven testimonies gave the Commission sufficient 
evidence that four comrades were involved in the illegal selling of plots in Indawo 
Yoxolo, even in the period during which the Commission of Inquiry was already 
in session. 
The Commission furthermore concluded that the scarce availability of re-
sources contributed to the conflicts. Indawo Yoxolo had been incorporated into a 
greater RDP structure, but really wanted a separate RDP structure altogether. They 
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had noticed that some felt that Indawo Yoxolo was neglected and was not 
receiving its share because the adjacent African township was being favoured. 
According to the Commission, the ward councillor and ANC member Mr Gqoli 
had failed to recognise the tensions between Indawo Yoxolo and the adjacent 
African township and should not have interfered. Thus, Mr Gqoli sided with the 
opponents of the Project Committee (the Big Five), and heightened the divisions in 
Indawo Yoxolo. Another factor which, according to the Commission of Inquiry, 
contributed to the conflict was that the DPC had started to hand out money at 
meetings as an incentive to attend. The Project Committee had also tried to mono-
polize meetings by distributing money among their own supporters while sending 
other visitors away. 
The Commission of Inquiry recommended the ANC of the Western Cape take 
action against some of the Big Five. In the twenty-seven testimonies, two of the 
Big Five in particular were accused of the selling of sites to people who were not 
on the application list for RDP housing, the illegal selling of plots, the ‘selling’ of 
an occupied house, and furthermore theft, harassment and intimidation at gunpoint. 
It was recommended that these two be expelled from the ANC for six months. 
Another Big Five member, Mtontsi, was to be given a stern reprimand. Among 
other things, he was accused of harassment, of administering beatings with a fire-
arm, and of the illegal sale of houses. The most severe recommendation concerned 
Zantsi, who was to be permanently expelled from the ANC. Zantsi had, according 
to the twenty-seven testimonies, bribed people, illegally sold their plots, and 
attempted to kill one of the complainants. The Commission did not investigate the 
allegations against Zantsi and these allegations were in fact not the reason for their 
recommendation. Instead, they wanted to expel him because of his lack of party 
loyalty: 
Reason for this stern action [expelling Zantsi from the ANC] are [sic] that he has really 
acted in a devious manner, like leading a march to the ANC office and organizing the 
radio to come thus ridiculing and bringing the name of the organization in disrepute. 
Also there are strong rumours and information which we have investigated and found to 
be true of him inciting a mass meeting in Indawo Yoxolo for people to join the NP or 
Holomisa (UDM) (Commission of Inquiry, 22 October 1997). 
Because some of the Big Five held key positions within SANCO, the 
Commission of Inquiry proposed that SANCO be informed about the problems in 
Indawo Yoxolo. They furthermore noted that the participation of these ‘comrades’ 
in the RDP had to be re-evaluated and that people who wished to take legal action 
should be encouraged to do so. The Commission of Inquiry did not report the 
crimes to the police. The ANC of the Western Cape enforced the Commission’s 
recommendations. However, after one year, Zantsi was re-admitted to the ANC, 
despite the fact that he was supposed to be expelled for life. It was not so much the 
criminal activities of the Big Five that concerned the ANC: they needed a loyal 
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Project Committee in order to establish control over the area. One of the recom-
mendations of the Commission was that a proper ANC branch be established in 
Indawo Yoxolo, which had been absent up to then. Thus, the ANC provided 
political security to the Big Five in return for their political loyalty, and that 
security is one of the parameters of the big men paradigm. 
Thoden van Velzen (1973: 596) has suggested that – in the analysis of power 
relations – it is important to incorporate ‘those who are neither big men nor 
followers’ but relatively independent of big men and relatively powerless. 
Mabeqa’s group and the twenty-seven complainants were neither big men nor 
followers and tried to challenge the political security of the Big Five. The ANC 
recorded the allegations but, after mild punishment, continued to support the Big 
Five. The ANC wanted other political parties to be kept out of Indawo Yoxolo, an 
ANC branch in the area, a stop to relations between the Big Five and SANCO, the 
removal of the councillor from the area and the Big Five’s proof of loyalty to the 
party. Although Mabeqa’s group and the twenty-seven victims of the Big Five’s 
terrorisation were able to express their discontent towards the ANC – just like they 
had protested against the school principal and the Department of Education – such 
protests did not undermine the Big Five’s power. 
 
Challenging Future Dwelling 
Although people were intimidated by the Big Five and realised that it was 
dangerous to challenge them, they had asked for a meeting with Future Dwelling. 
In November 1997, Mabeqa, Michael, Gqiza, Edith, the local SANCO leaders, two 
Gwayta town councillors, and a few other residents of Indawo Yoxolo had a 
meeting with the director of Future Dwelling, Hendrik, and one of the other 
employees. Everyone was aware of the ANC’s Commission of Inquiry into the Big 
Five, but the residents from Indawo Yoxolo were under the impression that the 
inquiry was still taking place as its results and procedures were not yet, and never, 
made public. Therefore, at the time of this meeting, they were uninformed of its 
outcome. 
They met at Future Dwelling’s office, which was not far from Indawo Yoxolo. 
There were no Big Five supporters and it was, therefore, no problem for me to 
attend. Because of the tense atmosphere, Hendrik was not in a position to ask 
about my role in the proceedings, although he was probably not terribly thrilled 
about my presence. I detected that Hendrik was, in any case, visibly unhappy about 
the meeting, but he could not avoid such a large turnout of angry people. The 
residents informed him about the problems they had been experiencing with the 
DPC Project Committee, i.e. the Big Five and Mguye, the Future Dwelling liaison 
officer who was responsible for the contacts with the Project Committee. They 
repeated the allegations they had expressed earlier at the Gwayta Town Council 
meeting, namely that the liaison officer of Future Dwelling had sided with the Big 
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Five and was also involved in corruption. Instead of challenging the corruption and 
violence in Indawo Yoxolo, they protested that Future Dwelling actually supported 
the Big Five. 
The residents felt that that the Big Five were never properly elected and did not 
represent the new residents of Indawo Yoxolo. They told the director that Future 
Dwelling was not the only organisation that chose to ignore the problems: Mr 
Mbuyi, from the Department of Education, also persistently ignored Mabeqa’s 
group and continued to work with the Big Five. 
The response of the employee of Future Dwelling present at the meeting, was 
that Future Dwelling was waiting for the results of a large-scale ANC investigation 
into housing and the RDP in the Cape Metropolitan Area. This investigation was 
separate from the Commission of Inquiry’s investigation of the Big Five. The 
director added: 
Things have changed in Indawo Yoxolo since we started. All political groups have to be 
included which represent the whole community. It has to be an inclusive community 
committee and should be elected. Then we have an accredited RDP forum in Indawo 
Yoxolo. It must include the entire community. 
In attempting to explain the impossibility of establishing a committee that 
would comprise Mabeqa's group and the Big Five, the residents described the 
levels of violence and intimidation. ‘How can you expect us to co-operate with 
people who threatened us and tried to kill one of us?’ they asked the director. He, 
however, kept repeating his ‘formula’ that the Project Committee had to be 
inclusive and completely ignored the objections that were raised. 
As for the Future Dwelling’s liaison officer accused of corruption, the director 
was not willing to take any disciplinary action: ‘One cannot change people’s jobs 
based on some rumours’ was his response. However, he did promise that the 
Liaison Officer would henceforth work in another township and that another 
liaison officer would replace him. It was later rumoured, however, that the 
particular liaison officer initially accused of corruption had continued to keep 
control over the situation in Indawo Yoxolo through the new liaison officer who, 
residents complained, relied heavily on his predecessor’s advice. He also con-
tinued to work with the Big Five and completely ignored Mabeqa’s group. This 
ongoing support of the Big Five led to rumours that Future Dwelling, including its 
director, was also involved in the corruption. There were also speculations about 
the ANC’s involvement because it became apparent that the large-scale investi-
gation into housing and RDP issues in the Cape Metropolitan Area was never 
going to come to conclusion. 
Some regarded the slow pace of the investigation process as a deliberate 
attempt by the ANC to conceal its involvement in corruption. No remarks alluding 
to corruption were made about the National Party (NP), however, despite the fact 
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that they were the largest political party in the Western Cape Province and in the 
Cape Metropolitan Area. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 October 1997 
 
 
Future Dwelling’s approach to the conflict seemed to have been politically 
motivated and, as figure 3.2 clarifies, it meant that the Big Five could remain in 
power. Future Dwelling co-operated with the Big Five because they were the most 
powerful group in Indawo Yoxolo and thus most likely to carry out the 
development projects successfully. Although Future Dwelling used the rhetoric of 
inclusive community representation, their primary concern was simply to get the 
job done. The Big Five’s willingness to use violence worked greatly to their 
advantage because it made them more powerful in Indawo Yoxolo. Future 
Dwelling thus provided the Big Five with the support that made them powerful 
men (cf. Thoden van Velzen 1973). It gave the Big Five control over the 
distribution of resources, ignored their crimes, and provided political security by 
ignoring opponents. The opponents’ main challenge was to influence the distri-
bution of resources and to undermine the Big Five’s political security.  
 
Reconfiguration of the political field 
From January 1998 onwards, the Big Five made attempts to co-operate with the 
National Party. Their position as big men was still secure because Future Dwelling 
kept them on the DPC Policy Committee. But the Commission of Inquiry had led 
to tensions between the Big Five and the ANC. Moreover, the national and 
provincial political landscape had changed and this appeared to influence local 
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political alliances. These changes become clear if one considers the first demo-
cratic elections. 
The 1994 elections resulted in a tremendous victory for the ANC. It secured the 
majority for the national government and had only narrowly missed a two-third 
majority that would have allowed it to draft the new constitution without the co-
operation of other political parties. The ANC had a majority in all the provinces 
except KwaZulu Natal and the Western Cape. In KwaZulu Natal, Buthelezi’s 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) became the largest political party. In the Western 
Cape, the National Party was dominant and, being supported largely by Whites 
and Coloureds, thwarted an ANC victory. The ANC co-operated together with the 
NP and the IFP in the Government of National Unity with ANC leader Nelson 
Mandela as president and the NP leader De Klerk as vice-president. The Govern-
ment of National Unity emphasised that transition had to be peaceful, that the new 
South Africa was inclusive, and that minorities would also have a voice. In the 
Western Cape Province, the NP majority and the ANC minority had also formed a 
similar government of unity. 
Two years later, in June 1996, the NP left the Government of National Unity. It 
felt side-tracked by the ANC and argued that democracy would benefit from a 
strong opposition party. Strategically, it also seemed better for the NP to become 
an opposition party in preparation for the upcoming national elections.12 The break 
between the ANC and the NP in the national government was followed by a 
similar move in the Western Cape. The ANC indicated that it could no longer co-
operate with the NP and argued that it had been completely powerless within the 
provincial government. There was no unity and the NP was said to consistently 
ignore the issues that the ANC put on the agenda. With the next elections in mind, 
the ANC preferred to take up the role of opposition party, withdrew from the 
ministerial posts in the provincial government, and opposed the NP from the 
benches of the provincial parliament. On 20 January 1998, the NP voted in the 
new provincial ministry, which consisted only of White and Coloured men and 
excluded the ANC. At a national level, the ANC could manage without the 
political support of the weakened NP, and at a provincial level the NP was able to 
perform better without the ANC. Among others, Barth (1959: 16) and Scott (1985: 
134) have discussed the dynamics of such a political process, namely that if a party 
in power strives to acquire a smaller majority, or be part of a smaller coalition, or 
of no coalition at all, the power can then be held by a smaller faction.  
                                                          
 
12  One of the consequences was that the post of Minister of Finance, which had been 
occupied by the NP, became available to the ANC. The new Minister of Finance 
(Trevor Manuel) introduced GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution). 
GEAR put more emphasis on a macro-economic restructuring of the economy, 
creation of jobs, and government responsibility than the RDP did. Later increasing 
attention was also paid to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). 
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Those who were aware of this political change – many could not be bothered 
with politics – felt that in the Western Cape the NP was now completely in charge 
of all government activities in the province. The ANC had stepped out of the 
government and, therefore, some felt that they had become unable to provide 
development initiatives for Africans. The Big Five were affected by the with-
drawal of the ANC from the provincial government, as they were continuously in 
need of political security and needed control over the flow of resources to Indawo 
Yoxolo. As a result, the Big Five attempted to co-operate with the NP in the 
adjacent Coloured township Mountain View. It was conjectured that the NP would 
be able to secure the Big Five’s position as controllers over development. For its 
part, Mountain View’s NP was eager to embrace the community leaders of Indawo 
Yoxolo. African support would bolster the party’s image and could attract more 
votes in the upcoming provincial elections. Although the Big Five rubbed 
shoulders with the NP because some had been expelled from the ANC, they did 
not completely alienate themselves from the ANC either. Rather, they carefully 
explored the relationship with the NP while keeping an eye on the ANC. 
Ideological concerns did not appear to be a consideration for the political alliances 
being forged. 
Generally, the residents of Indawo Yoxolo restrained themselves from com-
menting on the political changes. Nobody seemed to like the NP, and many were 
disappointed in the ANC because the RDP ‘houses’ were not really houses, 
poverty was still prevalent, and the ANC had generally failed to fulfil its promises. 
Some wondered how the ANC could provide money and services to Africans once 
they had left the provincial government. Some even suggested that it was better to 
join the NP. An ANC ‘comrade’ in Indawo Yoxolo told me: ‘It is better to be 
oppressed by Whites than by your own people.’ In general, people expressed their 
disappointment about politics and did not bother to discuss political issues, much 
in the same way that they had tried to avoid politics during the apartheid days. 
The Big Five must, at least to some extent, have felt threatened by the changes 
that were taking place. Perhaps it was pure coincidence, but three weeks after the 
new provincial government was installed, Nqase killed Gilbert Mabeqa. Mabeqa 
and Michael were walking around in Indawo Yoxolo on a Friday in the early 
evening when Nqase and Bula approached them. Nqase shot Mabeqa twice, once 
in the back and once in the back of his head. Then Bula shot Nqase in his leg and 
Michael ran for his life. Nqase’s leg wound was later used as an alibi in a court 
case as to claim that Nqase killed Mabeqa out of self-defence. After some time, 
however, Nqase was found guilty for the murder of Mabeqa and consequently 
served a short prison sentence. 
Edith told me the next day that one of the Big Five supporters had visited her 
that morning to inform her of Mabeqa’s murder and also tell her that she was on 
the hit list as well. Later that day, Bula, who was also a Big Five member, visited 
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Edith and proudly notified her that they had taken care of Mabeqa. He advised her 
to leave Indawo Yoxolo because she was going to be the next one to die. Within a 
few days, all the known political opponents of the Big Five fled to Councillor 
Gqoli and went into hiding. Only Edith and Gxyiza remained in Indawo Yoxolo. 
Gxyiza felt he could not abandon his wife and children and said: ‘I am too old to 
run away. If they want me they can come and get me.’ Later that week, when Edith 
was walking to catch a taxi, she was threatened again by one of the Big Five: ‘We 
will do everything, yes everything, to get what we want.’ But he added that they 
were going to wait a while before they would kill again. They were waiting for 
their opponents to come out of their hiding places. It was, after all, much easier to 
kill someone in Indawo Yoxolo than elsewhere in the Cape Flats. 
Edith felt increasingly intimidated and the situation was horrifying. All of 
Mabeqa’s political allies had fled and the Big Five were brimming with confidence 
and were more powerful than ever before. Although some opponents had appealed 
to the police for security measures, nothing came of it. As usual, there were never 
any police officers in Indawo Yoxolo. Everybody, including myself, asked Edith 
to leave Indawo Yoxolo, at least for a while. Edith’s husband was not supportive 
of her departure. Being unemployed at the time, one can imagine that he worried 
about food. He did, however, allow her to stay with his sister in Gwayta, but Edith 
herself did not feel safe at her sister-in-law’s place, which was only about a twenty 
minute walk from Indawo Yoxolo. As is very common, there were also tensions 
between Edith and her sister-in-law. Her sister-in-law admitted that she had 
intended to poison Edith only a few weeks earlier, around Christmas. But because 
everyone was sharing plates, the sister-in-law did not succeed; she had been too 
afraid she would poison the wrong person, possibly her own brother. 
Against her husband’s wishes, Edith went into hiding. A few days later, I 
accompanied her to her place in Indawo Yoxolo so she could see how her child 
was doing and to fetch some clothing. While I was reading the newspaper in front 
of the shack, Edith and her husband started to argue and her husband pulled Edith 
into the shack and tried to lock her in. Edith protested loudly and attempted to 
force the door back open. Her husband, however, had hidden a screwdriver 
beneath his trousers lying on the bed, which he took and stabbed Edith in the hand. 
Edith screamed and her husband continued his attempts to keep her in the shack. 
Edith struggled to break away, but he held her arm, trying to pull her back inside, 
while I, hearing the commotion, dropped my newspaper and started to pull her 
other arm to help her get away. Her husband finally let go and Edith and I went to 
the Groote Schuur hospital for medical treatment. We then went to the police in 
Mountain View but they proved to be very uncooperative. We were left waiting 
for hours on end. Some of the African women who had been waiting there for a 
few days finally left and decided not to report the assaults they had suffered. One 
of the women told me that her husband had shot at her, but had luckily missed. As 
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usual, the police did not take the allegations of domestic violence seriously and 
they did not show any interest in the larger political context of the violence that 
took place in Indawo Yoxolo. Many officers were unidentifiable because they did 
not wear their badges. After we had waited for half a day, I approached one of 
them and insisted on knowing his name and rank. He told me his name and rank 
and anxiously asked me: ‘Why do you want to know this? Are you going to take it 
any further?’ I asked him if he knew what else I could do. Within five minutes, the 
statements were finalised and a police car was ready to accompany Edith to 
Indawo Yoxolo so she could get some clothing. Sometimes it helps to be White. 
On the surface, everything seemed to be back to normal in Indawo Yoxolo. I 
was astonished to see how little visible impact the murder of the leader of the 
opposition to the Big Five had had on most people. A prominent resident was 
killed, but that only took a few minutes and only a few people had to flee Indawo 
Yoxolo. I was surprised that life went on as usual, although the political conse-
quences of this murder were significant. Most residents were too scared and 
intimidated to talk about what had happened and this denial of violence seemed to 
be a successful way of coping with daily life. 
Within a few days it had become impossible to do any research in Indawo 
Yoxolo. The Big Five were in complete control and every vestige of safety had 
disappeared. Those I trusted and who were concerned about my safety had been 
chased away by the Big Five, and even Edith did not want to return to Indawo 
Yoxolo and had found another place to live. In the weeks that followed, I only did 
research outside of Indawo Yoxolo since some residents attended financial 
mutuals meetings in other areas of Cape Town. Moreover, I was aware that I 
should not restrict the research to Indawo Yoxolo or neglect relations with people 
and institutions in other parts of Cape Town. I focused particularly on financial 
mutuals in Khayelitsha and Philippi, where many residents were also recent 
migrants to Cape Town. 
These events revealed the consequences of a participant observation approach 
in conflict situations. The only way to perform my research was to rely on a few 
people and establish trustworthy relations with them. Without such relations, I 
could achieve no insight into these conflicts, their causes, and consequences. 
Nevertheless, the possibilities to do research were also restricted because of the 
limited freedom I had to move around, and the inability to talk freely with all who 
were involved in this conflict. People’s lives were under threat, and a court case 
was pending. In such a situation, one cannot expect people to reveal all their 
actions, motivations, and opinions. 
A few weeks later, Edith and I restarted the research. In the meantime, the 
brother of one of the Big Five members had presented residents of Indawo Yoxolo 
with a contract. It would allow a construction company to use the remains of their 
subsidies to build small one-roomed houses on their plots. Many people wanted to 
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keep the remains of their subsidies because they wanted to join an NGO called 
Victoria Mxenge. This NGO had a housing scheme that enabled the participants to 
save extra money and cut costs by doing the building work themselves. This 
scheme would also enable them to build bigger homes. However, fear of the Big 
Five compelled people to sign the contract anyway. No-one received a copy of the 
contract, nor did they dare complain about the terrible ‘houses’ that were built. 
Mr Mabeqa’s murder led to a court case being brought against Nqase. In 
addition to the murder charge, the police had found two boxes of illegal firearms at 
Nqase’s place and there were further charges related to the murders of one or more 
people in the nearby township of Crossroads. Despite a total of five cases being 
brought against him, he was still released on bail. Just a few days after the murder, 
he was strolling around Indawo Yoxolo, chatting to everyone on the streets. When 
I finished my fieldwork in December 1998 he had still not been convicted, but I 
heard from Mabeqa’s wife that he was finally imprisoned in 1999, more than a 
year after the murder. By the end of the same year, however, he was back on the 
streets of Indawo Yoxolo. 
The Big Five were now more powerful than ever and continued their work as 
the DPC Project Committee. However, Nqase must have been afraid to walk 
around freely. He often wore a white substance smeared on his face. A widespread 
interpretation was that he had visited a diviner or herbalist and had received the 
substance for protection. Overall, however, the murder of Mabeqa confirmed the 
power of the Big Five over the development projects and the people in Indawo 
Yoxolo. The national and provincial political changes, as well as the ANC’s 
Commission of Inquiry were threats to the Big Five. The strategic murder of Mr 
Mabeqa had a successful outcome that reinstated their position of power in times 
of temporary political insecurity. 
 
The wake 
Up to the day of the funeral, every evening at seven o’clock there was a wake at 
Mabeqa’s mother’s place in the nearby township Guguletu. Usually wakes were 
held at the home of the deceased, but for safety reasons the wakes had to be 
relocated to Guguletu. The wakes were well attended, by at least a hundred people. 
The routine at the wakes was that someone, mostly a man, walked forward and 
gave a speech that highlighted his relationship with the deceased and the 
unavoidability of death. After the speech – and sometimes during the speech if an 
elaborate speaker went on for too long – the choir started to perform a well-known 
gospel song and many people sang along. It was difficult for Edith to translate 
what happened during the wakes due to her emotional involvement, but she 
managed to communicate some things to me. I felt uncomfortable writing in my 
notebook during the wakes so I made notes once they were over. Church brothers, 
reverends, neighbours, family members, and friends gave speeches, and all 
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avoided references to the cause of death or its political context. Instead, they high-
lighted the fact that death was unavoidable: it was God’s decision to present bitter 
things to people. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 January/February 1998 
 
 
Only once did the political context of Mabeqa’s death become explicit. One of 
the people present was regarded as a Big Five supporter. Many were shocked that 
he was there and felt that he had come to spy for the Big Five: ‘He wants to find 
out who Mabeqa’s supporters are.’ The already tense atmosphere heightened when 
he stepped forward to give a speech. He said: ‘One word, one heart, one heart, one 
word’, in order to emphasize the unity of the bereaved. The crowd started 
mumbling and people became nervous. The man continued: ‘As some of us have 
to go back to Indawo Yoxolo after this service …’, but the rest of his sentence was 
drowned out by the ensuing noise. The secretary of Mabeqa’s group, Constance, 
had started ululating and dozens of other women joined her. The noise was so loud 
that it was useless for the speaker to continue. Some of the people were angry with 
the ululating women and said: ‘Let him speak first!’ The man was shocked and 
confused and left the stage. The choir started a gospel number in an attempt to 
diffuse the tense atmosphere and to shout down the ululating women. This was 
fairly successful, as the women stopped to join in with the choir. 
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In the meantime, the man who had left the stage was detained by young men on 
the sidewalk. They encircled him and increasingly more men joined in. What 
followed was a fierce debate about what they should do with him. The atmosphere 
was tense and charged and everyone was excited and eager to see some action. 
When I asked Edith: ‘What will they do with him?’, she laughed and made a 
cutting movement with her finger across the front of her neck. She rolled her eyes 
and let her tongue hang out of her mouth, mimicking a murder. Some felt that the 
man should have had the opportunity to speak first and then be killed. Others, 
however, felt he had to be killed straight away and that he should not have the 
opportunity to defend himself. I immediately left and phoned Councillor Gqoli on 
his mobile phone, perhaps the only man who might be able to diffuse the scene. He 
duly arrived and the captive was allowed to go. 
The speaker’s words appeared to be an attempt to reconcile the Big Five and 
Mabeqa’s group, but he had failed completely when the ululating women shouted 
him down. In the ‘battle of the voices’, it was eventually the choir that, at least to 
some extent, was able to stop the acceleration of emotions. In a way, the contest of 
voices resembled a voting system, like one sometimes sees on television shows or 
in the British parliament. The ‘battle of voices’ that was dominated by women was 
in favour of peace, after which the young men captured the Big Five supporter and 
then let him go after having intimidated him. Although Mabeqa’s group were 
severely under threat, they did not retaliate by murdering the Big Five supporter. 
Mabeqa was buried in Gcuwa (Butterworth) in the Eastern Cape, the same 
town that Bula came from. Bula’s family did not attend the funeral. They were 
probably afraid or embarrassed. Mabeqa’s wife, Nopumsile, could not understand 
why they did not come. She felt that they should have. After all, they could not be 
held responsible for their son’s deeds and for the problems in Cape Town. The 
main worry of Nopumsile, who sought refuge with her mother-in-law, was 
Mabeqa’s clothing. The police were in the possession of Mabeqa’s personal 
belongings and she was afraid that the Big Five might use them for witchcraft 
purposes. She said that Mabeqa could not rest until his clothing was returned. 
Mabeqa’s mother shared Nopumsile’s worries. She had recurring nightmares in 
which she saw her son’s face and in which he told her that he wanted his clothes 
back. Although they tried several times, the police refused to give back Mabeqa’s 
clothes and watch. 
The clothes were also Mabeqa’s neighbour’s concern. She dreamt about them 
twice. In her dream, she entered Mabeqa’s house and saw that everything was 
broken. The doors of Mabeqa’s wardrobe, which together with the bed and cup-
board, was the only piece of furniture they possessed, were open. She said it was a 
terrible dream. We told her that Mabeqa’s clothes were missing and she was 
convinced that this explained her dreams. She said it was very likely that Nqase 
took them from the police to a witch (igqwirha) in order to inflict more pain on 
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people. Nqase was seen with white substance on his face for protection. Some-
times, a diviner (igqirha) could also be a witch (igqwirha), and the white substance 
on Nqase’s face was proof that he had already visited a witch. 
 
 
A new opposition 
 
In the following months, the Big Five and their supporters killed three more 
residents of Indawo Yoxolo. One was a known opponent of the Big Five, and 
another was the younger brother of an opponent. They shot the latter through the 
corrugated iron wall of his shack because they mistook him for his older brother. A 
Big Five supporter also kicked a twelve-year-old child to death, as I already 
mentioned in chapter two. Michael, who witnessed the murder of Mabeqa, was 
also shot at. His story was confusing and seemed inconsistent. He told me that he 
was taken by surprise late at night when people entered his shack. He claimed they 
were police officers sent by the Big Five, and that they first shot him in the hand, 
and then in the stomach and leg. He said he was unarmed, but because he was first 
shot in his hand it seemed logical to me that he had either held a weapon or was 
reaching for one. Half-a-year after the shooting he was still a crippled shadow of 
the strong and confident man he used to be. 
The murder of Mabeqa and the destruction of the opposition to the Big Five led 
to more political changes in Indawo Yoxolo. ‘Shooter’ – a telling nickname – 
claimed to be related to SANCO. Before Mabeqa’s death, it appeared that he also 
opposed the Big Five, although he was not a prominent figure. Rumour had it that 
he had switched sides and joined the Big Five. Sometimes for weeks in a row, 
residents saw Shooter walking around at three o’clock at night. Every couple of 
minutes he fired a shot in the air, waking and terrifying the people in the vicinity. 
Due to the bad state of the shacks and RDP houses, it was quite possible that one 
of his many bullets would eventually pierce through a wall, window, or roof and 
injure someone. 
Shooter joined the leader of the Big Five, Zantsi, and they established a 
SANCO interim committee for Indawo Yoxolo. The SANCO interim committee 
had planned elections for 6 September. They were held during a meeting at a 
public area in Indawo Yoxolo. Although this was a public place, it was regarded as 
a space controlled by the Big Five because they usually held their meetings there. 
Because of this location, and the central role of Zantsi and Shooter in its 
organisation, the meeting was attended mainly by Big Five supporters and curious 
bystanders. Most residents of Indawo Yoxolo, however, were uninterested or too 
scared to oppose Shooter and Zantsi. At this ‘election’, Shooter and Zantsi elected 
themselves. Shooter became the chairperson and Zantsi a board member. 
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Shortly after the elections, a long-lasting dispute over housing grants and the 
allocation of plots started between Shooter and Zantsi. Some residents still lived in 
the squatter settlement and had yet to move to their new plots. Future Dwelling 
continued threats to evict them but had not yet taken any action. However, due to 
the unwillingness or inability to bribe the Big Five, they were forced to stay in the 
squatter settlement. The Big Five and Shooter, who also had his own supporters, 
were fighting about the exact number of residents on that particular site. This 
conflict caused a rift between Shooter and Zantsi. According to Zantsi, there were 
312 households on the site in question that qualified for a plot. Shooter argued that 
there were 424 households, because this was the number of people officially 
registered on the DPC’s housing list, a list controlled by the Big Five. Zantsi, 
however, had made an actual count with members of the city council’s Housing 
Committee after a meeting on 8 October. They had counted 312 households. 
Shooter questioned this count because a councillor who was known to be loyal to 
Zantsi had chaired the meeting and organised the count. The discrepancy of nearly 
a hundred households fed allegations of corruption against the Big Five. They 
were rumoured to have registered people who did not qualify for housing subsidies 
and to have bribed them, or to have sold plots to people who were not even 
registered. 
The dispute between Shooter and Zantsi was not only due to this incident. An 
analysis of the parameters of the big men paradigm provides a basic structural 
explanation for this conflict. Again, national and provincial political processes 
appeared to influence local political relations. In September 1997, Bantu Holomisa 
and Roelf Meyer established a new political party: the United Democratic 
Movement (UDM). Bantu Holomisa headed the Transkei under the apartheid 
regime and, after the 1994 elections, he became the national deputy minister of 
environmental affairs. He was expelled from government and the ANC, and the 
general opinion was that this was because he had complained of the ANC not 
adequately addressing the problem of corrupt party members. Roelf Meyer was a 
young NP politician who had played a major role in the 1992-93 negotiations that 
had led to the abolition of apartheid. Meyer felt increasingly dissatisfied with the 
NP’s inability to reform and attract black voters. Together they presented the 
UDM as an alternative party, which was not based on race, and which, unlike the 
NP and the ANC, was not embedded in the history of apartheid. It was expected 
that their main stronghold was going to be in the Eastern Cape, because Bantu 
Holomisa had been the leader of the Transkei homeland. 
Virtually all African migrants in Cape Town were Xhosa and came from 
Emaxhoseni, of which Transkei was a part. The UDM wanted to gain support in 
Cape Town for the 1999 elections. The opponents of the UDM expected them to 
attract many voters. Because of the large support that the NP had previously 
received, voting behaviour in this province was more crucial than in other 
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provinces where it was clear that the ANC was going to win. After he was 
approached by the UDM, Shooter established a UDM branch in Indawo Yoxolo. 
The new political opportunities expected to emerge after the elections prompted 
Shooter to turn his back against the Big Five, but some still regarded him as a Big 
Five ally and suspected that the opposition was fake. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4  September/October 1998 
 
 
Although Zantsi had been expelled from the ANC for life as punishment for his 
lack of loyalty, he was re-admitted by the end of 1998. Probably with the next 
elections in mind, the ANC judged it wise to retain among their ranks a powerful 
leader in Indawo Yoxolo. Consequently, the Big Five turned its back on Mr Vogel, 
the local councillor for the NP in Mountain View. Although there was a court case 
in process against Nqase – and after my return to the Netherlands I heard of court 
cases against other Big Five members – the Big Five remained the most powerful 
political group. The ANC had won the 1999 elections for that ward and Zantsi was 
appointed councillor to Indawo Yoxolo. 
Two opposing groups had developed once again. It seemed to be a central 
characteristic of politics in Indawo Yoxolo that, as soon as one opposition force 
was destroyed, a new political opponent emerged. The new opposition was a fence 
sitter, if not an ally to the Big Five. African political structures, especially in Zulu 
history, have been characterised as systems of fission and fusion (Gluckman 1971; 
Kuper 1997: 74-77; Shapera 1956). Gluckman (1971: 25-26) argues that relation-
ships among Zulu should be understood within the context of relationships 
between Whites and Zulu. The temporal equilibrium of Zulu social structure could, 
since colonialism, only be understood by incorporating the role of Whites. Simi-
larly to how development projects work in contemporary South Africa, colonial 
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rule was channelled through ‘tribal’ chiefs who enabled control over Africans and 
allowed certain Africans to become powerful leaders. Shooter’s fence sitting in 
Indawo Yoxolo seems to illustrate Gluckman’s analysis of a situation where two 
unequal groups exist, in which membership could not be changed:13 
‘Where there are unequal groups and membership can not be changed... Dissident 
members of the superior group may become leaders of these new interest-groups within 
the inferior. Conversely, some members of the inferior group become interest-groups 
assisting the superior and standing opposed to the mass of their own group’ (Gluckman 
1971: 48). 
Continued opposition against the Big Five was an expression of discontent by 
some residents of Indawo Yoxolo. The marginal residents of Indawo Yoxolo tried 
to challenge the political security and flow of resources. This took place through 
the fissions and fusions expressing the tensions and alliances between people. RDP 
development created a temporal equilibrium in Indawo Yoxolo, which was 
‘disturbed’ by national and provincial political changes, and a new opposition 
emerged. Clearly, conflict was central to the temporal equilibrium in Indawo 
Yoxolo. 
The changing political landscape and the murder of Mabeqa and other oppo-
nents eventually bore no consequences for the relationship between the Big Five 
and Future Dwelling. Future Dwelling’s support of the Big Five could not be 
attributed to a lack of information. DPC’s own Bulletin of June 1998 warned 
against corruption: 
 
WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! 
No one should be made to pay money to be allocated a site in any DPC housing 
project for families with a household income of less than R1500 per month. The site 
and house is free and fully subsidised by the government. 
No community leader or unauthorised person is allowed to allocate sites/houses. 
There are no shortcuts! No one can pay to be nominated as a beneficiary of a house 
or site in the DPC. 
If you have any queries you can contact: The Project Facilitator. Tel. xxx Fax. xxx 
 
The pamphlet caused a stir in Indawo Yoxolo. It did not reveal who the project 
facilitator was, but people suspected Mguye because he had co-operated with the 
Big Five before. People were afraid that the project facilitator would inform the 
Big Five about their phone calls and kill them. Instead of a warning, the notice was 
regarded as a trap set by the Big Five in order to find out who their opponents 
                                                          
 
13  This is the situation that Gluckman (1971) describes which most closely resembles 
the political situation in Indawo Yoxolo. 
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were. This was an understandable fear considering Future Dwelling’s attitude 
towards the conflict. To my knowledge, nobody dared to phone Future Dwelling. 
The Big Five, however, did not like the pamphlet at all, which suggested it was 
not a trap. However, in such a politically charged and tense situation, it became 
difficult to distinguish the truth from paranoid interpretations. Eunice, a neighbour 
of Edith’s, told me that Ma Ntshona had asked her to help distribute the pamphlets 
throughout the neighbourhood. Ma Ntshona was the Big Five supporter who was 
liaison officer for Leed Construction and a parent’s representative at the school 
(although she had no children in Indawo Yoxolo). The Big Five discovered that 
Eunice had distributed the pamphlets, and she told me that some of them had paid 
her a visit. They informed her that the Big Five had held a meeting about this 
incident and were discussing what they should do with her. They were in doubt, 
they said. Some were in favour of shooting her, while others felt that it was more 
appropriate to burn her alive, but one of them had convinced them all that it was 
better to talk with Eunice first so she could offer a defence. Eunice feared for her 
life, and told them that the pamphlets came from Ma Ntshona. Because Ma 
Ntshona supported the Big Five, she did not think that they would object, and the 
Big Five did indeed decide to leave her alone. They gave Ma Ntshona a R150 fine 
instead. Eunice was very relieved and felt that Ma Ntshona received such a small 
punishment because the Big Five did not want to alienate her. Ma Ntshona knew a 
lot about their crimes and could easily go to the police should they turn her against 
them. Apart from this pamphlet, I noticed no other attempts by Future Dwelling or 
other DPC organisations to discontinue their support of the Big Five or prevent 
violence in Indawo Yoxolo. 
In 2006, there were again local government elections. Zantsi was the ANC 
candidate but residents wondered if he was going to win as his popularity had 
decreased and the development project was nearing its end. It appeared that with 
the finalisation of the development project his power base had started to weaken. 
Yet it was not the police, an NGO, or political problem that threatened Zantsi. It 
was his girlfriend. She was getting increasingly upset that Zantsi was seeing 
another girlfriend and was neglecting her. As a result, she eventually called a 
community meeting in the beginning of November 2005 in order to ask the 
residents to help her solve the problems she had with Zantsi. At the meeting, 
because she was angry, she put forward a lot of complaints about her boyfriend. 
She told everyone that he was having an affair with another woman, stole an RDP 
house from its legitimate owners and gave it to her, and had also misappropriated 
funds. Allegations such as these revealed that her loyalty towards Zantsi had 
ended. After this meeting, the ANC suspended Zantsi and took away a van that he 
had misappropriated. Moreover, unlike in the previous local government elections, 
there was a contender. Similarly to Shooter, this opponent also used to be affiliated 
with the Big Five but had distanced himself from them and became a candidate for 
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the Universal Party (UP). At least in Indawo Yoxolo, some considered this very 
small party to be a serious threat to the ANC’s dominant position. It was expected 
to attract Coloured voters who felt discriminated against by the ANC. The distrust 
of the ANC was strengthened after it was discovered in July 2005 that the advisor 
to Cape Town’s major, Blackman Ngoro, had written in an editorial on the 
Website of the Afro Rights Committee in Asia that Africans are “culturally 
superior” to coloureds, who, unless they underwent an “ideological transform-
ation”, would “die a drunken death”.14 Although the advisor was eventually fired, 
the confidence with which members of the ANC expressed such racism only fed 
the feelings of alienation among Coloureds. In Indawo Yoxolo, the emergence of 
the Universal Party created new terrain for political entrepreneurs. Some residents 
of Indawo Yoxolo believed, however, that if the UP councillor were to win the 
elections he would immediately leave the UP and join the ANC. With the 
marginalisation of Zantsi, due to decreasing development funds and an angry 
girlfriend, this became a likely scenario. 
Only a few weeks before the elections, it became clear that Zantsi was still 
standing as local councillor for Indawo Yoxolo. The ANC had split Indawo 
Yoxolo into two wards and without publicly readmitting Zantsi to the ANC, Zantsi 
had become the ANC candidate of the western ward. His UP opponent had left the 
UP and had become the ANC candidate for the other eastern part of Indawo 
Yoxolo.15 After the elections, Indawo Yoxolo was confronted with two ANC 
councillors, one for the eastern half, and one for the western half. Very soon, 
however, residents felt that Zantsi was the councillor for the whole of Indawo 
Yoxolo and rumour had it that he had intimidated and chased his opponent out of 
the area. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The development dream was shattered, even to those who had not believed in the 
dream that much from the start. The plans of the ANC proved too ambitious and 
the utopian vision for South Africa had to be relinquished. This can partly be seen 
in a policy shift by the government away from development towards strengthening 
a market economy through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programs. As 
                                                          
 
14  Marianne Merten, Racist Website Wars in W Cape, Mail and Guardian, July 22: 
2005, online on  
 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=246100&area=/insight/insight__nati
onal/ 
15  The UP election results were very poor. In the Cape Metropolitan Area, they only 
received one out of the 210 council seats. 
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the case of Indawo Yoxolo shows, the ideology defining community and develop-
ment was problematic. Conflict and violence accompanied the actual development 
projects. The many reports on conflict in service delivery, particularly when it 
concerns housing, give the impression that Indawo Yoxolo is not a unique case.16 
According to field workers of a Cape Town based NGO working in the field of 
conflict resolution, the conflicts in Indawo Yoxolo were also present in Crossroads 
and more recently in the housing developments in Joe Slovo Park near Langa. The 
RDP policies led to a type of authoritarian rule through its provision of political 
security and resources to a group of powerful local leaders. This exemplified 
virtually the only state presence in Indawo Yoxolo, as was the case in many other 
settlements where African migrants started to live. 
Far from being hegemonic in nature, development gave rise to, or fuelled, 
existing conflicts concerning the distribution of resources. There were people who 
attempted to challenge the way development gave rise to a ruthless regime by a 
few powerful people. Their attempts to question the distribution of resources and 
political security had hardly any effect as they were systematically ignored (Bähre 
2005). These political struggles were central to the relations defined by the 
migrants and no neutrals were allowed in this conflict. 
The post-apartheid state was most manifest through violent development and it 
was in this context that migrants tried to organise their financial mutuals. Financial 
mutuals were attempts to create some sort of safe havens and withdraw into small 
social circles, even if they were only temporary. Most financial mutuals were 
organised among neighbours who lived very close to each other, and together they 
hoped to build something that allowed them to feel secure and valued. Financial 
mutuals were, as the next chapters will show, defence mechanisms against the 
political, economic, and psychological threats that people experienced, not in the 
least as a result of the development economy. 
Needless to say, violence and conflict made it difficult for me to do research. I 
could not move around freely, was not able to talk with everybody, and was 
dependent on a few people, particularly my research assistant. In this conflict, 
there was no place for any neutrals, meaning that, with a substantial number of the 
residents of Indawo Yoxolo, I was unable to hold fruitful conversations. Violence 
made people suspicious and hesitant to talk about political events. However, at 
least I was aware of this limitation and appreciated how financial mutuals were 
embedded in this political-economic field. In addition to the methodological 
obstacle that violence caused, it was crucial to understand the interplay with social 
relations on which financial mutuals were built. I was able to evaluate the way in 
which violence and distrust had an impact on people’s actions, what they were 
willing to say and to whom. 
                                                          
 
16  See Fakir’s (1999) newspaper article on community project and ideology. For an 
examination of the quest, as well as the problems of ‘community’, see Baumann 
(2001). 
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Creating mutuals:  
Reluctant solidarity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
How did Xhosa migrants who hardly knew each other and lived under abominable 
circumstances form financial mutuals? It was a challenge to co-operate with neigh-
bours in the context of the threatening triad of violence, economic insecurity, and 
volatile relations. Most migrants did not want to be involved in local politics or 
civil organisations, even if such organisations could have a huge influence on their 
lives. They were preoccupied with the immediate problems of money and volatile 
relations and, therefore, people tended to organise themselves around these con-
cerns only. The close-knit networks among Xhosa neighbours were less threat-
ening than the ‘outside world’ was (see also Wacquant 1997; Reis 1998).1 Finan-
cial mutuals that were organised by neighbours were, therefore, less vulnerable to 
the outside world and co-operation with neighbours felt safer. 
Financial mutuals were the first organisations that migrants developed – except 
for the organisation of violence and development. This chapter discusses the way 
in which neighbours established financial mutuals with each other. As the neigh-
bours did not want to co-operate with everybody, it was inevitable that some had 
                                                          
 
1  Reis used Banfield’s (1958) concept of ‘amoral familism’ to highlight how, in a 
situation of insecurity and deprivation, one’s relations can be extended beyond kin 
relations. See also Laughlin (1974) on deprivation and changing relations. 
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to be excluded. The process of exclusion was bound up with identification pro-
cesses, i.e. ‘you are one of us’ or ‘you are not one of us’. Social exclusion was a 
precarious process for neighbours who were confronted with each other on a daily 
basis. The processes of identification revealed why some could join, while others 
were not allowed to participate or were only able to participate marginally. Many 
financial mutuals closed in November and December. People evaluated the past 
year and decided if they wanted to continue, break up, or start a new group. Most 
of the residents of Indawo Yoxolo had left their previous settlements only months 
before and they now had the first opportunity to leave the financial mutuals in the 
old area and establish new ones in Indawo Yoxolo. What were the important 
factors for including or excluding potential members and what social dynamics 
were part of excluding particular neighbours? 
 
 
Exclusive values 
 
In his discussion of collective insurances De Swaan (1996a: 155-157) notes that 
small, voluntary collective care arrangements tended to exclude people with a low 
status and little capital, while, at the same time, people embraced those with a high 
status. This also proved to be true for financial mutuals in South Africa (cf. 
Burman & Lembete 1995: 43). People who had little money did not organise their 
own financial mutuals based on lower contributions. The likely reason why those 
excluded did not establish their own organisations was of a social nature. After all, 
they were excluded mostly for moral reasons and these ‘outcasts’ were not likely 
to join hands and trust one another. Moral and social indicators were much more 
relevant than one’s financial situation for inclusion in or exclusion from financial 
mutuals. Financial circumstances, in fact, were difficult for neighbours, colleagues, 
or abakhaya to judge. Unemployment and underemployment meant that a person’s 
financial situation could fluctuate greatly within short periods. Income was also 
difficult to measure because people often concealed their financial situation from 
others. People would hide their wealth to prevent certain claims from kin, while at 
other times they would hide their poverty out of embarrassment. Still others did 
not always have a clear picture of their own financial situations. Adversity, risk, 
and potential claims or contributions from kin or household members meant that 
one’s financial situation largely depended on others. To judge the financial 
situation of others was even more difficult, and that made it an inappropriate 
yardstick for exclusion. In the end, the decisive variables were moral and social. A 
person’s financial situation did not necessarily say anything about his or her 
feelings of solidarity and responsibility, since a rich person could also default. A 
much more relevant factor as regards inclusion was how people valued particular 
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relationships and how they gossiped about them. Based on these judgements, 
people were eager to identify with some and reluctant to identify with others.2  
For Xhosa migrants, violence, economic insecurity and volatile relations made 
moral guidance ever more pressing. Moreover, status conversion – the conversion 
of economic power into status, prestige, and moral superiority – meant that moral 
evaluations of others were, at least partly, embedded in economic circumstances.3 
People suffering from hunger, malnutrition, disease and abuse are no longer able to 
behave appropriately without money. It was only by having some money that a 
person could live up to the standards that made others want to associate with him 
or her. For the Xhosa migrants, moral evaluations concerned three values in 
particular: ‘helping each other’, ‘taking care of oneself’, and respect. These values, 
the ambiguities they carry, and how they interplay within particular social con-
figurations were at the core of separating those who were ‘one of us’ from people 
who one preferred to reject.  
‘To help’, or ukunceda, was highly valued, as is clear from the names of the 
financial mutuals described in chapter two. At one ROSCA meeting, a member 
stressed the importance of helping in a song that she sang for a fellow member: 
 
Jesus, you are a friend of the soul, 
I am coming to you to help this heart, 
I have no other hope, which I can build on to, 
No other place to help myself. 
 
Many desperately needed help to survive the threatening triad of violence, 
economic insecurity, and volatile relations. As grandma Doris said in a prayer at 
her ROSCA (umgalelo): ‘Let God help us, as we come from nothing.’ Even if only 
in small ways, people did try to help one another. Those who gave money and 
goods to their fellow financial mutual members expressed humility and gave 
speeches emphasising that ‘it is only something small that I give you’, or ‘I know 
it is not much, but it comes straight from the heart’. 
In addition to the role of the financial mutuals, neighbours, colleagues, and 
friends tried to help. Frequently, neighbours borrowed money or asked for some 
food and promised to pay it back. Even if people did not return the favours, this 
did not automatically mean that someone could never ask for help anymore. The 
                                                          
 
2 Lamont (1992) has analysed how even people with a lot of money, like the French 
and American upper-middle classes, apply moral standards for identification and 
exclusion. The upper-middle classes of Lamont’s study invested in and worried 
about morals. Their opinions were at the front lines of social boundaries. 
3  See Bourdieu (1984) and De Swaan (2000: 57) on status conversion. Van der Geest 
(1997) reveals how pivotal money was for morality and the value of relationships in 
Ghana. 
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lack of money was a constant theme running through the migrants’ lives. The help 
that one could offer was limited and, as the entanglement of sex, blood, and money 
revealed, the directional flow of money had drastic consequences for the relation-
ships one had with people. This was the great advantage of financial mutuals, 
namely that people could help fellow members without incurring too much 
expense because members had to reciprocate the help they received. Other help, 
such as from colleagues and neighbours, was restricted and rarely concerned more 
than a few rand. Only at public events, such as funerals or initiations, could com-
petition cause people to contribute relatively large sums of money.4 More impor-
tant was the help and assistance that people received through kinship relations. 
Many complained about the stress of obligations and people’s unwillingness to 
help, but it was nevertheless a last resort for shelter and food. 
People also stated how important it was to take care of oneself properly. Con-
trary to what one might expect, accumulation could be legitimate if money was 
needed to take care of oneself. Many men, for example, supported their wife’s or 
girlfriend’s participation in financial mutuals. Many men knew about the financial 
mutuals, although they were often kept in the dark about the details and felt that it 
was good to accumulate money in order to buy something that was worthwhile, 
such as cooking utensils, furniture, or clothing. Nokwanda was a case in point. She 
moved from Khayelitsha to Indawo Yoxolo by the end of 1996 and participated in 
a ROSCA called Masiqumane, which, as she explained, meant ‘let us cover each 
other’s back’. The ROSCA members contributed R20 per week and additional 
small gifts. When I asked her what the attraction of Masiqumane was for her, she 
replied: 
Some of us are unemployed and our husbands have little money. Although we have 
little money we want to buy other things than only food. If you buy groceries and come 
back with a kettle instead, the husband will complain: “Why do you buy a kettle and no 
food?!” But not when you have it via the umgalelo. Then the husband thinks it is good 
and says: “Look what these women are doing!” 
The other women who were present at the meeting laughed and recognised this 
kind of behaviour. They also used the money for things like a kettle, curtains, and 
so on, and their husbands were glad that they accumulated money in their ROSCA. 
During a meeting of another ROSCA, a woman told us how she had tried to use 
the ROSCA to fool her husband. She had joined a small ROSCA and when it was 
her turn she used the money to buy groceries. On her way back home, she dropped 
her shopping bags off at her neighbour Thandi and went home to tell her husband: 
‘I need money from you to buy groceries, otherwise we won’t have anything to 
eat.’ He gave her money and she visited her friend Thandi, had a cup of tea, saved 
herself a trip to town, and returned home with the shopping bags. Instead of 
                                                          
 
4  See also Kiernan (1988) on Zulu Zionist churches. 
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spending the money, she pocketed it and used it for something else. She said that 
she was certain that her husband knew nothing about it, but one evening they had 
an argument. Her drunken husband shouted: ‘Ah, you should keep quiet. I know 
that you do your shopping at Thandi’s place.’ Her husband had known it for 
months and the women at the meeting burst out in laughter. Later he told his wife 
that he had not said anything because he felt it was a good idea that his wife 
accumulated some money. The woman said that her husband had told her that he 
had been waiting for the opportunity to use it against her. 
Rich people were looked up to and people wanted to identify with them rather 
than with poor people. Didi Burial Society, for example, had split up after a 
controversy over status and support. Some members had refused to pay for the 
funeral of a poor member while they were more than willing to pay for the funeral 
of a rich man’s daughter. The fact that this rich man was not even a member of the 
burial society had fuelled the tensions. On the one hand, wealth could evoke 
feelings of jealousy and envy because people aspired to it. At the same time, 
however, many tried hard to look their best, even if they had little money. The 
value that was attached to accumulation could conflict with ‘helping each other’. 
Having little money meant you had to make difficult decisions about who to help, 
for what goal, how to accumulate, and how to spend. 
The third value was respect. Men, in particular, could talk at great length about 
the reciprocal nature of respect and ways to earn dignity. Violence and the undig-
nified poverty made it ever more important to relate to others in a respectful way 
and be treated the same. The selection of members of financial mutuals was firmly 
rooted in the way one showed respect to others. Respect was related to habitus: the 
way a person behaved verbally and physically, how one spoke to elders, body 
language, and the actual shape of one’s body. It was felt to be degrading and 
insulting to show no respect to others. Showing respect was crucial for the main-
tenance of proper relations, which also meant that one would comply with the 
hierarchies embedded within them: ‘How can you expect a child to respect you if 
you don’t show respect to the child?’ 
To show respect, one had to address a person properly. ‘Father’ or ‘mother’ 
were reserved for older people, while ‘brother’ or ‘sister’ were used for people of 
one’s own age. The tone of voice should be soft, a handshake gentle and slow. It 
was even more respectful to greet by sticking out one’s right hand while sup-
porting it by holding it at the wrist with one’s left hand. Bending slightly forward 
or bending one’s knees a bit when shaking someone’s hand was also part of the 
body language that denoted respect. Prolonged eye contact had to be avoided. If 
one gave or received something, especially something valuable, such as money, it 
was respectful to give or receive it with two hands. Proper receiving was done by 
letting the other person put it in the palms of one’s hand, and not by taking it out of 
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the hands of the giver. These social conventions conveyed humility, vulnerability, 
and respect. 
For women, there were particular ways of showing respect. Married women 
had to follow rules of avoidance concerning their affinal ancestors (ukuhlonipa). 
Moreover, having children was crucial for a woman’s respectability and status: ‘If 
you don’t have children or can’t have children, they don’t even treat you as a 
person’, I was told by a woman without children. Her husband and her affines 
abused another woman because the couple did not have any children. Together 
with her belongings and children she was thrown out onto the street and had to live 
with residents elsewhere in the Cape Flats. It was deeply humiliating for her not to 
have children, and everybody talked about her. Although some felt sorry for her, 
she was ostracised nevertheless. In another instance, Umatoto, who wanted to join 
a ROSCA, was excluded because she was childless. She had pretended that her 
sister’s children were hers, but was quickly found out, after which she was told to 
leave the ROSCA. 
If one is extremely destitute, abused, uneducated, or an alcoholic it is virtually 
impossible to give respect to others and, therefore, it is impossible to be respected. 
In general, Africans treat beggars with great contempt. Being poor was regarded as 
embarrassing enough, but to ask for money while doing nothing was disrespectful 
and infuriated those who tried hard to get by and live decently. I vividly remember 
the treatment of children who were sometimes begging for money and food at the 
traffic lights in Indawo Yoxolo. The driver in front of me indicated to the child that 
he had some money for him. When the child approached him, the driver stretched 
out his hand and, instead of giving money, grabbed the child’s hand firmly and 
waited for the light to turn to green. In the meantime he stepped on the accelerator 
and clutch to make the engine roar, pretending to prepare to drive away at a great 
speed while dragging the child along. Eventually, the driver let go of the child and 
drove away laughing, while the child’s peers joined in on the laughing. Another 
variation was to slap the begging child’s hand fiercely. I was assured that this 
would teach the children not to beg but show some respect. The general opinion 
anyway was that these children were only begging for fun so they could buy 
sweets and skip school. 
To sum up, ‘helping each other’, ‘taking care of oneself’, and respect were 
crucial values that determined inclusion and exclusion. People who complied with 
these values were more likely to be included, while those who did not help others, 
did not take care of themselves properly, and behaved disrespectfully were not 
welcome. What complicated the processes of exclusion was that these three values 
could be ambiguous and in conflict with one another, especially if one had little 
money. ‘Helping each other’ centred on sharing, while ‘taking care of oneself’ 
valued accumulation. Precarious choices had to be made about whom to help, and 
how to take care of oneself. Furthermore, the reciprocal nature of respect meant 
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that those who gave respect also deserved respect. But what if a person did not 
give respect? This presented a dilemma, namely whether to treat a person with 
contempt or to uphold one’s standards and nevertheless treat that person respect-
fully.  
 
 
Poor reputations 
 
During many conversations it became clear that it was felt that people were, at 
least to some extent, to blame for their own misery.5 People demonstrated their 
distance from them with jokes, gossip and abuse. A process of disidentification 
(see De Swaan 1997) took place, which meant that feelings of hatred and revulsion 
dominated. These feelings and the stigmatisation that accompanied them allowed 
the exclusion of people. Moreover, such feelings could legitimise a person’s 
malicious behaviour towards that person. Reputation was pivotal for the ways 
people perceived each other, and judged each other’s behaviour: 
The small politics of everyone’s everyday life is about reputations; about what it means 
to ‘have a good name’; about being socially bankrupted; about gossip and insult and 
‘one-upmanship; in short, about the rules of how to play ‘the social game’ and how to 
win it’ (Bailey 1971: 2-3). 
The three values were embedded in the creation of reputation, and thus these 
values defined a social phenomenon that extended beyond the relations of those 
directly involved. By means of gossip, a person’s reputation had more effect than 
his or her own immediate interactions with others as regards introducing him or 
her into a wider social configuration. Once a reputation was established, it was 
very difficult to escape it and people rarely expressed disagreement about the 
reputation of neighbours (cf. Elias & Scotson 1965: 6). Reputation meant that 
some were ‘one of us’, and others ‘one of them’. Depending on the emotional 
processes of identification and disidentification, people were excluded or included 
from a financial mutual. This opinion was not a private one, but rather – through 
gossip and the politics of reputation – was subject to a social process in which 
people tended to agree on a person’s morals, social skills, and financial abilities. 
Although the neighbours in Indawo Yoxolo hardly knew one another, 
reputations emerged very quickly and were based on little information. Although 
reputation was not directly based on money, one nevertheless needed money to 
help others, take care of oneself, earn respect, and be respected. Without money it 
was impossible to adhere to these values and live a decent life. Poverty was felt to 
                                                          
 
5  See also Howe (1998) on Belfast where unemployment is explained in terms of 
individual incapacities while more structural aspects of poverty and unemployment 
are not acknowledged. 
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be embarrassing and I found it a difficult topic to address. My own wealth, 
education, and future prospects contrasted sharply with theirs and that made it 
uncomfortable to ask questions that concerned their poverty. When I had 
established some trust, people eventually began to tell me about particular conflicts 
and worries that were related to poverty. However, it was always difficult to 
discuss whether people felt embarrassed, jealous, angry, or other emotional dimen-
sions of destitution. It was uncomfortable and appeared to have a considerable 
disturbing effect on the person with whom I had the conversation. In response to 
this, it was tempting to distance myself, also in writing, through cynicism, irony, 
and black humour. Although such defences were at times unavoidable, as with 
many neighbours in Indawo Yoxolo, they had to be contained. After all, they could 
hinder an analysis of the situation. 
The best illustration of how reputations were established within a very brief 
time is through an account of some of the neighbours of my research assistant, 
which shows the experiences and rumours on which gossip was based and how 
they influenced a person’s reputation. It also highlights how vital money was for 
one’s reputation and its moral effects. Many of these neighbours will also appear 
in the case study of the funeral. 
My research assistant Edith lived in a bright green, two-roomed shack with her 
husband Zama and their nine-year-old child Nana. At times, other people joined 
the household, like Zama’s brother and Edith’s sister’s son Thomas. Edith, Zama 
and the child used to live in Paula Park, an informal settlement near Guguletu. 
There they applied for an RDP subsidy and moved to Indawo Yoxolo in April 
1997. Edith belonged to one burial society and she had just started an umgalelo 
together with three grandmothers who lived about 200 metres away from her 
house. In order to learn more about ROSCAs and to get to know people better, I 
too joined this ROSCA. Every member contributed R200 per month. Edith 
considered joining one of the new organisations in the neighbourhood, but in the 
beginning of 1998, it was not certain which initiatives would finally materialise. In 
early 1998, she joined an ASCRA for her children (see the next chapter on this 
ASCRA). 
Edith’s neighbour was nicknamed Magazi, after a deceitful movie character. 
He was known to have many girlfriends, among others the daughter of his 
girlfriend, and he was the minister of a small independent church that gathered in 
the living room of his two-roomed shack. He did not belong to any financial 
mutual, nor did the girlfriend with whom he lived. Magazi claimed that his church 
had an umgalelo together with other branches of the church, but some members of 
the congregation said that he was lying, as there were never meetings with other 
branches. Just like most of the neighbours, I was not particularly fond of him and 
could easily agree about his reputation. However, like many of his neighbours, I 
tried my best to hide my feelings and continued to engage in polite conversation. 
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To avoid insulting him by accident, I always called him brother (bhuti). I used to 
address him as father (tata), but I found out that he was not that old. More 
importantly, I felt that he had endangered my life and that of my girlfriend Esther 
when he drove us to his brother’s funeral. He drove like a madman and we found 
out that he did not even have a licence. Moreover, he had left us waiting at 
Kentucky Fried Chicken in Queenstown – just about the best waiting place 
available – for about half a day before he arrived to pick us up on the way to Cape 
Town. 
At the end of the year 2000, Magazi died in a lake in the Eastern Cape. He was 
baptising new members of his congregation when the current pulled him down. 
The woman who was being baptised was able to escape, but both Magazi and the 
bus driver who tried to save him drowned. At first, the congregation had cheered 
and was full of excitement that their minister had been taken away by God. It was 
only the next day, after they found the two bodies on the shore of the lake, that 
they started to mourn their tragic loss. 
Nomfundu and her boyfriend lived next door to Magazi. At the end of 1997, 
Nomfundo belonged to a burial society and a savings scheme for housing 
organised by the NGO Victoria Mxenge. At that time (January 1998), she did not 
take part in a ROSCA or ASCRA, although she was very interested in doing so. 
She had repeatedly asked her neighbours if she could join an umgalelo, but the 
neighbours refused her and devised all kinds of excuses. I was informed that 
‘Numfondu is a mental case’, and ‘the tape in her head has broken again’. She 
used to talk fanatically about the world coming to an end, the number 666 which 
refers to the beast of the apocalypse, and the devil. She would pick up news from 
the radio or television and give it a surprising twist of her own. She could approach 
neighbours aggressively with her views and tell them about God’s huge satellite 
dishes that were going to be used in a fight against the devil. Neighbours 
frequently felt insulted by her. For example, she had deposited a pile of rubble 
partly on her neighbour’s plot. When he wanted to discuss this with her, she started 
to scream and swear and told him to ‘fuck off’. The lack of respect towards others 
was an important reason for keeping her out of a financial mutual. People told me 
that if one lent some money to her, she would never return it. Instead ‘she suddenly 
accepts you as a friend and keeps the money’. Neighbours complained that she 
would ‘overeat’. She would visit neighbours around dinner time and even accepted 
the food that they offered her, when she should have refused it. Occasionally, she 
also brought visitors along. Although some felt sorry for Nomfundu, they were 
also irritated by her rude and demanding behaviour. 
The relationship between Nomfundu and her boyfriend was often problematic 
and, at times, Nomfundu tried to involve the neighbours in their fights. For 
example, when Nomfundu’s boyfriend abused her, she turned to a neighbour for 
shelter. Her boyfriend followed her, but the neighbour refused to let him in. He 
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returned to their shack and destroyed everything. He broke the water pipe and 
flooded the place, threw food in the water, destroyed the electricity cables, broke 
Nomfundu’s iron, and threw all her humble belongings into the water on the floor. 
He took R50 that Nomfundu needed to commute to her work. Nomfundu was only 
able to go to work the following day after borrowing some money from a 
neighbour. She then took a train to a friend’s place, where she stayed for a while. 
Around the same time Nomfundu had a fight with her next door neighbour, 
Magazi, who had, by that time, already made several attempts to rape her. This 
particular fight started about a wooden, self-made fence that marked the boun-
daries of the two plots. Nomfundu was already irritated that the members of 
Magazi’s congregation walked on her plot all the time and became angry when she 
saw one of the church elders leaning against the fence. She told him that it was not 
a strong fence and that it had broken before. But Nomfundu told me that she had 
jokingly added that he was a man and therefore could fix any damage he might 
make. Magazi visited Nomfundu immediately after the church service and 
Nomfundu told me that she expected him to apologise. But, instead, he started 
beating her. Nomfundu ran out of her house and tried to lock herself inside the 
toilet, but Magazi kept beating her. Nomfundu went to the police but without any 
result. Therefore, she turned to some Big Five supporters and asked them to handle 
the situation. They called Magazi to a meeting and Nomfundu recalled with great 
satisfaction how scared he was. He almost wet his pants out of fear of being 
beaten, she said. They gave him a probational fine of R10,000 which he would 
only have to pay if Nomfundu submitted a new complaint against him. This 
intimidated Magazi, but did not make Nomfundu any more popular among her 
neighbours. Nomfundu had the reputation of being a troublemaker, a difficult 
person who, at times justifiably, could be rude and unpredictable. 
Nomfundu would have liked to have belonged to an umgalelo where stamps 
from the supermarket chain Shoprite were saved to purchase groceries. However, 
she was kept out. She also wanted to join Masifunde, an ASCRA that was being 
organised by her neighbours at the beginning of 1998. She had heard about the 
initiative and kept asking her neighbours about it, but they were reluctant to 
include her. At one of the first meetings, which took place at Ma Dlamini’s place 
across the street from her on the first Sunday of January 1998, Nomfundu showed 
up uninvited. She wanted to join, but the neighbours objected and asked whether 
Nomfundu was able to pay the R20 contribution. Nomfundu had no money, which 
was a very uncomfortable situation, but Ma Dlamini’s oldest daughter quickly put 
a banknote in her hand. Nomfundu told the women that she did have money and 
therefore could join. At this meeting, Nomfundu was fined R 0.25 for talking 
loudly. Unlike others who were also fined, she refused to pay the 25 cents. 
Incidents like these, as well as Nomfundu’s awkward behaviour, irritated the 
neighbours. However, they also knew of the destitution that Nomfundu faced, 
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which made them pity her. The neighbours harboured ambivalent feelings towards 
Nomfundu, ranging from pity to irritation. Being rude and impolite to neighbours 
seemed to be one of Nomfundu’s last resorts to get her way and defend herself 
against exclusion. 
Makafreeman, mother of Freeman, lived a few plots further down the road. Her 
husband had a little welding business and made burglar bars for windows. He 
owned a small pick-up truck in which he delivered his merchandise. Maka-
freeman’s husband and Edith’s husband Zama belonged to the same clan. Zama 
once asked him for help with transporting some things. I wanted a mattress and 
building material to be delivered to Edith and Zama’s place so I could stay there 
for a while. When Zama asked his clan member for help, he replied that he was 
more than willing to help, but just not on that particular evening. When we saw 
him and his pick-up truck at home that night, it looked like he had fed him an 
excuse. According to Zama, he was embarrassed to take money for the job from a 
clan member, but did not want to do it for free either. Nevertheless, Zama got on 
fairly well with Makafreeman’s husband. There were not very many nasty rumours 
being circulated about them. Makafreeman also belonged to the stamp umgalelo 
with Edith that Nomfundu had wanted to join. 
Next to a few empty plots stood a two-room shack which was the home of 
Nophuma, her husband, her husband’s sister, and the sister’s child. They sold cases 
of beer but did not run a shebeen (illegal bar in one’s living room) because 
neighbours were likely to complain about the drunkards, loud music, and fights. 
Nophuma died in October 1997 after she fell off a station platform and was run 
over by a train. Her neighbours were convinced that Nophuma did not fall by 
accident, but had committed suicide. They speculated that her life had become 
impossible because of her husband’s sister. I was assured that it was common 
knowledge that a woman never gets along with her sister-in-law. 
Nophuma’s husband told me that they belonged to a burial society and received 
some money for the funeral. The husband’s sister had joined the neighbourhood 
ASCRA Masifunde. Nophuma was the first neighbour to die and thus it was the 
first time the neighbours collected money. There was a meeting called after the 
collection in order to see if the neighbours could establish a burial society without 
a fund among neighbours. Only eight women showed up and the initiative col-
lapsed. One of the problems was that the neighbours Ma Zantsi and her friend 
Xoliswa had called for the meeting, but they were not liked by all. Many worried 
about their involvement in politics and felt that this could harm the burial society. 
The idea to establish a burial society was occasionally resubmitted, but the 
prevailing response was that there was no pressing need for it as long as nobody in 
the neighbourhood died. 
Noxolo, her boyfriend, and her children lived next door from them in a two-
room shack. From the freezer in one of her rooms she sold chicken, pork, sausages, 
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ice cream, and sometimes she had bread and eggs. Noxolo was careful not to give 
too much on credit. If her neighbours had too much debt, they would buy their 
groceries elsewhere because they were embarrassed to see her. Edith and I visited 
Noxolo many times for a chat. She was pleasant and knew a lot about the neigh-
bours because they were her customers. Some people seemed to be more visible 
than others, and Noxolo was one of those visible people. Noxolo belonged to an 
umgalelo with her mother and her mother’s neighbour, who lived in the adjacent 
township. Noxolo had lived with her mother before she moved to Indawo Yoxolo 
and still considered her mother’s neighbours, in a way, as her own neighbours. 
Another possible reason why she did not want to join an umgalelo with her neigh-
bours was because they were also her customers, which could have complicated 
their relationships. 
The school principal who was accused of corruption and ‘taken hostage’ by 
angry parents lived next to Noxolo. We did not talk much with him and his family 
and, to my knowledge, he did not belong to any financial mutual in the neighbour-
hood. Contrary to many other neighbours, one would never meet them on the street 
and have a chat. Their involvement with the Big Five and the bad relations with 
angry parents meant that they did not take part in any activity within the neigh-
bourhood. 
The shack next to the principal’s had a bright blue colour. It was lived in by a 
few men who participated in a ROSCA in which the abakhaya members 
contributed R500 a month.6 The principal’s wife was not sure whether she should 
join Victoria Mxenge, an NGO whose members saved for housing purposes. She 
was suspicious of any initiative in the area and told me: ‘Why do you need to go 
door-to-door to find members if it is such a good organisation?’ In January 1998, 
she considered joining a R250 ROSCA with her neighbours, but felt that she could 
not afford it and could not trust the neighbours. She had also heard about an 
ASCRA, but was unfamiliar with it and doubted whether it could work. She was 
afraid of corruption in the ASCRA and Victoria Mxenge because of Ma Zantsi’s 
involvement. Ma Zantsi also lived in the neighbourhood and had the same clan 
name as one of the Big Five members and some regarded her as the mother of this 
Big Five member. Ma Ntshona, the liaison officer for Deel Construction who sided 
with the Big Five, was also involved in Victoria Mxenge. She wanted to avoid 
anything political and felt intimidated by Ma Zantsi and Ma Ntshona. She would 
have liked to have joined an organisation but felt that she could not afford to take 
the risks involved. 
There was little contact with the neighbours on the other side of the street and 
Edith complained: ‘They don’t even greet you. They think they belong to a higher 
                                                          
 
6  I only spoke with his wife about his ROSCA, which made information slightly less 
reliable. 
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class.’ Only a few people were known, like Ma Dlamini. She was the head of a 
three-generation female household, as she lived with her daughters Margeret and 
Xoliswa, and Xoliswa’s young daughter. Sometimes there were also other people 
at their place. From the beginning of 1998, the newly established ASCRA 
Masifunde had its meetings at her place every Sunday afternoon. Her two 
daughters also belonged to this ASCRA and one of them was the chairperson. 
Voyiswa and her two small children lived across the street from Ma Dlamini. 
She was unemployed but nevertheless wanted to organise an umgalelo with 
Nomfundu, an attempt that was unsuccessful. Voyiswa had a poor reputation, and 
Nomfundu, who did not have a very good reputation either, seemed to dislike her. 
Voyiswa had approached Edith for a R200 monthly ROSCA but Noxolo had 
warned her. Noxolo had once lent money to Voyiswa who had refused to give it 
back. Other neighbours also complained about her. She was said to sleep around 
and could be very rude to her neighbours. One neighbour had told me in 
confidence that she suspected that Voyiswa used witchcraft. Voyiswa had sent one 
of her children to her with a piece of paper that said: ‘Could I please borrow R15 
from you.’ But the neighbour sent the child back empty handed. She explained to 
me that she had no money herself but that she was also afraid that Voyiswa would 
use the money for witchcraft. Notwithstanding Voyiswa’s poor reputation she had 
managed to join a financial mutual called Masifunde; in her case, it was explained 
to me, neighbours found it difficult to oppose her rude behaviour without be-
coming rude themselves.7 
Another neighbour had the derogative nickname Noparuru, an allusion to her 
speaking disability. She lived with a small child and had a teenager who visited her 
on and off. Her teenaged son spent most of his time with his gang members and 
stayed in a shelter in Woodstock, one of the Southern Suburbs near the city centre. 
Noparuru’s husband rarely visited her. He was, like Noparuru, a heavy drinker. He 
was at times seen pushing his supermarket trolley through the streets in the white 
neighbourhoods, or the city centre, in search of something that he could either eat, 
sell or barter. Edith helped Noparuru sometimes by giving her food, and also 
invited her over for the Christmas barbecue because she had nothing to eat. Al-
though the neighbours sometimes felt sorry for Noparuru, she just as often irritated 
them. She was disrespectful, never helped other people, and showed no sign of 
appreciation when others helped her. She was one of the poorest, possibly the 
poorest, person in the vicinity. Noparuru did not belong to any financial mutual. 
Whether they liked each other or not, these neighbours had to try and make the 
most of their neighbourhood. They had to deal with the poor, irritating, and, at 
times, crazy neighbours. Although the reputations of neighbours were not pri-
                                                          
 
7  As will become clear in the next chapter, the risk of default in an ASCRA is small 
compared with a ROSCA. 
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marily about money, money did play a pivotal role. People’s concerns revolved 
around money, how to take care of themselves, their children, kin, as well as others 
who were in need. Tensions within relations, as well as feelings of jealousy, were 
also often about money, and much of the gossip among neighbours concerned 
money matters. Money was pivotal for the compliance with the values ‘helping 
each other’, ‘taking care of oneself’, and respect. Thus, morals and reputations 
centred on that which the poor lacked and desired most. 
The neighbours who had a bad reputation – due to the fact that they did not 
adhere to the fundamental social values, because they literally could not afford to – 
had to be excluded. Disidentification, through joking, behaving rudely, and 
personalising the structural problems of poverty, led to social exclusion. At the 
same time, however, one could not neglect someone completely. This would be a 
disgrace for the neighbourhood because of the ‘dependence of individuals on the 
standing and the image of groups to which they belong’ (Elias & Scotson 1965: 
103). The physical and social proximity that became apparent in a shared concern 
for the neighbourhood’s affairs and reputations also gave rise to identification. As 
De Swaan argued: ‘Processes of identification … occur as a restructuring of 
concerns, of a person’s dispositions to be emotionally affected’ (De Swaan 1995: 
25). The outcome of the processes of identification and disidentification were 
ambivalent feelings towards marginal neighbours. This led to a half-hearted 
inclusion or reluctant solidarity. 
 
 
Noparuru: A poor reputation 
 
Just like her neighbours, Noparuru had only lived in the newly established 
township of Indawo Yoxolo for a few months. She came from the town of Fort 
Beaufort in the former impoverished Xhosa Bantustan Ciskei. However, with the 
breakdown of the apartheid state, followed by the first democratic elections in 
1994, more and more women like Noparuru left the impoverished towns, leaving 
family, neighbours, and fellow church members behind, in order to find a job in 
the city as a cleaner, nanny, or domestic worker. However, Noparuru was one of 
the many who did not find a job and she ended up becoming the poorest person in 
the street. 
The women migrants in particular quickly established neighbourhood organi-
sations that revolved around money. The events relating to death were a major 
concern as nobody wanted to be buried in a hostile city without family. Therefore, 
money had to be saved for a descent funeral back home. This made funerals 
expensive. Even a simple funeral easily cost a cleaner half a year’s wage. Neigh-
bours tried to establish burial societies to provide for the mutual assistance, such as 
collecting money among neighbours, organizing wakes, supporting the bereaved, 
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and ensuring a proper burial back in the Eastern Cape. However, Noparuru did not 
belong to any organization although she had approached her neighbours and asked 
them if she could join. The neighbours did not want someone with a poor 
reputation to join any of their organisations (cf. Elias & Scotson 1965: 103). They 
complained that when Noparuru had some money, which was not very often, she 
was frequently drunk. She was often rude, had a speaking disability which every-
body made fun of, and she looked terribly unhealthy wearing the same worn-out 
cloths every day. Neighbours felt that she did not behave respectfully, was 
irresponsible, never helped her neighbours, and would be a disgrace to the group. 
One neighbour told me that at one time she had some rotten meat left that she had 
not managed to sell in time. She wanted to give it to the dogs which, after sniffing 
the meat, refused to eat it. Because Noparuru had been without food for a long 
time she eventually gave it to her and she did eat it. She told the neighbours 
jokingly how disgusting the meat had smelled and how terrible it was that 
Noparuru actually ate something that even dogs refused. This story was greeted 
with feelings of embarrassment and revulsion at Noparuru’s poverty, as well as 
aggression since the gift of rotten meat was very humiliating for Noparuru (see 
also Bataille 1991).  
Neighbours expressed processes of disidentification (see De Swaan 1997 on 
this term). Through jokes, gossip, as well as abuse, people distanced themselves 
from Noparuru and feelings of hatred and revulsion dominated. At times, however, 
neighbours also expressed how they identified with Noparuru. She was, after all, a 
fellow neighbour and fellow migrant from the Eastern Cape. Moreover, the living 
conditions of most neighbours were very fragile and many were aware that they 
were themselves only a few steps away from ending up just like Noparuru. This 
ambiguity – being ‘one of us’ while simultaneously ‘one of them’ – was crucial to 
understanding the attitude towards Noparuru. 
Identifications, ambivalence, reluctant solidarity, and the politics of everyday 
life revealed themselves most clearly around the cruel occurrence of death.8 After 
Noparuru died in hospital on 18 May 1998, it became clear how her neighbours 
tried to deal with ambivalent relations and conflicting concerns, and how this led 
to reluctant solidarity. Most neighbours had been unaware of Noparuru’s hos-
pitalisation until they heard about her death from her brother, Umzwandile. 
According to Umzwandile, she died of tuberculosis. It was, however, very likely 
that she died of AIDS, but people often pretended that AIDS did not exist and 
instead referred to tuberculosis, often an AIDS related disease. After Noparuru’s 
                                                          
 
8  See Verdery (1999) on the significance of reburial across Eastern Europe and the 
contributions in Ojwang & Mugambi (1989) on the conflicts around the burial of a 
Kenyan lawyer. These are inspiring studies on the socio-political processes that sur-
face around death and corpses. 
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death, Umzwandile asked my research assistant Edith to contact his mother in Fort 
Beaufort in the Eastern Cape. As she had no phone, Edith phoned her own parents-
in-law, who coincidently also lived in Fort Beaufort, and asked them to visit 
Noparuru’s mother and inform her about the death of her daughter.9 Noparuru’s 
mother was also extremely poor, just like her daughter had been, and Edith’s in-
laws promised to take some food with them so that she would at least have 
something to eat that day. Because the communication between Umzwandile and 
his family went largely via Edith, and because of my familiarity with the neigh-
bourhood, I was able to acquire detailed information about the flows of money and 
the socio-political processes related to the funeral. Quite unexpectedly, people 
were confronted with a dead neighbour whose corpse was in a Cape Town 
morgue, who had left no money, and who had never helped others. 
 
Struggling neighbours 
After the death of Nophuma who had been hit by a train half a year earlier, 
Noparuru was the second death in the short history of the neighbourhood. When 
Nophuma died almost all the neighbours had contributed R10, at the time about 
one dollar, or more to the funeral costs. Noparuru had not contributed. Now a 
second neighbour had died and it was felt that a more permanent arrangement had 
to be made through the formation of a burial society for neighbours only (see also 
Bähre 2002). As is common after a death, wakes were going to be held at 
Noparuru’s shack until the corps had left the morgue for the Eastern Cape and it 
were particularly the women who attended these wakes who felt responsible. 
Before or after the wakes they talked about the formation of a burial society to 
provide for neighbours after their death, and also in order to discuss what help 
should be given to Noparuru. The fact that Noparuru had not contributed to the 
funeral of the other neighbour who had died half a year earlier made most people 
feel that she did not deserve help. At the first wake one of the neighbours, 
Voyiswa, confessed that she still remembered that Noparuru wanted to give R10 
but that she had created a problem for Noparuru. She had borrowed money from 
Noparuru and had failed to give it back in time. She explained that Noparuru had 
even asked her sister to interfere, but even that did not prompt her to return the 
money. Voyiswa said that she now felt guilty because if she had given the R10 to 
Noparuru she would probably have used it for the funeral and neighbours would be 
less reluctant to help her. 
One of the women, Makafreeman felt it did not matter: ‘She [Noparuru] is not 
in our book, so there is nothing we can do.’Others, however, felt that they had to 
                                                          
 
9  There were a number of reasons for contacting Edith. She had a mobile phone, her 
affines lived in Fort Beaufort, and she was umakoti (married), which made her more 
responsible to assist in funerals. 
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do something. Noparuru had no relatives in Cape Town, except for her brother 
Umzwandile. Her husband was nowhere to be found and was probably pushing his 
supermarket trolley somewhere in Cape Town. Her sixteen year-old son had joined 
a gang and her other child was not even a teenager. Her relatives in the Eastern 
Cape would not have the money to pay for the funeral. The discussion hovered 
around the willingness and possibilities to do something. When the wake came to 
an end no conclusion had been reached. 
The next day my research assistant Edith and myself gave Umzwandile 
(Noparuru’s brother) a ride to an undertaker. He could organise a funeral in Cape 
town for R1,679 but he insisted on being paid in advance. He had had bad 
experiences with people who disappeared once the corpse had been buried. With-
out money there was nothing he could do. Following the meeting we drove to 
Umzwandile’s house in the neighbouring township Guguletu as Umzwandile had 
said he wanted to make some phone calls. When we arrived at Umzwandile’s 
house he behaved very awkwardly and uncooperatively. He said he had tried to 
phone his sister in Port Elizabeth, but we saw how he consistently dialed the 
wrong number. Finally he asked Edith to phone and have the conversation with his 
sister while Umzwandile went outside of the house to argue with his tenant. 
During the following weeks, it became clear that Umzwandile was constantly 
trying to avoid his family as much as possible. Not only did he not want to talk to 
his sister, he also told the neighbours that it was Noparuru’s last wish to be buried 
in Cape Town and not in Fort Beaufort. The neighbours did regard this a dis-
graceful wish. Apart from Umzwandile, Noparuru had no kin in Cape Town and 
one woman remarked: ‘You can’t be separated from your family. As an ancestor, 
you want to visit your family sometimes, but Noparuru doesn’t have any family 
here.’ Umzwandile frequently complained to us about Noparuru’s neighbours: 
they did not care about Noparuru at all. He insisted on having the burial in Cape 
Town and on using his house in Guguletu, not Noparuru’s house, for the funeral 
services. 
Time and again Umzwandile asked Edith, but also other neighbours, for help. 
They had to make phone calls, arrange the undertaker, arrange transport, and so 
on. From Edith’s telephone conversations with Umzwandile’s family, from Edith’s 
in-laws in Fort Beaufort, from neighbours in Cape Town, and from talks at the 
wakes and the funeral that I attended, a better view emerged of the complex web of 
relations and problems around Umzwandile. 
Quite some years ago, I was told by different people that Umzwandile had 
broken his wife’s neck. As a consequence he was fired from his job at a shipping 
company and, after a court case, for which his sister in Port Elizabeth paid all the 
legal expenses, he was imprisoned for the murder. When Umzwandile got out of 
prison, he bought a house in Guguletu with the R30,000 that he supposedly 
received from his pension plan after he was fired. Umzwandile rented out his 
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house for only R500 per month, and this was his main source of income because 
high unemployment and a criminal record made it impossible for him to get a job. 
He had had an affair with the tenant but, to his annoyance, the relationship ended 
sometime later. At that point he decided he wanted the woman out of his house so 
he could stay there himself or rent it out to others, possibly at a higher rate. 
Umzwandile campaigned for a funeral at his house in Guguletu in order to put 
pressure on the former girlfriend to leave the house. The wakes, the funeral, and 
visitors would put pressure on the tenant to leave. In retrospect, I could not help 
feeling that he wanted Edith and me to visit his place for that reason and not to 
make phone calls. A white visitor was possibly meant to impress the tenant and I 
would not have been surprised if he had told the tenant that I was his lawyer. 
Umzwandile had other reasons to lobby for a funeral in Cape Town. Not only 
would it be cheaper, it also would enable him to avoid his family. Umzwandile’s 
sister who lived in Port Elizabeth complained a few times about the lack of 
financial support that Umzwandile gave to his family. She had had to pay all the 
expenses of her father’s funeral a few years ago, despite Umzwandile having 
R30,000. She remembered very well that Umzwandile had sent just R500 to his 
needy mother via a postal order. However, the personal details on the postal order 
were incorrect and it was consequently returned to the sender. Umzwandile’s sister 
was convinced that Umzwandile had done this on purpose. She also felt that 
Umzwandile wanted Noparuru to be buried in Cape Town so that he could avoid a 
confrontation with her as well as with his mother. Moreover, if Umzwandile were 
to go to a funeral in Fort Beaufort he risked meeting the late wife’s family who 
lived in a nearby village. Although Umzwandile had sat out his sentence for the 
murder, the family possibly still had hostile feelings towards him and might have 
wanted to kill him. For these reasons, which mainly concerned conflicts relating to 
money, Umzwandile tried to have a funeral in Cape Town, preferably with a 
ceremony at his house. 
 
Two competing neighbours 
The next wake was attended by lots of people. About forty, mainly female, visitors 
barely fitted into Noparuru’s shack. Even old neighbours from the nearby squatter 
camp Paula Park had come to pay their respect. Knowing that Umzwandile was 
struggling and because I wanted to contribute something, I had brought sugar and 
coffee. Having no sugar, tea or coffee was regarded as the nadir of deprivation. 
One of the worst signs of poverty was not being able to make a cup of tea with 
sugar for visitors. The absence of sugar, tea, and coffee at the previous wake had 
been a dreadful moment: it revealed the absence of hospitality and the inability to 
help one another. 
At the wake, which consisted of the usual sequence of hymns and speeches, the 
speakers said that Noparuru had been rude at times, but that she had never failed to 
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apologise for her rudeness. One woman recalled that Noparuru had always 
addressed her female neighbours respectfully by using the term ‘mama’ and said: 
‘Noparuru never failed to respect her neighbours.’ The references to Noparuru’s 
respectful behaviour hardly resembled people’s actual experiences, nor the way 
they gossiped about her. Nevertheless, on this occasion people did their best to say 
something sympathetic and positive about a person who, during her lifetime, had 
neither elicited many opportunities to evoke sympathy in others, nor had been able 
to make a positive contribution to people’s lives. 
At the end of the wake a little dish was passed around, as is usual at wakes, and 
people contributed between five and twenty cents ‘to keep the light of the house 
burning’, as the expenses of the wake are referred to. Many were only prepared to 
gave little and gossiped that Umzwandile was going to use it to buy cigarettes 
anyway. This reluctance was also apparent in the serving of coffee and tea to the 
guests. Umzwandile had quarrelled with some women because he did not want to 
serve the neighbours coffee and tea and had commented that it was ‘a waste’. 
However, a few women had successfully protested. In the following days the 
coffee and tea rapidly disappeared, much faster than could be expected. Eventually 
neighbours started to search Noparuru’s place, where Umzwandile had started to 
live, and found several plastic sandwich bags filled with coffee and sugar hidden in 
the cupboards and under the mattress. We were all very upset that Umzwandile 
was not even willing to use coffee and tea for his sister’s wakes. 
In the meantime, Noparuru’s next door neighbour, Ma Dlamini, had set up a 
meeting with neighbours and an undertaker Mr Mnyungulo. This undertaker said 
he could arrange a funeral in Cape Town for R1,200, which was a very low price, 
and an excellent arrangement because he did not require payment in advance. Ma 
Dlamini mentioned to him that the neighbours wanted to organise a burial society 
and were going to meet the following Saturday. She wanted Mr Mnyungulo to be 
the permanent undertaker for the members of the burial society. The undertaker 
seemed to consider Noparuru’s funeral as an investment for future clientele 
provided via the burial society. Ma Dlamini was concerned as a neighbour, but 
also saw a chance to enhance her status within the neighbourhood and take the lead 
in the formation of a burial society. 
A few days later this undertaker called Edith. He told her that Noparuru’s 
family in Fort Beaufort had contacted a local undertaker called Stompie and that 
he had agreed to work with Stompie and fly Noparuru’s body to Fort Beaufort. He 
did not yet know how much this would cost because, according to Mr Mnyungulo, 
it depended on the weight of the body. He first wanted the neighbours or 
Umzwandile to deposit the money into a friend’s account, not his own account. 
The next Saturday afternoon, Ma Dlamini organised another meeting where the 
formation of a burial society was further discussed. The meeting lasted an 
extremely long time as new neighbours kept arriving all the time and had to be 
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updated on the discussion. The central questions were: ‘How much should we 
collect?’, ‘whose deaths are covered?’, and ‘how high are the benefits?’ Ma 
Dlamini, who was initially the central figure at the meeting, proposed calling the 
organisation Masincedane (‘let us help each other’). 
While the meeting had been going on for quite some time, Ma Zantsi arrived, 
the neighbour who was believed to have ties with the Big Five and who dominated 
the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme. She had also publicly taken credit for 
organising the collection after the suicide of Nophuma although she had had little 
involvement in it. Ma Zantsi was elaborately updated and Ma Dlamini grew 
increasingly silent. After a few minutes, Ma Dlamini excused herself and said: ‘I 
would like to leave now, my children. I have flu.’ The meeting continued and, 
finally, the women decided on a R30 joining fee and a monthly contribution of 
R20. They were going to ask neighbours to donate R10 voluntarily towards 
Noparuru’s funeral expenses, but neighbours were also able to join the burial 
society without making the payment. 
In the following days, Ma Dlamini stopped attending wakes, withdrew from the 
organisation of the funeral, just like the undertaker that she had introduced, Mr 
Mnyungulo. Stompie, the undertaker in Fort Beaufort, had phoned Edith and told 
her that he was not reliable and that it was nonsense that the cost of Noparuru’s 
flight depended on the weight of the corpse. Stompie had contacted another under-
taker in Cape Town that she wanted to work with. The neighbours gossiped that 
Ma Dlamini was unhappy that ‘her’ undertaker had been excluded and, therefore, 
halted her involvement in Noparuru’s funeral. Moreover, Ma Zantsi was now the 
woman in charge. 
 
Respect and disgrace 
The final wake was on Monday 25 May as the following day Noparuru’s body was 
going to be flown to Fort Beaufort. Some neighbours were excited about 
Noparuru’s flight: ‘Who would think that Noparuru would ever go on an aero-
plane’, someone had jokingly remarked. Umzwandile complained to some neigh-
bours that he had no money and, therefore, could not afford to go to Fort Beaufort. 
Before the wake Umzwandile had sent Noparuru’s little son to Edith to ask for 
sugar for the wake. Due to Umzwandile’s ‘disappearing act’, the coffee, tea, and 
five kg of sugar were gone within a few days. 
About thirty to forty people attended the wake. It was one of my most uncom-
fortable and disturbing research experiences and I find it difficult to convey why 
this was so. It basically boiled down to the contradictions that were apparent 
between how things were, and how they ought to have been. One woman gave a 
speech in which she claimed to have been very good friends with Noparuru: 
‘Noparuru used to come to my place and wash my clothing for money. But I lost 
my job and could not afford to pay her anymore.’ She broke out in tears and said 
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how much she missed her good friend Noparuru. But she was clearly exaggerating 
their friendship. Some people, as well as the speaker, could barely disguise their 
laughter at this theatrical facade. Although the woman lived only about half-a-
dozen streets away from Noparuru, she had never been seen in the area prior to 
Noparuru’s death. 
Some of the men were drunk and a few women wore trousers instead of the 
required skirts, which was commonly regarded as very disrespectful. Some of the 
younger women were giggling and joking and, if this had been the wake of a 
neighbour of some status, this would not have been tolerated. At the end of the 
wake there was a little argument among the younger women responsible for 
making tea and coffee. None of them felt like making it and they jokingly tried to 
back out of their obligation, using lame excuses. When they finally returned with 
tea and coffee some of the men barely disguised how they poured brandy into their 
cups, notwithstanding that it is a great taboo to drink alcohol at wakes and funerals. 
After this wake early in the evening I drove to my White upper-class home and 
realised I had – at least temporarily – lost confidence in humanity. The contrast 
between the glorifying speeches and disrespectful behaviour was startling. 
Poverty, violence, and oppression by apartheid have not helped Noparuru’s neigh-
bours to feel good about themselves. It also made it difficult to feel compassionate 
towards neighbours and relatives all the time. The humiliating events of the day 
contrasted sharply with the speeches that that emphasized ‘helping each other’. 
Friendship and affection were central to those speeches while, at the same time, 
one could see that the wake was for a poor, marginal woman who had died of a 
disease which no-one wanted to name. I had hardly ever spoken with Noparuru. It 
was just too uncomfortable to be confronted with her desperate situation all the 
time and it was virtually impossible to have a conversation with her. Noparuru’s 
poverty was very unsettling. Maybe some were wondering what would happen to 
them if they were to die in this hostile city with high murder rates but without 
friends and family. The identification with Noparuru as a neighbour, and a poor 
migrant in a violent place, as well as with the nasty way she was treated, often 
because the neighbours had little more, seemed to be at the core of the ambivalent 
feelings toward Noparuru and her death. Some neighbours confided that they felt 
guilty and felt they had failed the deceased (see also Freud 1984: 86-111). The 
ambivalent relation to Noparuru was apparent in the way in which respect and 
disgrace were both prominent at the wake. Respect was expressed through 
language and the people’s presence, while disgrace was expressed through dress 
and non-verbal behaviour. 
Ma Zantsi, the neighbour who had ties with the local mafia, had by now taken 
over the initiative from Ma Dlamini. However, this did not mean that the neigh-
bours stopped interacting altogether. The neighbourhood was too important to 
break relations completely or to let them become too antagonistic. This became 
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very clear during the birthday of one of Ma Dlamini’s grandchildren a few days 
later. This was the first birthday ever to be celebrated in the young history of this 
street and the mother had written a card for her little daughter which said that she 
hoped that she would become a nurse one day. Ma Zantsi was also present and she 
gave one of the most expensive presents, which were clothes. When the mother 
had unwrapped the present she started to cry out of joy and the children all started 
to cheer. The present revealed that the tensions between the two women did not 
lead to a breakdown in neighbourhood relations. 
The next Sunday Ma Zantsi had called another meeting to discuss the 
establishment of a burial society, which was fairly well attended, among others by 
Umzwandile, my research assistant Edith, and myself. Everyone was unhappy 
about the neighbours’ hesitation to provide financial support for Noparuru’s 
funeral and that the wakes had come to an end. Umzwandile continued to argue 
that Noparuru’s body was still in Cape Town and he also felt that the money that 
was going to be collected should be given to him. Ma Zantsi did not agree: 
together with some other women she was going to attend the funeral in Fort 
Beaufort herself and deliver the money. Earlier in the meeting, and in the absence 
of Umzwandile, she had told everyone that she did not trust Umzwandile and that, 
therefore, she should bring the money herself. Some women did not want to get 
into a discussion about who should get the money while others felt that Edith 
should get the money: She was going to attend the funeral with her husband, my 
girlfriend Esther, and myself. 
Edith left the meeting early and a few minutes later her next door neighbour 
dropped by. She told Edith that as soon as she had left, Ma Zantsi had started 
accusing her of spreading lies. Ma Zantsi told the women that Edith was the one 
who had told the neighbours that the body had left Cape Town and she should 
have kept silent about it so the wakes could have continued. Edith immediately 
returned to the meeting and confronted the women with what she had heard. Ma 
Zantis and Umzwandile explained to her that there was a misunderstanding and 
that her next-door neighbour had not properly conveyed what had been said. Edith 
left it at that but was getting tired of these fights and was quite happy not to have 
anything to do with the money: It would only lead to all kinds of accusations 
towards her. 
During the following days it again became clear that Umzwandile needed 
money desperately. He had put up Noparuru’s plot and shack for sale and the 
neighbours gossiped that Umzwandile was disrespectful. He could not even wait 
with making money until his sister’s corpse had been buried. Umzwandile had also 
asked Zama, at the time the husband of my research assistant, to organise transport 
to the funeral. Zama told me that he felt that Umzwandile wanted him to organise 
transport in order to avoid financial responsibilities. Furthermore, Umzwandile 
told me that he was cross with Ma Dlamini for telling the neighbours that 
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Noparuru’s body had left Cape Town. This had made it impossible for 
Umzwandile to continue the wakes and collect the few cents that he seemed to 
need so desperately. Eventually, the neighbours in Indawo Yoxolo and Paula Park 
collected R700, at the time about $100. The neighbours in Indawo Yoxolo, and 
particularly Ma Zantsi, decided that Umzwandile was going to bring the money to 
the funeral. 
 
Quarrelling kin 
About a week later, on Saturday 6 June, Edith, Edith’s husband Zama, my 
girlfriend Esther, and I drove the 1,000 km to the funeral in Fort Beaufort. Zama’s 
family kindly provided accommodation for Esther and myself. Thirteen people 
were sharing a house that consisted of a living room, a kitchen, one bedroom, and 
two additional bedrooms at the back of the house. We were privileged by being 
allotted the most private space, which was one of the two little rooms at the back. 
Three of Zama’s siblings were mentally ill. One woman stood all day as motion-
less as a piece of furniture in the corner of the living room. A man ran around the 
house all day laughing like only a madman could, while asking for cigarettes. He 
had stayed with Edith and Zama in Cape Town, but his crazy and, at times, 
aggressive behaviour had made him an impossible visitor. The third child, also an 
adult, was quiet most of the time and walked around with a big smile. All three 
children had been in and out of mental hospitals for most of their lives and were 
taking medication. About a year or two later Zama joined his brothers and sister as 
he also started to suffer from severe mental problems that forced him to take 
medication and live with his parents. 
Noparuru’s funeral started the next morning at her mother’s place. Her mother 
lived on a small plot with a small house which had just two small rooms, and no 
kitchen or sanitary facilities. To accommodate the visitors, she had rented a tent 
that was put in front of the house. Umzwandile and Noparuru’s youngest son had 
also arrived. Noparuru’s oldest son, as well as her husband, had not been found 
and were not informed about the death of Noparuru. Ma Zantsi was not there 
either, although she had promised to attend the funeral with some of her friends. It 
seemed that she had made this promise in order to show how important neighbours 
were. One after another more people arrived until there were about a hundred 
people, which was not many, especially if one considers the food that was going to 
be available. It showed that Noparuru’s family did not have a high status in the 
neighbourhood. The fact that the four of us had come all the way from Cape Town 
was highly appreciated, and was referred to at the beginning of one of the first 
speeches: ‘Noparuru was with people. We can see that people from Cape Town 
came, which shows that she was a good neighbour. Even if you have fights or 
other problems, this is the time to put that aside because you are at a funeral.’ 
Another man addressed the visitors and said: 
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You guys have a different colour but we are here together. Thanks for coming. I thank 
Noparuru as white people followed her. It shows we are the same. Now we preach on 
the bible. Even if a child cries you have to consult the child. The sensitive part of the 
person is the heart. Thank you for coming all the way from Cape Town so we can see 
that we are one nation. 
Most of the speeches were about the two white visitors and the two neighbours 
from Cape Town. Our presence provided evidence of Noparuru’s good life among 
respectful and helpful neighbours in Cape Town: 
It [our presence] shows that you were neighbours; you eat together and cry at the same 
place. Thanks for accompanying the neighbour. You should know everything about 
your neighbour. If there is no neighbourhood, then there is no burial. You need unity 
and love between neighbours, and Noparuru had love between neighbours. We are a 
disgrace between people. Pray and you [will get] answers. The lord calls all of us: 
prayer makes you strong. People are being killed! 
There was extensive talk about the love among neighbours, the importance of 
caring for each other in a strange environment, and how caring for others enabled 
one to feel good about oneself. But here and there the speeches also hinted at 
disidentification among neighbours, about disgrace among people and the religious 
support one needed to resist disgrace. The mentioning of ‘people are being killed’ 
revealed the conflicts that could emerge. When we left for the graveyard, one of 
the passengers in my car complained about the many deaths that had occurred 
lately. The old man had noticed that more people were dying than ever before: ‘All 
our children who are away for work come back in a coffin’ due to increasing 
incidences of witchcraft. He felt it had never been this bad in the past.  
When we arrived at Noparuru’s grave, it contrasted sharply with the adjacent 
luxurious grave that had a velvet tent placed above it while more velvet cloth was 
draped around the hole. The coffin was even going to be placed in that grave using 
an automatic lift! Noparuru’s grave was a simple hole in the ground and the coffin 
had to be lowered with ropes, which meant that a few men had to climb into the 
hole to place the coffin correctly. While Noparuru was being buried, we saw the 
large elaborate procession descending the hill to bury the apparently much more 
important person in the much nicer grave. People talked about respect and ‘helping 
each other’, but also indicated the marginality of this poor woman who, like many 
other migrants who had left Fort Beaufort, returned in a coffin. 
After the men had filled Noparuru’s grave, we all returned to the home of 
Noparuru’s mother. Upon arrival, we washed our hands to prevent the spread of 
death. We ate some corn, drank some lemonade, and waited until we received a 
meal of cooked sheep, rice, beetroot salad, and pasta salad. It was prepared at the 
neighbour’s place and one of the neighbours told me that they had collected the 
plates and cutlery we ate with from their own homes. The plates were all made of 
the same red plastic and it seemed awkward to me that the neighbours all had 
identical plates. The food looked very good, but Edith refused to eat it. She was 
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afraid that someone had put something in the food that could bewitch her. Before 
we left, we asked if we could return in the evening to talk with Noparuru’s mother 
about the funeral more privately. 
 
 
 
Photo 4.1  Noparuru’s grave 
 
 
Early that evening, we visited Noparuru’s mother. The tent had already been 
taken down, everything had been cleared and cleaned up, and there was little to 
remind us of the funeral earlier that day. Noparuru’s siblings were also there: 
Umzwandile, Noparuru’s sister from Port Elizabeth, and a young man who still 
lived with his mother. His mother told me that, although her son was an adult, he 
could not live on his own due to mental problems. Another son in Khayelitsha, 
Cape Town, and another daughter in Port Elizabeth had not been able to afford to 
attend their sister’s funeral. Noparuru’s mother told us that her neighbours had 
helped a bit with the funeral. She borrowed two large cooking pots from a nearby 
school and her next-door neighbour allowed her to use her yard to cook the food. 
Her own yard was too small because of the tent, the visitors, and because the kraal 
could not be used as a cooking space. Her neighbours did not collect any money 
and had only come to eat. From Noparuru’s husband’s family, who lived in a 
nearby village, and from her sister, she had received R200. 
There had been a lot of tensions about money that morning. Noparuru’s hus-
band’s family had also arrived at the funeral and they knew that the neighbours in 
110  CHAPTER 4 
 
Cape Town had collected money. They had heard this from Edith, who had talked 
on the phone with Noparuru’s husband’s brother’s wife in Port Elizabeth. 
Noparuru’s husband’s brother’s wife, in turn, had informed her affines about the 
money. That morning, Noparuru’s husband’s relatives demanded the money from 
Umzwandile. They had taken guns along and put Umzwandile under severe 
pressure, but he convinced them that the neighbours had not collected any money 
at all and that they were misinformed. 
Noparuru’s sister intervened and was angry with Noparuru’s husband’s family 
for the way they were treating Umzwandile and demanding money from him. 
Noparuru’s sister knew from Ma Dlamini that Noparuru’s neighbours had col-
lected money. However, she did not know that it had been given to Umzwandile. 
Therefore, she felt that Noparuru’s husband’s relatives had treated Umzwandile 
unfairly. When they told us what had happened that morning, Edith was shocked. 
Umzwandile had tried to keep the money for himself and had told everyone that he 
did not have it. Edith immediately told Noparuru’s mother and sister that the 
neighbours in Indawo Yoxolo and Paula Park had collected R700. Both the mother 
and sister were shocked since they had believed Umzwandile. Umzwandile over-
heard our conversation from the adjacent room and protested loudly, shouting 
‘Hey, hey, hey!’ He did not want the conversation to continue and did not like it at 
all that his deceitfulness was being discovered. The atmosphere was far from 
pleasant and the unease between Umzwandile and his mother and sister was 
tangible. 
Noparuru’s mother told us that she was suffering from serious financial 
problems. I asked her about the plates that were used for the meals and asked 
whose they were. The sister from Port Elizabeth told us that they were hers, but 
Edith told her that a neighbour had said that they had collected them. ‘This is 
nonsense!’, she said in an angry voice. Because Noparuru’s mother received such 
little support she had had to borrow R600 from a cash loan company at 30 percent 
interest per month. The company took all her personal details and was authorised 
to withdraw money from her bank account into which her pension was paid. She 
used R100 to pay off her television that she had bought on a rent-to-own plan.10 
The remaining R500 were spent on phone calls to Cape Town, the funeral, and the 
wakes. She complained about Noparuru’s husband’s family, whose members had 
promised to help her but eventually did nothing. With great disappointment, she 
said: ‘I would give them some money to buy sugar or tea or other things for the 
funeral, but they would return empty handed. With nothing and they even ask for 
more money.’ The undertaker charged R2,300 for the funeral, which included the 
coffin, transport from Cape Town to Fort Beaufort, a simple wooden cross, trans-
                                                          
 
10  There was no television or any other furniture at her place, but it might have been at 
a neighbour’s place in order to create space for the visitors. 
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port to the cemetery in the back of a pick-up truck, refrigeration, administrative 
costs, and legal fees. This was a good price, especially because Stompie organised 
the funeral without the usual R500 deposit. As soon as Noparuru’s mother could, 
she would pay two instalments of R500 and continue to pay the rest off in smaller 
amounts every month. Noparuru’s mother was very pleased with this arrangement. 
Noparuru’s mother’s financial situation was downright depressing. The R600 
debt at the cash loan office alone cost her R180 interest per month. She owed the 
undertaker another R2,300, luckily based on better terms. Her pension was about 
R400 per month, but the payment of pensions was often very irregular and some-
times pensioners had to wait for months, or would not receive their pension at all. 
Her son earned only R200 per month at his temporary full-time job as a construct-
ion worker. Some of the misery could have been avoided if Umzwandile had given 
her the R700 that was collected in Cape Town, but he had very likely needed the 
money to get to Fort Beaufort with Noparuru’s youngest child. Noparuru’s mother 
was going to be in severe debt for the rest of her life. In retrospect, I am quite sure 
that she expected me to give her the money that was collected in Cape Town, and 
maybe even more. The praise that the white visitors had received that morning was 
maybe not only for their attendance, but also for the money that they were 
expected to give. It must have been a big disappointment for Noparuru’s mother 
that I did not bring any money at all. Instead, Edith and I contributed to a conflict 
with her son Umzwandile. 
The next day, we returned to Cape Town. In Indawo Yoxolo, the neighbours all 
wanted to know how the funeral had been and what had happened to the money. 
Had Umzwandile handed it over to his mother? Edith refused to discuss this with 
her neighbours. It would be her word against Umzwandile’s and she did not want 
to be involved with this funeral any more. She told her neighbours that they had to 
ask Umzwandile. After all, they were the ones who had decided to leave him in 
charge of the money. For many neighbours, however, her silence about the issue 
said enough. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To define a substratum of people who were categorically excluded from partici-
pation in mutuals was a more complex and precarious task than I had expected. 
The practice of inclusion and exclusion deviated from the rules of organisations 
because sometimes status carried more weight than the rules of the organisation. 
Such ‘deviations’ from rules were closely related to notions of respect and the 
status of particular people. The way people looked at fellow neighbours depended 
on their compliance in ‘helping each other’, ‘taking care of oneself’, and respect. 
These values, and the reputation that was built accordingly, distinguished those 
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who one would like to be close to and be eager to help from those who were 
regarded embarrassing, disgusting, and who were perhaps even feared. One tried 
to keep them out of the financial mutuals, although this was a difficult task. Their 
social and geographical proximity, and maybe also their obnoxious behaviour, 
forced neighbours to deal with them. The realisation that their own situations 
differed little from the most marginal people might have made it even more 
difficult to ignore these marginal and irritating people completely. Therefore, 
instead of a complete social separation, they maintained ambivalent relations with 
the most marginal among them. Such marginalised neighbours could not be 
included completely, nor could they be excluded completely, without their fellow 
neighbours being overcome with guilt and embarrassment. 
Processes of identification and disidentification were pivotal for understanding 
reluctant solidarity. People frequently attested to the importance of morals, but 
criticised those who wanted only to be associated with successful and respectable 
people. Although some of the poor were an embarrassment, one could not turn 
one’s face away completely. ‘They’ – the stinking and mad poor – were also ‘we’ 
– a family member, a neighbour, an umkhaya – and ignoring them completely 
would reveal that one could not live up to important values either. Such identifi-
cations and disidentifications resulted in a half-hearted inclusion, and reluctant 
solidarity among those who depended on each other. ‘[S]ocial identifications, no 
matter how intensely held, are essentially multiple and unstable’ (De Swaan 1995: 
34) and, at different moments, different identifications and disidentifications 
resulted in reluctant solidarity. The poor were assisted out of a mixture of ambi-
valent feelings, such as guilt for not being able to take care of the marginal, 
embarrassment if a member of a street was not assisted, the realisation that they 
could be in a similar position, the decision about how to spend what little money 
one had and the difficulty one had respecting a disrespectful person. 
The neighbours also had to contend with the ambivalent sentiments that were 
part of many neighbourhood relations. The ambivalence was based on a number of 
processes. First, there were the conflicts within and between the values of ‘helping 
each other’, ‘taking care of oneself’, and respect. Morals were structured in a way 
that ambiguity and conflict were inescapable, especially if one did not have the 
money to afford them. This in turn contributed to an ambivalent attitude towards 
neighbours who behaved immorally, even after they had died. Second, the 
destitute and poor were inescapably present. Whether they liked one another or 
not, they had to make the most of a new neighbourhood and new relationships. 
Bauman (1998: 93) points out a view often held of the poor: ‘Unneeded, un-
wanted, forsaken – where is their place? The briefest of answers is: out of sight.’ 
For the neighbours in Indawo Yoxolo, however, this was no option. They had to 
deal with their poor, irritating, at times crazy and obnoxious neighbours. 
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Third, the dividing line was thin between a good reputation and a bad 
reputation, between sanity and insanity, between having a job and unemployment, 
between participation and exclusion from a financial mutual. This meant that the 
dividing line between ‘one of us’ and ‘one of them’ was equally thin. This meant 
that many neighbours harboured contradictory feelings towards each other. These 
were solidarity, upholding the reputation of the neighbourhood, realising that one 
might need the same kind of help at a later point in time, and other identification 
processes. Simultaneously, neighbours felt disgust, embarrassment about the poor, 
shame for one’s treatment of the stigmatised, the fearful reminder of one’s own 
deprivation that had to be kept at bay, and other disidentification processes. The 
poor could not be kept out of sight and, let us not forget, the person who was 
slightly better off might quickly become one of them. 
Money played a pivotal role in the processes of identification and reluctant 
solidarity. Without money, it was impossible to behave appropriately. As studies 
on poverty and unemployment have shown, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
maintain a social network without a job (for example, see Howe 1998). Converse-
ly, social relations increase one’s ability to manage economic adversities and find 
sources of income (Granovetter 1973; Moser 1998). Without money, one could not 
help others, could not take care of oneself, and could not behave respectfully. 
Money also led to tremendous and horrifying competition in which people tried to 
gain control over flows of money by identifying with certain others. Some of the 
neighbouring women wanted to gain power and prestige by organising the finan-
cial mutuals, or simply to get their hands on the money. Umzwandile, in particular, 
used the relationship with his sister to put pressure on the neighbours and to ensure 
that sugar, teabags, chicory coffee, Noparuru’s plot, as well as R700 came under 
his control. 
Conflicts could be caused by only small amounts of money. Ten rand was not a 
lot of money, even if one only earned R800 a month. Many households, that is a 
total of seventy, were therefore willing to donate R10 to Noparuru’s funeral. How-
ever, in total, the R700, which was roughly a monthly salary, was enough to lead 
to terrible competition, envy, threats, intimidation, and many other strategies to 
influence people. The fact that some were willing to resort to such severe measures 
signifies the extent to which people had to deal with the threatening triad of 
violence, economic insecurity, and volatile relations. No wonder that it was diffi-
cult to discuss the consequences of poverty with Xhosa migrants. This was not 
only because I was wealthy and rich, but also because poverty revealed some of 
the less valued and embarrassing human characteristics. Xhosa migrants estab-
lished financial mutuals in an attempt to safeguard their money, manipulate its 
directional flows, and pulled together in relatively small, private, and dense social 
configurations. However, the way in which this had to be done was far from har-
monious. 
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Maintaining mutuals:  
Hope for islands of trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Distrust was an inevitable part of public life in South Africa. Historically, the colo-
nial government and apartheid were characterized by violence, intimidation, cor-
ruption, and a fear of spying neighbours. Distrust, however, was also present in 
post-apartheid South Africa. Moreover, in the Western Cape, 81 murders and 160 
rapes per 100,000 people were reported to the police (SAPS 2000) in 1999. Due to 
a lack of confidence in the judiciary system and a fear of public stigmatisation, the 
actual occurrence of rape must have been much higher. Of 4,000 women 
interviewed in Soweto (a township of Johannesburg), one in three said they had 
been raped the past year (BBC 1999). South Africa has the world’s highest murder 
and homicide rates, the world’s highest assault rate, as well as the highest rate of 
reported rapes.1 Economic insecurity is, for example, apparent in the fact that the 
country has the 9th highest Gini Index in the world,2 while health is under great 
pressure due to, for example, a prevalence of HIV/AIDS at a rate of about 29.5%. 
                                                          
 
1  See http://www.nationmaster.com. Colombia rates first with ‘intentional murders’ 
but South Africa ranks first as regards all the other types of murders and homicides 
that are listed. 
2  According to the World Bank 2005, see data on the Human Development Report 
website http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=148&y=1&z=1 
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South Africa is therefore part of the world’s region that is currently being hardest 
hit by this disease.3 
Racial relations were also governed by distrust. A survey revealed that more 
than half (56 percent) of black South Africans interviewed felt that Whites were 
untrustworthy. More than half also found it difficult even to imagine being friends 
with a white person. For Whites the percentages were lower (a third and 19 percent 
respectively) (Mail & Guardian 2001).4 Distrust further intensified in conjunction 
with the many economic uncertainties. I regularly met African men and women 
who told me that they had not received their salaries at the end of the month, or 
that they had received far less than their contract had stated. High unemployment 
promoted theft and fierce struggles over the allocation of money. As Franz & 
Keebe Von Benda-Beckmann (1994: 7) argue in their discussion on insecurity: 
‘Insecurity concerns not only the material aspects of life [but also] people’s 
feelings of trust and existential security.’ Why do many women, and quite a few 
men, put large portions of their meagre incomes into financial mutuals in a society 
in which there are so many reasons to distrust others? 
In an emerging democracy, such as South Africa, it is crucial to have trust in 
transforming government bureaucracies, newly established local governments, 
new economic activities, and new citizens that were previously confined to 
Bantustans. Based on research in varying Eastern European countries, Sztompka 
(1999) and Völker & Flap (1995) found that, during the communist regimes, 
people tended to close themselves off in relatively smaller networks in an attempt 
to stay away from unknown and untrustworthy people and institutions. After the 
political transition in the DDR, these networks shrunk even further, just like the 
trust within a person’s dense network (Völker & Flap 1995: 105). In Poland, after 
an initial decrease in trust, the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic state 
eventually led to an increase in trust as people stopped relying exclusively on close 
knit relations (Sztomka 1999). Putnam (1993: 2000) strongly argues that trust built 
in relatively small voluntary organisations can eventually lead to trust in society at 
large as well as in the government: ‘Good government in Italy is a by-product of 
singing groups and soccer clubs, not prayer’ (Putnam 1993: 176). 
Financial mutuals in South Africa are such small informal groups. This raises 
the question of whether financial mutuals should be regarded as enclaves of trust in 
an otherwise distrustful society (and if so how are these enclaves maintained). Or 
can, as Putnam argued on civic traditions in modern Italy, trust in financial mutuals 
help to overcome the dilemmas of collective action and establish trust in the state 
                                                          
 
3  See http://www.avert.org/safricastats.htm. Based on antenatal testing by the end of 
2004. See also the website on the reliability of these statistics. 
4  This survey was carried out by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliations (IJR) and 
its results were based on 3,727 interviews. 
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and society at large? This debate has become increasingly poignant since the 
United Nations and the World Bank have transformed this debatable argument into 
poverty alleviation policy. 5 
 
 
Masifunde 
 
The case of Masifunde reveals the inventive ways in which neighbours contained 
risks and managed relations with their fellow members. Many Masifunde partici-
pants were introduced in the previous chapter because Masifunde was organised 
by the neighbours of Noparuru. A study of Masifunde showed what the suspicions 
and risks were, how they arose, and what kind of action participants took to deal 
with them. This case study makes it possible to avoid ideal type relations, or 
assume rational, altruistic, normative, or other types of behaviour. Instead, it re-
veals the way in which participants deal with emerging problems, how they call on 
each other for help, put pressure on fellow members, and what the consequences of 
the dense social networks were for trust.6 
Already by the end of 1997, the neighbours started to talk about ‘setting up 
something’. Many women were interested in a financial mutual for their children. 
The financial mutual could cover the costs of tuition fees, school uniforms, books, 
and stationary. The women also hoped that it could teach children how to handle 
money. Instead of the mothers saving money, they wanted their children, at least in 
                                                          
 
5  See Fine (1999), Woolcock (1998), Rothstein (2000), and Putnam (1993) for the 
analysis of state transformation and development in relation to trust and social capital. 
See Hechter’s (1987: 123) ‘two stage theory of institutional development: In the first 
stage, individuals form groups to attain joint private goods, like credit and insurance, 
but to do so they must also establish formal controls, which constitute a collective good. 
Once these are in place, a second stage becomes possible. The group’s resources, now 
protected by the existence of formal controls, can be diverted … to the production of 
further collective, or even public, goods.’ Rothstein (2000) refers to collective memory 
to bring forward the importance of past experiences and memories in contemporary 
behaviour. Memories and knowledge of people and state institutions have a perpe-
tuating effect. Once such institutions are not trusted, it becomes very difficult to change 
such perceptions because, as Rothstein points out, such views can be manipulated 
politically. See Bebbington et al. (2004) on social capital in the World Bank as well as 
the declaration of the United Nations Year of Microfinance 2005 that strongly relies on 
social capital. See Fung (2003) and Mouritsen (2003) on social capital, voluntary asso-
ciation, and democracy in which Putnam’s work has played a crucial role. 
6  See also Webb (1989) and Buijs & Atherfold (1995) on the centrality of personal 
relationships and trust in South Africa. See, among others, Vélez-Ibanéz (1983) on 
confianza in Mexico and how this is dependent on people’s relationships. 
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name, to save and learn about money. The mutual was aptly called Masifunde: 
‘Let us learn.’ 
In the beginning of January 1998, women neighbours and some of their 
children met at Ma Dlamini’s place, the woman who had tried to play a prominent 
role in the funeral of their poor neighbour Noparuru but who was side tracked by 
the politically more prominent figure of Ma Zantsi. During the past months the 
women had had the opportunity to get to know each other and Masifunde would 
help to strengthen neighbourhood ties. The first meeting was on Saturday 25 
January, 1998. A participating mother had to pay R10 per week for each child that 
she enlisted. Many women had indicated that they wanted to join, but only ten 
turned up. The women made a list of thirty-five children that were going to save 
(eventually the number grew to forty). Most of these thirty-five children were not 
present. Although Masifunde was supposed to help children save, the mothers 
were the ones who usually saved for their children. Many women had children in 
the Eastern Cape who were also listed and some women told me confidentially that 
they ‘invented’ children that did not exist in order to save more money. Zanele, 
who did not have children, saved for someone she had made up. The mysterious 
man was jokingly called Mr Sicu, which did not mean anything and simply 
sounded funny, but his identity was kept a secret. For some time, the neighbours 
rumoured that he was Shooter, one of the political figures in the area involved in 
the struggles around the Big Five. Later it seemed to concern a neighbouring boy. 
The women often made jokes about the invisible Mr Sicu: ‘Where is Mr Sicu 
today’; ‘I hope Mr Sicu has enough money to come to this meeting next time’. For 
some women, ‘saving for children’ was a strategy to conceal that they actually 
saved for themselves. They put forward their most prominent social ties, that 
between mother and child, to pursue and legitimise their own ambitions and gain 
control over money. 
Family members, other than the women’s children, were not allowed to join. 
Many women did not have stable relationships and instead competed with partners 
and kin over resources (see also Bähre 2002b). Financial mutuals were established 
as a protection against financial claims from husbands, boyfriends, and relatives. 
By allowing them to participate, the women were afraid that they would start to 
rule the financial mutual and not pay off the loans properly. Trust was also 
regarded as gender-based. For the women, trust had to do with the responsibility of 
the home and particularly the responsibility for cooking. Because men could not 
cook, they were, just like children, considered to be irresponsible and, therefore, 
less trustworthy. High unemployment among men made it difficult for them to be 
responsible and take up their roles as fathers and husbands.7 Other male respon-
                                                          
 
7  See Buijs & Atherfold (1995: 55, 58, 63-64, 77) on the trustworthiness of men, and 
Bank (1997) on women’s position as related to cooking. 
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sibilities, such as those concerning ritual and kinship, had no place in the urban 
environment. Male authority seemed to be based on violence and money (wages) 
instead. 
The first formative meeting of this financial mutual led to heated discussions 
about loans. Edith, who was appointed treasurer of the ASCRA, and Noxolo, who 
owned the little shop in the street, opposed loans at that time. They wanted the 
members to contribute four or six times, deposit the money in a bank, and only 
provide loans once there was sufficient money in the bank to function as collateral. 
At first, many women agreed with Edith and Noxolo while only two out of the ten 
women wanted to borrow immediately. They argued that Masifunde was not able 
to collect enough money in order to open an account anyway. Therefore, they 
wanted the money to be divided as loans, possibly to make sure that one member, 
in this case the treasurer, would not steal the fund. Mandy, in particular, insisted on 
borrowing R50 and seemed to need it really badly. After some time, she said she 
had visitors at her place and left the meeting, but it appeared that she was in fact 
angry and wanted to express her dissatisfaction. Noxolo opposed Mandy parti-
cularly fiercely and broke off the discussion: ‘We are going to open the account 
and by the first weekend of the month we can discuss how much to borrow, if to 
borrow, and so on.’8 
Mandy returned a bit later and continued to complain about the loans saying 
that ‘there is a rule added by new members, like Edith. I don’t like it that 
borrowing is discussed again. The loans were agreed upon before.’ Edith, how-
ever, persisted, to the amusement of some of the children: it was funny how an 
older woman was teaching the teenager a lesson. Edith told Mandy: ‘You have to 
get used to this. We discuss things. At meetings we discuss things because we are 
not afraid of you. We will agree on things and we have to consider the opinions of 
new members.’ Noxolo added in Edith’s support: ‘Nobody wants to lose money at 
the end of the year. After we have voted we don’t have to argue anymore. If you 
force things it means that what you have to say does not have any power.’ Mandy 
kept objecting, but it was obvious that she was in a minority and that she would 
not win her point. It was decided that the rules about borrowing money were going 
                                                          
 
8  As the owner of a shop, she had some ideas about who to trust and who not. After 
some time, Noxolo had stopped giving meat to some customers on credit, even if the 
customers were members of Masifunde. To test Noxolo, Edith had once sent her 
child to Noxolo to ask her for meat. The child returned with Noxolo who was 
carrying meat. Noxolo told Edith that she was willing to give Edith meat on credit 
because she trusted her. After all, Edith’s husband and Noxolo’s husband belonged 
to the same clan. But Noxolo asked Edith to keep quiet about it. Edith, who was not 
interested in the meat, told Noxolo that she had changed her mind and did not need 
the meat after all. Through such ‘games’ people got to know each other’s reputation 
and test each other’s trustworthiness. 
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to be discussed in more detail at a future meeting. It was also agreed to have 
penalties, namely R2 for not attending the meeting, 50 cents for being late, and 25 
cents for disturbing the meeting. After this discussion, the women collected money 
which amounted to R193.75. Edith received the money and wanted to sign for it. 
She did not want to take the risk that members would accuse her of stealing some 
of it. Edith was also asked to open the account for Masifunde. The start of the 
financial mutual was a bit chaotic and people were still figuring out who would 
join, what the rules would be, and if one could borrow or not. 
The members of Masifunde met again the following Sunday. Twenty-one 
women and children attended because word had got around that this was the last 
meeting at which one could join. Noxolo – the owner of the shop – was absent. 
Later she told me that she got tired of the hassles at the meeting and could have 
done without these quarrels. During the previous week, Edith and the two other 
committee members (Zanele and Ma Dlamini’s daughter, Margaret) had not 
managed to get together in order to open a bank account. Edith had asked me to 
keep the money because she was afraid that it might be stolen. She wanted to show 
the money at the meeting to avoid possible rumours that she had spent it. Anxiety 
concerning such possible allegations was also the reason for carefully examining 
the financial records of Masifunde. Edith was unsatisfied with the way in which 
the payments had been recorded because it was easy to write down contributions 
without having paid for them. She did not like the fact that the records were being 
kept at Ma Dlamini’s place either because her daughter, Margeret, was on the 
committee. If money went missing, it was likely that Edith was going to be held 
accountable. 
At first, the women collected the contributions which brought the total amount 
to R1,050. Again, the women discussed whether loans should be provided or 
whether the money should go into the account. After a long discussion, they 
decided that each child could borrow a maximum of R50. The remaining money 
would go to the bank as collateral. The names of the children were called in 
alphabetical order and the women indicated whether they wanted a loan. Some 
were not present at the meeting and could, therefore, not borrow money. They did, 
however, make sure that they paid the contributions by asking fellow members to 
pay on their behalf. 
Breaking up the money into smaller portions through loans reduced the 
likelihood of default. It was easier for the women to repay a small loan and it was 
hardly worthwhile absconding with a relatively small amount of money. More-
over, giving loans to everybody strengthened the interdependencies of the parti-
cipants, which in turn increased social control. 
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Opening an account 
That same week, the committee members (Edith, Margaret and Zanele) and I went 
to the city centre of Cape Town to open a bank account. Usually, the women had 
to rely on a taxi (a minibus with a fixed route) or train, which was time consuming 
and unsafe, especially when carrying a lot of money. This time I was able to pick 
them up and we then went to town together. It was a bit of an outing and the 
atmosphere was jolly, but not at the bank: it felt uncomfortable for the poor 
women to enter the impressive banking offices along Adderly Street, where most 
employees were white. 
We had to visit about six banks before Masifunde could open its account. Most 
banks required a minimum deposit of R1,000 for a savings account or a thirty-two-
day notice account. The women preferred a thirty-two-day notice account because 
the interest was higher and it was easy to give thirty-two days notice before 
withdrawing money by the end of the year. However, Masifunde had given loans 
to its members and there was not enough money left for the minimum deposit. 
Nedbank even required a minimum deposit of R5,000 for a thirty-two-day notice 
account. The clerk explained that they also had to pay a ‘maintenance fee’ of R14 
per month for a regular savings account with a deposit under R4,000. This was 
way beyond the reach of the members of Masifunde. 
The Allied Bank was an exception. This bank did not require a minimum 
deposit for a thirty-two-day notice account and the interest was 13 percent per 
year. Everybody was relieved but, when the paperwork was done, the last bureau-
cratic hurdle was insurmountable. The lady behind the teller asked if anybody was 
registered for outstanding debts, for example due to missed instalments at clothing 
stores, or hire purchase. After Edith had translated this to Margaret and Zanele 
whose English was insufficient for understanding the conversation, Margaret 
suddenly remembered that she had forgotten her passport. The account could not 
be opened and we left the bank. Margaret, however, had not forgotten her passport 
and quietly admitted that she was registered for debts that she had failed to pay off. 
She did not want to talk about it and felt very embarrassed. The quest for a bank 
that was receptive to the needs of the poor had to be continued. 
When we arrived at another bank, an embarrassing situation developed again. 
A White woman approached us and treated the three women as if they were 
complete idiots. Although Edith was proficient in English, the woman started to 
talk very loudly and slowly, and exaggerated her articulation: ‘CAAAN WEE 
MAAY-BEE HEE-LUP YOUHOU?’, she asked. Even when it was very clear that 
Edith’s English was good, and after the employee failed to explain some of the 
rules, she added: ‘Let me find someone who can explain in your language!’ Since 
the women felt that they were not getting anywhere, they left the bank feeling 
upset. 
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Finally, we ended up at the Standard Bank where the women were able to open 
a group account. The employee promised to send a calculator and an admini-
stration book as a present, but it never arrived. The bank also wanted a copy of the 
organisation’s constitution, which could be submitted later. The employee said 
that, as soon as the balance exceeded R1,000, they could easily change it into a 
thirty-two-day notice account. In order to make this change possible, the three 
women had to sign at the bank. It was impossible to sign the papers now and hand 
them in later when there was sufficient money. It was, however, difficult for the 
three women to take an afternoon off to change the account, because two women 
worked irregular hours and one was still attending school and was responsible for 
some household tasks. Eventually, it took half-a-year before they were able to 
change the account and receive some more interest on the money. 
Many groups faced similar problems, i.e. the amount of money was too small, 
banking fees were high, transport had to be organised, or a committee member was 
registered with a debt. But the many hurdles were overcome nevertheless because 
one did not want to give the money to the treasurer, who might not want to keep it 
anyway out of fear of spending it or of theft. It was also dangerous to lend out all 
the money, which would not require a bank account. The members needed some 
financial collateral to ensure that the loans plus interest were returned. The com-
bination of saving at the bank and providing limited loans to members ensured that 
the risk of default was minimised, while cheap credit was still available. 
 
Social control and flexibility 
A few months later, the initial confusions within Masifunde had disappeared. 
Usually about thirty women and children attended the meetings, which now ran in 
a smooth and structured manner. On 3 May, Masifunde collected R7,352.20 in 
‘stage money’ (the fixed weekly contributions) and loans, while another R1,300 
was in the bank. The members worried about robbery given that such a large sum 
of money was lying on the table. Many members would have to work a year in 
order to earn this much. It was for this reason that, when a man asked to enter the 
place he was refused, which was exceptional under normal circumstances. As an 
excuse, a woman shouted: ‘You can’t come in now. We are washing ourselves.’ 
Voyiswa and another woman made a kind of growling noise when the money was 
on the table. It was the kind of rumbling noise a possessed person would make or 
if someone sensed the presence of witchcraft. Many women laughed about it and it 
seemed that the increasing amount of money that was accumulated by the 
members made everybody nervous. 
The large sum of money that circulated among the members did cause some 
problems as many women borrowed more than they could afford. One woman, for 
example had to repay her loan plus the accumulated interest of R180, but she only 
had R160. When she handed over the R160 some women expressed how upset 
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they were since she should have told them immediately about her financial 
problems and not wait and just give R160 instead of R180. During the quarrel, one 
woman discretely slipped her a R20 note, which she put on the table, and which 
ended the discussion. Another woman had previously failed to pay the R100 stage 
money. This was now regarded as a loan over which she had to pay R20 interest. 
But the woman only had R60. The women voiced their dissatisfaction clearly: she 
had to pay. The woman proposed borrowing the remaining R60 and paying it back 
later. Everybody agreed that this was impossible, and that she was only allowed to 
borrow money when she had no more debts. The discussion faded as other women 
started to pay their contributions. About half-a-minute later, the woman gave 
R120. Secretly, in order to avoid further embarrassment, one of the women had 
slipped R60 to her. Now the debt was an issue between those two women and it 
was up to them to resolve it. 
After a big pile of money had accumulated on the coffee table, the atmosphere 
became much lighter: ‘Yes, I can make it. In December I am going to get fat’, one 
woman joked, while another woman added, ‘yes, you are now all making a noise 
because you can hear the money being counted. Wow, it’s a lot of money!’ 
Another woman made a joke about Voyiswa, the woman who had made the 
rumbling noise earlier. She asked Voyiswa if she felt better now, which Voyiswa 
could confirm. Some women clapped and cheered when the amount of money was 
mentioned. 
After the money had been collected and counted, it was time to issue the loans. 
The demand for loans was high. Many also argued that it was good to give loans 
because interest on the loans would ‘make the money grow faster’. Some, 
however, worried that members were going to borrow more than they could afford. 
Therefore, they wanted to deposit part of the money, R500 or R1000, into the bank 
account. Others, again, felt it was not fair that some members were not borrowing 
much money. They argued that those who did not borrow did not contribute to the 
fund with interest that made ‘the money grow faster’. Nevertheless, while one 
would share in the interest others had paid, many also realised that it was risky to 
force members to borrow more than they could afford. 
Finally, it was decided to vote on whether R1,000 or R500 should go to the 
bank. The voting took place in a peculiar way. Someone stated: ‘The majority is in 
favour of R1,000 and only a minority is in favour of R500. Please, let the majority 
raise their hands.’ And, indeed, the majority of women raised their hands and 
R1,000 was allocated to the bank while the remaining money was distributed as 
loans. The atmosphere became a little tense when it became clear that the demand 
for loans exceeded the available money. Some women complained about the 
R1000 going to the bank. ‘At the bank the interest on the money is only two cents’, 
Voyiswa argued. Edith, the treasurer of the organisation, got annoyed and said 
threateningly: ‘I am going to bring R1,000 to the bank and there will be no more 
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borrowing. If you don’t stop arguing now, I will go to the bank and make sure that 
you only get the money in January [instead of December].’ The threat worked and 
the women who wanted to borrow more kept quiet. The uproar indicated that the 
women were nervous about their money and worried that some might default 
because they borrowed too much. Some women told me later that they wanted to 
borrow more money as a precaution against default. If Masifunde was to break 
down they would then at least not have lost all their money. This strategy, in 
combination with the desire for inexpensive loans, contained the risk of spiralling 
the organisation into excessive borrowing. Although the strategy was understand-
able from an individual point of view, the collectively organised ASCRA could be 
threatened. The money at the bank could prevent such a self-perpetuating cycle 
into default. 
Edith borrowed R600 for Xoliswa. Xoliswa was also a member of Masifunde 
but needed a lot of money for construction work on her mother’s house in 
Emaxhoseni. Xoliswa also participated in an umgalelo (ROSCA), but had her turn 
only at the end of the year, which was too late. She had asked Edith to borrow 
Masifunde money for her, which she would repay, including the interest. Edith felt 
confident about the arrangement although she remained responsible for returning 
the money to Masifunde if Xoliswa failed to pay. Edith felt that because Xoliswa 
was a member of Masifunde as well as of a ROSCA she was certainly going to 
have the money in the future. 
A month and five meetings later, it became clear that some participants had 
borrowed more than they could afford. It was time to pay back the loans from 
May, but some did not have the money. Unfortunately, Edith and I were not able 
to attend the meeting because we were in Fort Beaufort for Noparuru’s funeral. 
But Zanele told us the next day that most members had attended the meeting. 
Zanele and some other women had visited one of the defaulters at her home. They 
had found her completely drunk and it was clearly useless trying to talk with her. 
At the meeting, the members decided that everyone would be given more time to 
pay back the loans and interest. They were required to pay the interest first and 
follow that with the capital. However, meanwhile, they did not have to pay interest 
anymore on the outstanding loan. They collected R8,000 and all the money was 
lent to the members. This had greatly upset Zanele, as well as Edith. Many mem-
bers realised that if no measures were taken, the problems of loan repayments 
would only worsen and Masifunde could collapse. Therefore, the rules had to be 
discussed again on 21 June. 
Unfortunately, I could not attend the meeting on 21 June either because of the 
violence in Indawo Yoxolo. Edith told me that, although the participants had been 
given an extra month to pay back the loans and interest, some still had no money. 
The only thing that could be done was to give time until September to repay the 
loans and to refuse new loans. Again, no interest was charged on the outstanding 
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debt. The problem the organisation was facing became very clear when all the 
money was collected, amounting to only R300. It was clear that everybody was 
holding onto the money, maybe because they were worried about the future of 
Masifunde. Edith argued that the R1,000 should be put in the bank. In order to 
convince them, she showed the participants that one automatically took part in a 
lottery once the balance was over R3,000. This made some women more enthu-
siastic and it was decided to put R300 into the account. No loans were provided 
and if people lost confidence in Masifunde, they would stop repaying their loans 
and the group would spiral down into more problems. The lottery was a pleasant 
incentive and a good excuse to put more money into the bank, which made the 
repayment of loans more attractive. The flexibility of the rules ensured that people 
had the opportunity to repay the loans, and the social control among the partici-
pants, who could not avoid each other in the neighbourhood, put enough pressure 
on them to do so. Adding to the balance in the account ensured that default would 
result in the exclusion from a substantial amount of money. 
 
Sharing money 
Unfortunately, my fieldwork stopped because I returned to the Netherlands. 
Luckily, I was able to return to Cape Town in November 1998, which gave me an 
opportunity to witness the closing of Masifunde. On the first meeting of November 
the indebted members received a letter stating how much they owed and asking 
them to repay before the 16th. By the end of November, however, some still owed 
money. There was R16,000 in the bank and R15,785.50 worth of outstanding 
debts. This worried the members, some had borrowed up to R1,000 and Voyiswa 
even owed a staggering R1,364! Edith felt that there were too many debts and 
wanted to make sure she had at least some of Masifunde’s money. Therefore, she 
also borrowed money (R1,000), which she planned to pay off only when the others 
did the same. Nomfundu, Edith’s neighbour, was also at the meeting. Although 
some had tried to exclude her, she had paid properly and only owed a little bit of 
money. Nomfundu was clearly not her usual self as she sat quietly, and clearly 
bruised, in the corner of the room. One of the women said that the day before men 
had attacked and attempted to rape Nomfundu while she was on her way to the 
shop just around the corner. They had also stabbed her in the back and stomach. 
Although I knew that many women felt sorry for Nomfundu, I was quite surprised 
that the assault was barely mentioned and that nobody expressed any compassion. 
This again showed how difficult it was to establish trustful relations in Indawo 
Yoxolo. 
The women were wondering how and where they could divide the money 
safely and asked themselves: ‘Should we share at the bank?’, ‘maybe we should 
meet at the police station and share the money there’. Many thieves know that 
ASCRAs divide their money in November or December and might be on the 
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lookout. Some participants privately expressed their fear that one of the members 
would grab the money from the table and run, or instead pay a thief to steal it for 
her. Voyiswa bragged: ‘I am going to send the police and tell them to get my share 
from you.’ But Nomfundu immediately told her to keep quiet: ‘You owe money, 
you are a liar.’ 
The meeting of 29 November was poorly attended. Many members wanted to 
spend Christmas with their family and friends in the Eastern Cape and needed 
money to pay for the fare and in order to buy gifts. Some were upset that the 
money was still not divided and that their trip to the Eastern Cape was in jeopardy. 
Some of the women with large debts had failed to appear at the meeting. An 
argument developed about the way in which to punish those with outstanding 
debts. Some felt that they should not share in the accumulated interest. Others, 
however, disagreed and felt that the money had to be shared equally. The dis-
cussion continued for some time and no decision was made, but the threat of a 
sanction had come across. 
Voyiswa’s large debt was another problem and the members clearly stated that 
she would receive nothing if she did not pay. Voyiswa reacted aggressively as 
usual and told them not to worry about the debt because she would have the money 
soon. Voyiswa had a valid reason for withholding her payments. A few months 
previously, Voyiswa had taken Nothemba, a befriended neighbour but not a 
member of Masifunde, along to the meeting. It was very unusual to take along 
non-members, particularly when nobody had been informed beforehand. However, 
Voyiswa was as forceful as ever and nobody dared to complain. There were only a 
few women present at this meeting and Voyiswa made a strong case for a loan to 
Nothemba. Some women objected but Voyiswa insisted and promised to be the 
guarantor for Nothemba. The women did not have the courage to oppose Voyiswa 
and, against the rules, they lent Nothemba R602. 
A few months later, Nothemba had still not returned the loan and the members 
of Masifunde held Voyiswa responsible. Voyiswa, however, had also taken out a 
big loan months earlier and had never repaid it. Voyiswa’s loan already exceeded 
her share so there was no money that they could deduct from her share to cover 
Nothemba’s debt. The only way to get the money back was to press Nothemba. 
Some members had already paid Nothemba a visit and had managed to extract the 
promise that she would pay soon. She could only give R200 that she got from 
selling her refrigerator. She explained that she was about to sell her plot and leave 
Indawo Yoxolo. As soon as she would receive the money she would pay 
Masifunde. The women were not convinced and actually worried that Nothemba 
would leave Cape Town. As collateral, they took the small black and white 
television from her house. Nobody, however, dared to keep the television at their 
place until Nothemba paid her debt. They decided to let Voyiswa take care of the 
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television. After all, it was her friend. In addition to the television, they wanted to 
take Nothemba’s curtains, but the women agreed that this was too embarrassing. 
The last opportunity to collect debts was on 6 December. During the collection 
of stage money the meeting was structured and business-like as usual. The notes 
were handled carefully and each type of banknote was put in separate piles. In 
order to make neat piles, the images on the notes were all faced upwards. Stage 
money equalling R1,170 was collected and the women really enjoyed seeing and 
handling the money and started making jokes. It was a recurring reaction once the 
money was on the table. The women became nervous, laughed, made jokes, and 
behaved more disorderly. Pumla excitedly said: ‘Oh, I don’t know if I have the 
money [that she owed Masifunde]. I will go to the docks to sell my body.’ Zanele 
said this was a good idea, but Pumla told her: ‘You don’t have much chance. Your 
thighs look like pieces of Kentucky fried chicken.’ Nomfundu, who was quiet 
most of the time, told Pumla, ‘Yes, and then you are going to get AIDS!’ Voyiswa 
who did not get along with Nomfundu, saw her change to say something nasty to 
her: ‘Oh, Nomfundu; you are already infected with HIV. It is just a matter of time 
until it shows.’ Many women giggled and it was a bit embarrassing for Edith to 
translate this conversation. Nomfundu did not give up that easily and told 
Voyiswa, ‘you know, Voyiswa, your vagina stinks because you have more than a 
hundred boyfriends. My vagina is clean and tight so watch out or your boyfriends 
will come to me.’ Voyiswa continued to irritate people and it seemed that she was 
making jokes about me as well. But others teased her more and a few women said: 
‘Voyiswa doesn’t wear any underwear. That’s why it smells in here.’ The joking 
and teasing of Voyiswa was most likely inspired by her debts and the problems she 
got Masifunde into. The vicious remarks revealed that financial mutuals were not 
always cosy and that some of the women did not trust one another. 
R9,633 was collected and the members were very pleased. One of the women 
felt that Masifunde did so well because of my presence: a white person at the 
meetings surely must have meant good luck. Others agreed and it seemed that I 
was a kind of mascot to them. Edith put all the money in an envelope. A few 
members admitted that they had gone to the Standard Bank a few days ago. They 
knew that Edith had given notice at the bank in order to withdraw the money. The 
women admitted that they were worried that Edith might have already withdrawn 
the money and was going to steal it. They were relieved when the money was still 
in the account. As a joke about Edith’s trustworthiness, Voyiswa added: ‘Yes, 
Edith, I was wondering why you look so pretty today and are wearing such nice 
clothes. I was wondering what had happened with the money.’ 
The orderly meeting ended disorderly, as usual. Although the big pile of money 
took some members’ worries away, they were still anxious about dividing the 
money. The plan was to divide the money equally among the forty children that 
the women had enlisted, regardless of how much each had borrowed and con-
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tributed through interest. The outstanding payments were going to be deducted 
from the child’s share. Some women could not understand the decision and started 
to scream and shout. Therefore, Edith explained it several times over again and 
slowly everybody began to understand it and felt it was a fair system. They felt 
that those with debts should also receive a share of the remaining money and 
should not be punished twice (first by deducting the debt, second by being 
excluded from sharing the proceeds of these deductions). 
By the end of the meeting, Voyiswa’s friend Nothemba had still not arrived. 
The women felt that it was time to take action and visit her and force her to pay. It 
took some time before about thirteen women walked to Nothemba’s house, only a 
hundred metres away from the meeting place. Everyone felt very embarrassed 
about it. Upon arrival Voyiswa started shouting and screaming, which made the 
neighbours come out of their homes to see what was going on. Nothemba was not 
there and a neighbour said that she was taking her child by bus to the Eastern Cape 
and would return later. Voyiswa and some of the younger women set up a search 
in Indawo Yoxolo in order to force her to go to the meeting. They wanted to find 
out if Nothemba was hiding at a friend’s place somewhere. After a few hours they 
returned unsuccessfully and it was decided to meet and deal with Nothemba the 
following Tuesday. 
On the subsequent Tuesday, the special Masifunde meeting started at seven 
o’clock. Several women took the opportunity to pay off their remaining debts and 
another R1,330 was collected. Before the meeting started, a few women had paid a 
surprise visit to Nothemba and told her to accompany them to the meeting. 
Nothemba looked quite terrible and I could not help but feel sorry for her. She had 
been beaten up and her eyes were swollen. I could not find out who had done this, 
but the rumour was that it was related to her debts. Everybody felt uncomfortable 
and nobody dared to mention the loan. Finally someone had the courage to ask: 
‘Why have you still not paid the R402?’ Nothemba explained that she had wanted 
to pay last Sunday. She was participating in an umgalelo and it was her turn, but 
she did not receive anything because she had failed to contribute to a member’s 
turn. She did not go to the Masifunde meeting because she did not know what to 
say, except that she had no money. She had heard that they had tried to find her at 
her place last Sunday. She was not at home because she was on her way to her 
brother in Langa to ask him for money, but he was not at home. She also went to a 
friend in Indawo Yoxolo, who was not home either. 
Everybody kept quiet for some time and Maggie asked: ‘What do you expect 
us to do?’ Nothemba said that she just needed a few more days and would pay on 
Sunday. The women did not accept this: ‘We are waiting for you and your money. 
That is the only reason why we still have not shared the money’, and another 
woman added, ‘you are not a member. If you were a member we would know 
what to do, but now we do not know what to do and have to fetch you at your 
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place.’ Voyiswa was amongst the most critical, saying: ‘I signed for you, but not 
so they could deduct the money from my share.’ To the members she said, 
‘Nothemba has to pay. I refuse to stand for her. She doesn’t care about anything. 
She didn’t even come to me to explain what was going on.’ Voyiswa started to cry 
in order to express her disappointment in Nothemba. But it was obvious that she 
was faking and some women could not help but giggle. Later Voyiswa admitted to 
me that she was making a show out of it because she wanted to teach Nothemba a 
lesson. 
Everybody was at a loss about what to do next. ‘She can’t stay here forever. 
We have to go on with our meeting and she doesn’t live here [in this house]’, one 
woman remarked. It was Zanelle, one of the committee members, who made a 
proposal: ‘We have to get something out of your house.’ ‘But what should I do?’, 
asked Nothemba, who was close to tears. Now the criticism was directed at her. 
‘You do not respect us. You make it very difficult for us.’ ‘We should not wait but 
fetch things immediately.’ ‘We should get the curtains so we can sell something.’ 
‘You never told us you had financial problems. We cannot trust you and you don’t 
care.’ ‘Let us take more than only curtains. Let us take something that costs more 
than R400 to force her.’ Voyiswa continued with her theatre, trying to cry although 
she could not hold her laughter. Voyiswa wailed. ‘If I had R400 I would pay for 
you but I don’t have anything. Oh my God! I have learnt my lesson and will never 
do something like this again.’ The vicious remarks were very humiliating for 
Nothemba. 
It was time to go with Nothemba to confiscate her belongings, but nobody 
seemed to dare and we hesitated before finally walking to her place. When we 
arrived, we barely fit inside because her shack was so small. Nothemba had very 
few belongings and the curtains were about the only thing that was worth taking so 
two women took them off the rails. Nothemba went into the kitchen to take her 
pots and pans. While she was out of hearing distance Zanele whispered: ‘Jihu, this 
woman is poor. This is a disgrace.’ Taking a woman’s pots and pans was regarded 
as the last resort and it was embarrassing that they could not take anything else. 
There was a little colour television that had not been there before and Nothemba 
explained that she borrowed it from her boyfriend. Because Nothemba had so 
little, the women also took the television. This was a bit risky because Nothemba’s 
boyfriend was an ally of the Big Five, although he was a marginal figure. The 
women told Nothemba that she would get all of it back after she paid off her debt. 
Otherwise, her belongings were going to be sold among the members. We left 
quietly and embarrassed and some were giggling about this awkward situation. 
The following day, Masifunde met again. The participants were quite nervous, 
excited, as well as relieved that everything was going well. The women had to wait 
before the thirty-two days were over and the money could be withdrawn, and some 
still had to pay some debts. The events of the previous day were discussed and, 
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although the women felt it had been rude, they believed they had had no other 
option but to confiscate Nothemba’s property. Zanele also had problems concern-
ing a debt. She lent R200 of her Masifunde loan to a friend who, including interest, 
now owed her R400. She and her friend Pumla had visited her a couple of days 
ago. Because she had no money they took her refrigerator. One of the women 
reacted by saying: ‘You had better watch out Zanele, she might beat you for taking 
her refrigerator.’ But Zanele said she did not care and laughed and said: ‘What I 
liked about it was that Pumla and I could carry the refrigerator by ourselves.’ 
Zanele had sold the refrigerator for R450. 
Voyiswa was also present at the meeting and, to my great surprise, she put 
R1,300 on the table. Her debt was R1,364 so virtually all her debt was paid off. 
She promised to pay the remaining R64 the following day. Voyiswa’s payments 
were clearly related to Nothemba’s debts. Because Nothemba’s belongings were 
confiscated, Voyiswa did not need to worry anymore that they were going to take 
her money. By staying indebted, Voysiwa had mobilised Masifunde to put 
Nothemba under pressure. After Nothemba’s belongings had been confiscated and 
were available for sale, Voyiswa’s problems were over. Other women also paid 
their outstanding loans. Their debts were much smaller and could easily be 
deducted from their shares, but they wanted to pay nevertheless. It seemed that 
they were worried that they might get less than they were entitled to if they still 
had debts, and were also concerned about their reputations. The total amount of 
Masifunde money in the bank and in cash had become R31,025. This was an 
amazing amount of money. The women were very excited about it, which is easy 
to understand considering that many Xhosa had to work three years for this 
without spending any money, if they at least had a job. 
Nothemba did not turn up and the confiscated goods were sold. Everybody 
wanted something because the prices were very low: R130 for the black and white 
television, R150 for the colour television, R70 for the curtains and R70 for the 
aluminium pots and pans. Everybody was excited about this and people screamed 
and argued about prices. Xoliswa joked: ‘If we fetch Nothemba’s iron we can sell 
it as well and lower the prices even further.’ Voyiswa would have liked to have 
taken Nothemba’s small bookcase that she could have sold to her boss for R150. 
Ma Zantsi’s daughter wanted the colour television that had belonged to 
Nothemba’s boyfriend, but she was scared because Nothemba’s boyfriend had 
visited her mother the previous night. He had said that he was going to hurt the 
woman who was going to buy his television. Some considered Ma Zantsi to be a 
Big Five supporter, just like Nothemba’s boyfriend, and wanted to be careful. 
They did not know if the threat was serious and a wild conversation developed. 
The women screamed and shouted and argued about what they should do with the 
television. Many women wanted to buy something and a small fight broke out. 
The noise level increased so much that I had to leave the overcrowded shack and 
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stand outside for a few minutes to get some air. I just could not bear this screaming 
anymore as it physically hurt my ears. Some of the women noticed me leaving and 
used it in the argument. ‘Hey you! Shut up and keep quiet. You even made Erik 
leave with your noise.’ 
The women agreed to visit Shooter immediately after the meeting to talk with 
him about the television, just to be on the safe side. He was one of the political 
figures in the area who at that time was associated with the United Democratic 
Movement and who had a problematic relation with the Big Five as was described 
in chapter four. The women asked me to come along but I politely refused. I could 
not stand the shouting and screaming anymore and I also felt it was too risky. The 
story had spread already that I had been in the party that had confiscated 
Nothemba’s belongings. The women walked away but returned after going ten 
metres to ask me again if I could join them. When I insisted on staying behind, 
they told me that my presence would give them more courage and confidence. 
They said it had also made them feel more powerful and courageous when I joined 
them to confiscate Nothemba’s belongings. It became clear that I was not the 
passive bystander that I tried and preferred to be. Instead, my presence, even 
without saying anything, influenced the members of Masifunde. They probably 
would have visited Nothemba anyway, even without me, but it seemed that my 
presence had made it a bit easier for them. They decided to visit Shooter anyway, 
although I did not accompany them. He told them that he would not interfere when 
they would sell the colour television. 
Finally, they decided to divide the money on Friday 11 December. I offered to 
pick up the three committee members and take them to the Standard Bank in 
Adderly Street. The fee for withdrawing the money and closing the account was 
more than R500 and significantly cut down the interest earned which had been 
R277 over the last month based on an amount of R17,174. For safety reasons, the 
women divided the money at my home in the Observatory suburb. The total 
amount was R34,717.38, while another R1,506 was still owed. Edith kept separate 
books because she was worried about members altering the book at Ma Dlamini’s. 
Each of the forty children received R905.58. Because the largest debt was only 
R300, it could easily be deducted, which meant that the collateral at the bank had 
been sufficient. 
The money was put into envelopes with the names of the children and we left 
for Indawo Yoxolo. In the car, Zanele told me that it was very attractive to borrow 
money from Masifunde ‘but it is not a blessing’. It was attractive to borrow money 
and lend it to others and let them pay for the interest but the risks were not a 
blessing. Zanele gave the example of a weekly R50 ROSCA that she, Dolly, 
Margaret, and Xoliswa (all members of Masifunde) had started with a few other 
neighbouring women. Dolly had borrowed money from four Masifunde members 
but she refused to pay it back. Zanele said: 
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Dolly is rude and she screams. One of our women is soft and quiet and does not have 
anyone to help her put pressure on Dolly. She is not going to get her money back. Dolly 
had also caused problems in our R50 umgalelo. She refused to pay when it was 
Xoliswa’s turn because she knows that Xoliswa is also soft and will not put pressure on 
her. 
I had heard before that some suspected that Xoliswa and Dolly had tampered 
with the Masifunde books which, if it was true, might make it even more difficult 
for Xoliswa to coerce Dolly. Because of Zanele’s story, Edith was suddenly 
reminded of a R180 loan to a member of Masifunde. Edith had issued the loan 
some months ago but the woman had still not paid it back. She had also failed to 
say anything about it to Edith. Edith took R180 out of the woman’s envelope and 
wrote a note that reminded her of her debt. While other women had similar 
problems with fellow members, they had to sort it out themselves, Edith could use 
her position as a committee member to get her money back. 
We met the Masifunde members at a secret place in Indawo Yoxolo. I dropped 
them off and left again immediately. If I had stayed my blue Mazda would have 
attracted criminals and increased the risk of robbery and, just in case of an 
attempted robbery, I preferred to be elsewhere. Later I heard that the sharing went 
very well and that the meeting took only a few minutes. Many women were 
pleased with the organisation and started it again in January 1999. 
 
 
Containing risk 
 
The case of Masifunde reveals a number of measures taken to contain the risk 
associated with the financial mutual. First, it was important that there was money 
in the bank which was not accessible to the members. The only risk then would be 
that the three committee members would steal the money together. The money at 
the bank also functioned as collateral against loans. Whenever the loans increased, 
it also became important to increase the amount deposited at the bank to ensure 
that the loans would not exceed the savings. The members were willing to 
overcome many hurdles in order to open an account, such as travelling time, 
travelling expenses, legal limitations of opening an account, banking fees, as well 
as embarrassing treatment by bank employees. 
Second, the relative rigidity and flexibility of the rules were inherently faulty. 
The rigidity meant that the stage money – as the minimum contribution was called 
– was fixed and not open for negotiation, and that loans had to be paid back. The 
flexibility concerned the amount of loans, the exact time of repayment, the amount 
of interest on extended loans, and the amount of money in the bank. Flexible rules 
prevented default but, when changed, they could never be enforced individually or 
applied only to individuals. Decisions were made democratically and everyone had 
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to obey the new rule. This combination of flexibility and rigidity allowed members 
to avoid default or non-contribution and thus prevented excessive risk. 
Third, and contrary to my expectations, lending money to fellow members was 
not excessively risky. I expected loans to increase risks because more people could 
default. However, the loans prevented a situation in which only a few women were 
in charge of a large sum of money. Distributing part of the fund made it less 
advantageous to abscond. It also avoided pronounced inequality, which could 
attract witchcraft. 
Fourth, the members of Masifunde tried to keep political figures out and, in 
their dealings with outsiders, they trivialised the significance of the financial 
mutual. The political groups, particularly the dangerous Big Five, only once played 
a role after the colour television of the boyfriend of a non-member had been 
confiscated, just before the money was divided. By staying away from politics in 
Indawo Yoxolo, the risk that political divisions would dominate the relations 
within Masifunde decreased. It also made it less likely that political groups would 
use the financial mutual for political purposes. 
Fifth, certain categories of people were excluded because they could challenge 
the obligations inherent in financial mutuals. Just like many other financial 
mutuals, men were not allowed to participate in Masifunde, despite the fact that 
some men would have liked to have joined. Male authority, just like kinship 
hierarchies, could easily overrule the obligations that members had towards each 
other. They might simply refuse to pay and there would be little that the women 
could do to force them to. Kin, except for a few adult daughters who lived with 
their mothers, were excluded for the same reason. If kin, and especially affines, a 
boyfriend or husband were to join, this would seriously undermine trust. It would 
be nearly impossible to overcome the obligations and loyalties of such relations. 
Sixth, different forms and degrees of aggression and violence, varying from 
rumour and social control, to coercion, physical violence, and confiscation of 
property, were vital in order to contain risks (cf. Smets & Bähre 2004). The case of 
the confiscation of Nothemba’s property revealed what the members were capable 
of, even if it was uncomfortable and embarrassing for them. Women who failed to 
pay were put under pressure at meetings, were visited at their homes, and risked 
the confiscation of their humble belongings. In one case, the mutual jointly 
confiscated the humble possessions of a woman who was not even a member, and 
it is possible that they also beat her up.9 In other cases it was left to the individual 
member to get the money back because it was not regarded as the mutual’s 
responsibility. For example, it was up to Zanele to sort out her problems and she 
and a friend confiscated the refrigerator. In many cases, the threat of sanctions was 
                                                          
 
9  Lukhele (1990: 36) describes how a man was robbed of the money of a burial 
society and was found hanging from the rafters of a railway station three days later. 
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enough because people were aware that members who had lent money were 
willing to use pressure which they would not dare to use in other circumstances. 
The threat of the mutual and one’s fellow members forced the individual member 
to get her money back from neighbours or friends. One wonders if Zanele would 
have dared to confiscate the refrigerator if she did not need the money to pay off 
her debt with Masifunde. Therefore, the social constraints within the group could 
also influence the social constraints outside of the group. 
 
 
Co-operation without trust 
 
If people co-operate, they can take measures to contain risks, but risks can never 
be ruled out completely (cf. Coleman 1990: 91; Misztal 1996: 18). Crozier and 
Friedberg (1977: 6) express strong views on the dilemmas of establishing orga-
nisations: ‘Considering the context of not only bounded rationality, but also of 
bounded legitimacy ... and of bounded interdependence... it is a miracle that 
organizations exist at all.’ Sztompka (1999: 13) expresses an equally gloomy 
picture. He states that ‘without trust we would be paralysed and unable to act’ and 
cites Hardin (1993: 519 in Sztompka 1999: 25): ‘With a complete absence of trust, 
one must be catatonic, one could not even get up in the morning.’ The fact is that 
Xhosa migrants do get up in the morning, often very early, and deal with distrust 
and the problems that occur in financial mutuals. Although many neighbours did 
not trust each other, at least not all the time, they established financial mutuals that 
mostly functioned very well. This raises the same question, which Gambetta 
(1988: 217n6) so clearly posed: ‘We should ask why uncooperative behaviour 
does not emerge as often as game theory predicts’ (cited in Putnam 1993: 160).10 
However, should the dilemma of collective action indeed be sought in the 
dynamics of trust and social capital? A closer examination of cooperation in small 
social networks reveals that such a theory is in danger of romanticising co-
operation. To overcome an overly pessimistic view of organisations as put forward 
by rational choice theorists, as well as an overly romantic view as advocated by the 
social capital debate, it is necessary to acknowledge the ambivalence of social 
relations. By taking account of ambivalence (strong and contradictory feelings) in 
                                                          
 
10  Smelser (1998: 3) noted five ‘ingredients of rational choice’: ‘1) unconstrained 
actors try to maximize; 2) actors possess complete information about their tastes, 
their resources, and the availability, quality, and prices of products, as well as about 
job opportunities and other market conditions; 3) actors calculate and behave ration-
ally … 4) tastes are “given” – that is, they are stable and not to be explained – … 5) 
the interaction between two actors, the buyer and the seller, produces an equilibrium 
point at which exchange occurs, and at this point supply and demand and utility and 
cost converge.’ 
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human relations and towards institutions one gets a better insight into people’s 
actions (see Smelser 1998). 
A closer look at the way in which Xhosa migrants value relations provides 
some answers to their willingness to co-operate in a society where distrust is the 
rule rather than the exception. The interdependencies between neighbours and 
fellow members of financial mutuals, in particular, meant that many had mixed 
feelings towards one another. These ambivalent relations made it difficult to 
predict someone’s behaviour completely, especially if one had a close relationship 
with him or her. On a few occasions, some men and women shared their 
reflections about the way they understood social relations. Such occasions were 
not common and therefore the material presented here might come across as 
slightly haphazard snapshots. I prefer, however, to present it in this loose fashion 
than to pretend to give a clear, unambiguous and possibly idealistic image of 
Xhosa’s understanding of trust and social relations. Nevertheless, it is important to 
reveal such reflections on trust and social relations because they enable one to 
grasp why the men and women risked such substantial amounts of their meagre 
incomes. 
Nofurniture, for example belonged to a financial mutual and told me that she 
suspected that the organising committee had stolen money. She was angry and 
tried to do something about it, but she failed. Nevertheless, she joined again the 
following year with some of the same committee members. When I expressed my 
amazement at her decision to take the risk again she said: ‘What else can one do?’ 
Another woman told me that she had lent money to a neighbour although she did 
not trust her. The neighbour kept asking her for money and she finally gave in and 
lent her R150. As she expected, the neighbour never repaid the loan. When I asked 
her why she lent money to someone she did not trust, she replied: ‘To trust some-
one you sometimes have to take a risk. What else is there to do?’ 
Sometimes men and women conveyed that people, including themselves, 
encompassed good and evil characteristics. This seemed to be a fundamental and 
fairly unchallenged understanding of all humans. In the course of the research, I 
sometimes felt naive and alien when I expressed the view that people were 
basically good until proven otherwise. On such occasions people looked at me in 
amazement and I slowly started to adjust my thoughts. 
For example, in October 1997, Edith and I visited Ma Ntshona. She was known 
to be a Big Five supporter and was involved in a scandal for having stolen R3,600. 
The money belonged to members of Victoria Mxenge, a group of mainly women 
who saved money together to build houses. We had tried to meet Ma Ntshona 
before, but she was never there, even though we had made an appointment. It 
seemed that she was trying to avoid either Edith or me. We tried again and found 
Ma Ntshona accompanied by three women in front of her shack. They were 
waiting to be picked up and brought to a Victoria Mxenge meeting. The atom-
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sphere was uncomfortable and Ma Ntshona was visibly nervous. After we ex-
changed polite greetings, one of the women who had accompanied Ma Ntshona 
asked Edith: ‘Doesn’t it worry you that people now see you standing here with Ma 
Ntshona?’ Edith, who knew that Ma Ntshona was accused of stealing money, 
replied that this was not our business: ‘Every person has good and bad.’ The 
women agreed and one of them replied, ‘Injalo’, that’s how it is. 
A similar remark was made when we visited Ma Zibiya, a neighbour in Indawo 
Yoxolo who worked as a live-in domestic worker in the affluent, and therefore 
White, suburb of Tokai. During the week, Ma Zibya’s neighbour, Nobuntu, took 
care of the children because Ma Zibiya was only allowed to go home for the 
weekends. When we arrived at Ma Zibiya’s place, she was having tea with some 
friends. She laughed and enjoyed seeing us and said: ‘Ah, there we have the 
Paparazzi! Where is your camera?’ Obviously this was a playful reference to my 
paparazzi-like behaviour. Clearly I was probing into other people’s lives. The 
remark was also inspired by the death of Princess Diana. On the radio they had 
heard about her death in a car crash, which was possibly due to the paparazzi who 
were pursuing her. Listeners had phoned to the radio station and said: ‘It was all 
due to the pepperonis that Lady Di is dead.’ And another man had said: ‘You 
know, it are the Pavarottis that killed her.’ These remarks made Zibiya and her 
friends laugh. After Zibiya shared the joke with us, she told us that she had heard 
that Lady Diana was not only good. Before the radio programme she thought that 
Lady Diana was only good because she cared for children and tried to help people 
in need. But now she had heard on the radio and read in the newspapers that she 
also had bad sides which, according to Zibyia, only came out after her death. She 
was relieved to find out that Lady Diana was also a regular person, ‘Like every 
person: the bold and the beautiful’. Through reference to this popular soap series 
about rich people who are constantly fighting and deceiving one another, Zibiya 
emphasised that every person has good sides and bad sides, even Princess Diana. 
If people consist of good and evil, you should know that you cannot always 
trust them. It even implies that you cannot completely trust yourself either, because 
you might also harm others. The conflicts about the flows of money and com-
petition over money revealed that people were sometimes ruthless, and sometimes 
could not prevent harming people by not helping them. The ideology of ubuntu as 
well as the dynamics of witchcraft both revealed how good and evil were inter-
preted as a part of people and their interactions. 
Ubuntu can mean a lot of different things to different people. It is a useful but 
also a very politically charged concept. Therefore, it is important to explore this 
concept a bit further and be slightly cautious when using the term in a social 
science context. Ubuntu means humanity and is an ideology that emphasises 
respect for fellow human beings while stressing the inclusiveness of African com-
munities. Sometimes people also refer to this ideology in order to explain altruistic 
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or respectful behaviour. One has to be cautious when using the term ubuntu to 
understand social relations. In post-apartheid South Africa it has become a 
synonym for development and encompasses a romanticised vision of the redis-
covery of African values (cf. Van Kessel 2001). Ubuntu has come to stand for 
anything positively African. Archbishop Tutu played a pivotal role in putting 
ubuntu on the map. As the chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
he emphasized African morality and self-worth and highlighted ubuntu as a way to 
deal with pains of the past, work towards forgiveness, and envision a common 
future of interdependent people (see Battle 1997). Ubuntu has to be approached 
carefully because of its romanticised, one-dimensional notion that is now fashion-
able in politics and business.11 
In the course of my research, the African migrants never referred to ubuntu to 
explain their behaviour and instead emphasised ukunceda, or ‘helping each other’. 
But when I asked whether this could also be understood as ubuntu, they agreed and 
were surprised that I knew about this term. Ubuntu, although it was not often used 
in daily conversations, embraced the ideology of respect, helping each other, and 
solidarity. As Buijs & Atherfold (1995: 75) found among members of financial 
mutuals in the townships of Grahamstown, South Africa: 
[R]eputation is especially important in the context of ubuntu or the ideal of humanity … 
[which] recognises that human relations and human survival are paramount values and 
that material possessions are seen as the means whereby these values can be achieved. 
The proper names of financial mutuals, such as Masizakhe (‘let us build each 
other’), Mascedane (‘let us help each other’), Masonwabe (‘let us be happy’) also 
indicated the importance of this ideology. 
                                                          
 
11  For example Mbigi (1997) applies ubuntu to ‘Africanise’ the work force. Sindane & 
Liebenberg (2000), and Tusenius (1998) provide some examples of the glorification 
of ubuntu in the wake of the African renaissance. Van der Merwe (1996: 15-16) 
gives a very broad, unempirical, and idealistic vision of the role of ubuntu for finan-
cial mutuals in South Africa: ‘Die idee van “ubuntu” is ‘n gemeenskaplike ideaal 
wat aan alle Swartmense suid van die Sahara betekenis aan lewe en realiteit gee. 
Hierdie konsep word dikwels as die geestelike grondslag van alle Afrika-
gemeenskappe besckou. … Stokvels is een van die wyses waarop die beginsel van 
“ubuntu” uitgeleef word en mense mekaar ondersteun en help om te oorleef in om-
standighede van nood.’ Another example can be found in Kimmerle’s (2000) review 
of Ramose’s (1999) ‘African philosophy through ubuntu’: ‘“be-ing” in African 
philosophy is based on a “conception of the universe as a musical harmony” and that 
the “dance of be-ing” is an invitation to participate actively in and through the music 
of “be-ing”’ (Kimmerle 2000: 192). For a critical examination of the African renais-
sance see Hammond-Tooke (1998). Since Tempel’s Bantoe-filosofie (1946), which 
tried to comprehend the notion of ntu in Congo, such notions have been heavily 
debated and criticised. See Okafor (1982) for a discussion of Tempel’s work. 
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The expression umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu, means ‘a person is a person 
by means of other people’ is central to the ideology of ubuntu. Ubuntu highlights 
the interdependencies of people and how social configurations determine, or at 
least influence, one’s future. When I asked people about their motivation for 
particular forms of action, it was common to reason from a relational point of 
view. The expectations of others, especially kin that lived over a thousand kilo-
metres away, were an important reason for establishing financial mutuals and, 
through new social relations, direct flows of money. 
The ideology of ubuntu reminds one of Fortes’ (1983 [1959]) understandings of 
fate and destiny among the Thallensi. For the Thallensi, fate and destiny were very 
much a result of people’s interdependencies and particularly relations with an-
cestors: ‘A man’s Destiny, then, consists of a unique configuration of ancestors 
who have, of their own accord, elected to exercise specific surveillance over his 
life-cycle, and to whom he is personally accountable’ (Fortes 1983: 21). Moreover, 
Fortes (1983: 23) writes that: ‘Destiny ancestors are benevolent not out of 
affection for their descendants but out of self-interest and because they have the 
power. Their solicitude is gained not by demonstrations of love but by proofs of 
loyalty.’ 
For the Xhosa, relations with ancestors encompassed good and evil. Personal 
well-being depended on the ambivalent relations with ancestors. Ancestors could 
give protection but could also withhold protection when they were not respected 
and recognised through ritual. The migrants in Indawo Yoxolo were new. Hardly 
anybody had performed the ritual beer drinking that could ensure ancestral 
protection. This increased their vulnerability. Neglecting ancestors could have 
serious repercussions, as Hirst (1997: 220-221) noted: 
When the ancestors are neglected, they withdraw their protection (ukukhusela) from 
their descendants, making them open to witchcraft/sorcery (ukuthakhatha) and thus 
subject to illness … According to experienced diviners, the various symptoms suffered 
are directly related to difficulties in relationships with significant others. 
While the ideology of ubuntu emphasises the positive way in which people can 
help, forgive, and support one another, the experience of Xhosa migrants was 
much more ambiguous as, for example, shown by the reluctant solidarity described 
in the previous chapter. According to the notions of ‘helping each other’ and 
ubuntu, people can ‘construct’ each other and support each other and establish a 
positive sense of well-being and humanity. However, witchcraft shows that it is 
definitely possible to do the opposite. As the threatening triad reveals, people can 
also influence each other in destructive and dehumanising ways. 
In her study on the spread of AIDS among Zulu youth, Leclerc-Madlala (1997: 
377) refers to the ‘“flip side” of the Afrocentric ethos of ubuntu’ that promotes 
common misery. She describes how those who were infected with HIV, or 
believed to be infected, wished to infect others as well. A nineteen-year-old 
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student explained: ‘By giving it [HIV] to others, I won’t be going down alone. 
That’s my only hope’, while another nineteen-year-old male also had the desire to 
infect others with HIV, ‘This disease is horrible. The only good thing would be if 
we’re all together. Ubuntu, we share … if we are people we must share’ (Leclerc-
Madlala 1997: 371). The conversations with youth about AIDS and ubuntu led 
Leclerc-Madlala (1997: 372) to pose the question: ‘Could there be a “dark under-
side” to the process of ubuntu?’ 
The danger of ubuntu also emerged in relation to marriage. In the course of the 
research I had attended only one wedding because people rarely got married, and if 
they did it was a jural marriage. During a conversation with a few men and women 
I discovered the reason for this was related to gifts: 
If a man has a girlfriend, she will be jealous of the bride. The jealous girlfriend might 
give a present, such as clothing or money that is treated with herbs (amayeza). This gift 
causes the newlyweds to spend money like crazy and they will end up in misery. 
Ubuntu can be dangerous sometimes. 
On another occasion, a woman told me that her sister once received R30 from 
someone out of the blue. She was surprised because she had not indicated to that 
person that she needed money. She visited a diviner (igqirha) who explained to her 
that the woman gave her the money in order to harm her. When she told me the 
story she added: ‘So you see: Ubuntu can be dangerous sometimes.’ Money was 
particularly vulnerable for use in witchcraft and people were thought to put 
witchcraft medicine on the money to harm others. Thus, circulating money in a 
financial mutual definitely had its dangers.12 For this reason, people would some-
times keep money from a suspicious source separate in order to prevent it from 
contaminating other notes and coins. By spending it as quickly as possible one 
diminished the risk of being bewitched by it. In other words, wealth needs to be 
avoided because it can lead to jealousy. Jealousy is a problem because it can lead 
to witchcraft and therefore undermines trust. The paradox here is that trust is 
needed in order to ‘create’ wealth through co-operation in financial mutuals while 
that same creation of wealth undermines trust. 
Ubuntu and witchcraft were related because both indicated how people were 
influenced through relationships and, just like people hardly spoke about ubuntu 
and preferred ‘helping each other’, they hardly ever discussed witchcraft openly 
but instead spoke of the dangers of jealousy. People seemed to be aware that one 
could not be in complete control of oneself, and they realised their own kind-
heartedness and malignancy. Jealousy was the emotional component of witchcraft, 
and it is an emotion that was difficult to control, even if one tried very hard. 
Jealousy, followed by guilt when one feels responsible for the misfortune of others 
appears to underlie self-accusations. Grandma Doris told me how she witnessed a 
                                                          
 
12  See Taussig (1980) on such dangers in South America. 
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case of a self-confessed witch. Grandma Doris’ twelve-year-old daughter had 
tragically suffocated from the smoke caused by a fire that had burned her shack to 
the ground. Soon after the child’s death, her neighbour ran out onto the street and 
screamed and shouted and moved wildly. She publicly blamed herself for the death 
of Grandma Doris’ daughter. The woman had opened the bible and the power of 
the bible had caused her to reveal herself as a witch. 
Self-accusations were rare but did occur (see also Niehaus 2001).13 People saw 
humans, including themselves, as consisting of good and evil. They were good 
natured as well as malicious, could contribute to other people’s lives in a positive 
way, but were also capable of destroying others by, for example, uncontrolled 
jealousy. This had significant consequences for people’s understanding of trust. It 
was inherent in people’s understanding of their entrenchment in social configu-
rations that relations were ambivalent. Therefore, one could not always trust one 
another, and one could not even entirely trust oneself. This was a basic fact of life 
and any form of interaction and co-operation. Sometimes things go wrong: Injalo, 
that’s life, c’est la vie, zo gaat het nu eenmaal. Because people were aware of 
these risks in life, it was enough to maintain them, and they did not expect them to 
be eliminated. People can have multiple, conflicting feelings about one another 
and nevertheless co-operate. The participants entrusted large parts of their income 
to others without trusting them all the time, and without entirely trusting them-
selves. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Financial mutuals can be regarded as ‘islands of trust’ but only to a certain degree. 
The threatening triad of violence, economic insecurity, and volatile relations urged 
people to organise into confined, dense, social networks that did not extend beyond 
a radius of a couple of dozen metres. They at least could be controlled to some 
extent through gossip and rumour and physical proximity. 
The contradiction between a distrustful society in which trustful financial 
mutuals flourished is, to some extent, false. The threat of violence and confiscation 
                                                          
 
13  Geschiere (1997: 12) rightly argues: ‘Most anthropologists still tend to reduce 
discourses on witchcraft to an unequivocal opposition between good and evil, even 
when the local terminology hardly lends itself to this.’ Among the Xhosa, ubuthakati 
(i.e. witchcraft) has a negative connotation but is also a discourse that highlights the 
desire for wealth. A diviner (igqirha) might also be a witch (igqwirha) and the herbs 
(amayeza or umti) that are used can be both dirty and clean, depending on their use. 
Therefore, I wish not to reinforce simplistic oppositions of good and evil but show 
how good and evil work can be done through similar techniques and social pro-
cesses. 
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show this more than anything else. The same violence that undermined trust in 
South African society could, under certain conditions, contain risks in financial 
mutuals. Although financial mutuals certainly built up social capital, it was also 
the threat of violence that offered the control that was needed. Acts of violence, 
intimidation and confiscation were legitimate yet problematic within the context of 
financial mutuals, but are difficult to reconcile with the maintenance of good 
governance and legitimate bureaucracies. Therefore, the political transformative 
capacities of financial mutuals in South Africa are small. It did not seem very 
likely that trust in financial mutuals could lead to trust in society at large or in 
political institutions. 
The organisers of financial mutuals established strategies that contained risks 
by managing social relations. The case of Masifunde revealed the strategies that 
people used to manage relations with fellow members: the money at the bank was 
used as collateral against default, the combination of flexibility in rules and rigidity 
in its application also implied risk. By dividing the fund into many small parts and 
lending it to many members, mutual dependencies were emphasised while 
absconding with the money became less advantageous. The mutuals steered clear 
of political division in the township. No kin – except for a few daughters – or 
boyfriends and husbands were allowed because the hierarchies in these relation-
ships were threatening to the members’ mutual obligations; the threats of violence 
and confiscation were severe repercussions in case of default. 
These measures, however, could not eliminate risks. Financial mutuals were 
part of a violent, threatening, and distrustful society, although the members made 
attempts to separate themselves and their money by creating ‘islands of trust’. The 
threat of violence was even necessary to deal with default. Distrust and threats 
were endemic to society and an inevitable part of social relations, also among the 
members of financial mutuals. The dense social networks among the participants 
were subject to risks but also gave rise to complex interdependencies that in turn 
created an ambivalence within these relations, similar to other social configura-
tions, such as kinship. 
Because ambivalence is central to the social configurations revealed, one could 
co-operate without trusting others completely. It makes it possible to grasp why 
one was willing to risk being harmed by others. People understood themselves and 
their interdependencies with others as a mixture of good and evil forces that were 
not always under control. Distrust was, therefore, an inevitable part of life. Some-
times you cheat and sometimes someone cheats on you and then you pick up the 
pieces, get back on your feet, and continue living. Injalo; that’s the way it is. 
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Spending money: Consumption,  
friendship and friction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the year, many African women, but also men, contributed substantial 
amounts of their sparse income to financial mutuals. It was not uncommon for 
them to reserve a quarter of their monthly salary for the mutual. Contrary to the 
ambitions of many development agencies, hardly anyone used the money for 
business purposes. The reluctance to use money for business purposes should, 
however, not come as a surprise. Setting up a business in the informal economy is 
difficult and risky and the income is unlikely to be comparable with the wages of 
an unskilled or semi-skilled worker.1 Moreover, violence in places like Indawo 
Yoxolo makes it difficult for businesses to succeed, especially if one does not have 
the protection of local Mafia-style leaders. It actually puzzles me that, while many 
foreign investors are reluctant to invest in South Africa’s economy, uneducated 
and inexperienced migrants are expected to invest their money in businesses in an 
unprotected informal economy. 
Virtually all the money was spent on consumables and one can roughly 
distinguish three categories, namely clothing, rituals, and food. Clothing should be 
understood as a very broad category. It includes dresses, school uniforms, and so 
on, but also items considered to be ‘clothing for the house’, such as refrigerators, 
                                                          
 
1  See, for example, Rahman (1997) and Reinke (1999). 
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stoves, cooking utensils, crockery, and duvet covers. Often, money was used to 
contribute to the costs of rituals, such as funerals, initiation of sons, or rituals that 
were held in order to evoke respect towards the ancestors. Finally, money was 
used to buy food. Ma Zibiya, for example, belonged to several imigalelo, of which 
one was a monthly grocery ASCRA. In December, the members collectively 
bought a massive amount of groceries at the nearby MAKRO store, including 
sugar, rice, flower, washing powder, cooking oil, milk powder, and dried beans. 
She also received R527 in cash. After she had received the goods and money she 
took most of the food to her mother’s place in the former Transkei. The cash was 
used in order to buy a bull that was slaughtered to honour her deceased father. 
 
 
Status and conflict 
 
Why is consumption so important for Xhosa migrants? Spending money on con-
sumables certainly generates economic advantages. It protects you against adver-
sities and food can be bought more cheaply from wholesalers, without having to 
take a loan (see Heidheus 1994; Lont 2000b; 2002; Miracle et al. 1980; Scofield 
1997). 
At least as significant as the economic aspect of consumption is its social 
significance to Xhosa migrants. An important function of consumption is being 
and feeling less poor and being able to hope for a better future. Consumption 
enables people to feel better about themselves, distinguish themselves from others, 
and show a lifestyle that evokes respect and status (Bourdieu 1984: 1992; Lamont 
1992: 68-70; Veblen 1899). The Xhosa migrants were pre-occupied with con-
sumption and, particularly under the conditions of poverty and despair, it was 
important to distinguish oneself from others through one’s consumer habits. For 
example, when I visited a second-hand store in the township Philippi, one of the 
clients wanted to buy the largest radio. I asked the client why she preferred that 
particular radio, to which she responded: ‘It is the largest radio. I know it is only 
competition, nothing more, to see who has the biggest radio.’ 
Food was also important for respectable behaviour as the provision of food to 
visitors showed hospitality. Moreover, food led to fatness.2 Men readily explained 
that gaining weight meant gaining the good of the public opinion. During a 
conversation, a man once jokingly referred to his belly, as well as mine, as ‘a lot of 
public opinion’. Status and respect were closely intertwined with food and other 
forms of consumption, which could only be afforded by participating in financial 
mutuals. 
                                                          
 
2  See, among others, Masquelier (1995) on consumption, particularly sweetness and 
its pivotal role for the Mawri in Niger to grasp changes in society. 
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Distinction, status, and respect through consumption did not go unchallenged 
by those who did not share in them. For example, while having tea at the home of 
one of the residents in Indawo Yoxolo a man walked in with a mobile phone 
clipped visibly onto his belt. The phone attracted everybody’s attention. People 
wanted to see and hold it and find out how it worked. Soon it became clear that the 
man did not know how his phone functioned and that it was not even connected to 
a network. Everybody laughed, and with a look of dismay, the owner of the phone 
had to listen to humiliating jokes about the way he had been bragging. 
Status, consumption, and lifestyle were also at the core of critical remarks made 
against another resident in Indawo Yoxolo. One of Edith’s neighbours was the 
only one in the street with a brick house. It had four rooms and stood out beauti-
fully against the surrounding shacks and ten square meter RDP ‘matchbox’ houses. 
During a casual conversation on the street, the neighbours started to gossip about 
their neighbour with her large house. They complained that she did not greet them 
anymore and would only reciprocate a greeting, never start one. Another woman 
said that she had noticed that, since the neighbour had lived in this big house, she 
had changed the way in which she walked. To clarify her argument she mimicked 
her neighbour by parading slowly in front of us, head up, while wiggling her 
behind. Everyone laughed at this little show. Another woman complained that she 
had failed to recognise her neighbour the other day because of her different walk, 
‘She now thinks she belongs to a higher class’, ‘she thinks she is better than us’. 
Consumption, as a status indicator, was accompanied by envy, jealousy, and 
dismay. Consumption worked well as a means of distinction, but this distinction 
was felt to be problematic, especially among people who were fairly close to one 
another. To have a lot of possessions and to show off without shame was regarded 
as bragging (ukubreka or ukuqhayisa). The person who brags, the brekgat, i.e the 
‘bragging ass’, was the one who bought the biggest and most desirable products in 
order to compete. 
The literature on the colonial encounter and modernity has given ample atten-
tion to the dynamics of consumption, social relations, and socio-political conflict 
(see among others Appadurai 1986; 1997; Burke 1995; contributions in Comaroff 
& Comaroff 1993; 1999; Fisiy & Geschiere 1996; Masquelier 1995; Meyer 1995, 
1998, 1999; Taussig 1995; Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1991). Although 
only in passing, financial mutuals in South Africa have also been compared with 
the potlatch (Buijs & Atherfold 1995: 42; Kuper & Kaplan 1944: 84). Bataille 
(1991) and Wolf (1999) convincingly argued that this 19th century gift giving 
institution among the Kwakuitl contains an element of warfare and rivalry.3 A gift 
                                                          
 
3  See also Mauss’ (1954: 35) reference to gift giving as the ‘war of property’ and ‘the 
war of wealth’. See also Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering, especially on the 
secret dumping place of possessions of convicted witches in the forest of Suriname, 
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forces the recipient to make a more valuable counter gift. In the potlatch, there was 
rivalry and competition over who could give the most and thus had the most 
prestige and rank. Due to new sources of wealth and insecurity, the potlatch 
increasingly became a space to compete and fight with goods (Wolf 1999). 
This perspective on consumption (status and conflict) provides an interesting 
approach to financial mutuals. Financial mutuals are too easily portrayed as 
‘solidarity groups’. At first glance, consumer practices that are part of financial 
mutuals can be understood as expressions of belonging and mutual help which, as 
will become clear in this chapter, does not do justice to the complex social dyna-
mics of consumption in financial mutuals. 
 
 
Zolani Club: The price of a bed 
 
Comaroff & Comaroff (1999: 293-294) state that ‘there is this perplexity ... about 
the very nature of human subjects, about their covert appetites, about dark prac-
tices of the heart that show themselves in spectacular new fortunes and orgies of 
consumption’. Indeed, there is much uncertainty about the powers that bring about 
wealth and enable consumption. The case of the financial mutual Zolani Club 
revealed much more clearly than a fragmented account how consumption was 
regarded as pivotal to social tensions. However, in order to understand this per-
plexity – and here I share Moore’s (1999) methodological caution on the imagina-
tive interpretation made by Comaroff & Comaroff (1999) – I submit that the 
inquiry must be rooted in ethnography. 
Zolani Club was part of one of the largest and most sophisticated financial 
mutuals that I encountered during my fieldwork. The name of the club was derived 
from the word ukuzola, ‘to stay cool, to relax’. Zolani Club meant something like 
‘the ones who stay cool’, which they did by giving money to one another. It was a 
ROSCA and the members met three Sundays per month in a classroom at Chumise 
High School, Khayelitsha, Site B (ukuchumise means ‘to produce a lot of fruit’). 
One of the members of Zolani Club introduced me to the organisation, and I had 
ample opportunities to go to their meetings, have conversations with members, 
visit them at their homes, which were mostly in Khayelitsha, and pick up some of 
the rumours and gossip. It was only an intimate knowledge of the relationships 
between the members that enabled me to see the other side of Zolani Club, and to 
see that the club was not only about happy people supporting each other with gifts, 
respecting each other and distinguishing themselves from others through con-
                                                                                                                                              
 
on the embeddedness of consumer products in conflict (Thoden van Velzen & Van 
Wetering 1991: 154-156). 
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sumption in a carefree fashion. It revealed that the support that members gave each 
other was neither unconditional nor unproblematic. 
 
 
 
Photo 6.1 Some of the members of Zolani Club 
 
 
Financial arrangements 
The 31 participants of Zolani Club made financial contributions to each other in a 
number of ways. Each meeting was oriented around a ‘birthday’. The ‘birthday’ 
was fictitious and had nothing to do with the member’s actual date of birth. The 
contribution to a birthday depended on a variety of factors. In 1998, Zolani Club 
was divided into three subgroups of about ten members each. On the occasion of a 
birthday of someone within the same subgroup, one was obliged to contribute at 
least R100. If the member belonged to one of the other two subgroups, a minimum 
gift of R10 was sufficient. This gift money had a special name – ‘stage money’ – 
because it was needed before one was to be allowed ‘on stage’, that is, allowed to 
come forward and start giving. Two secretaries recorded all the contributions in 
two books. One book was kept for the individual member, the other for the organi-
sation. 
In addition to stage money, participants were encouraged to give additional 
money or goods, such as cooking utensils and soap or even larger presents such as 
refrigerators or stoves. The prices of any items given were also recorded. The extra 
amount of money and goods given beyond ‘stage money’ was called ukuskora, 
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derived from ‘to score’. This extra amount offered depended on the individual 
participant and her relationship with the recipient. Nevertheless, recipients were 
expected to reciprocate all contributions with a gift worth at least the same amount. 
Besides ‘stage money’ and ‘scoring’, there were other ways of receiving on a 
‘birthday’. Zolani Club was part of a network of ROSCAs called Noluthando 
(meaning approximately ‘the group/person is based on love’) initiated in 1984. At 
least six other ROSCAs were part of Noluthando, each with its separate board, 
uniform, meetings, and organisers. Within this network of groups, it was possible 
for one group to visit a birthday celebration hosted by another group. To attend 
these celebrations, a R2 admission fee had to be paid which covered some of the 
expenses for food and drinks. On top of the R2, visitors were encouraged to give 
whatever amount they preferred. Like the gifts coming from within the immediate 
group itself, gifts from members of other groups within the Noluthando network 
were also written down by the secretaries, and were expected to be reciprocated at 
the appropriate time. Thus, by contributing to the birthday of another group’s 
member, one created the obligation for another to attend one’s own birthday with a 
contribution of at least the same amount. 
To create even more opportunities for giving and receiving, participants created 
a fictitious or ‘quasi’-kinship system. Each member had a ‘mother’, a ‘grand-
mother’, ‘sisters’, and often also ‘daughters’. Although participants did not use 
different terms for kinship within the organisation – the situation made it clear who 
was who – I will distinguish these ‘organisational kin’ from biological family with 
the use of quotation marks; ‘mother’, ‘grandmother’, and so on. In order to join 
Zolani Club, the aspirant was required to declare an intention to join and choose a 
‘mother’. Every woman in the organisation wanted to have as many ‘children’ as 
possible and often asked, before the meeting took place, if anyone would like to 
become their ‘daughter’. Still, it was up to the ‘daughter’ herself to decide on who 
her ‘mother’ would be. By choosing a ‘mother’, the member automatically placed 
herself in a social web that included ‘sisters’, a ‘grandmother’, and possibly even a 
‘great grandmother’. Furthermore, ‘aunts’ (the ‘mother’s sisters’) and ‘nieces’ (the 
‘mother’s sister’s daughters’) were also part of the picture. Nevertheless, because 
the quasi-marriage of quasi-kin was non-existent, there were no quasi in-laws. For 
many, this last aspect was important. 
At a member’s birthday, it was quasi kin in particular who provided plenty of 
money and presents. The ‘mother’, ‘grandmother’, ‘sisters’, and ‘children’ asked 
what the member would like to have for her birthday. The minimum amount given 
in addition to the stage money depended on the amount that had to be reciprocated 
from previous exchanges. Again, if you owed someone because of what you had 
received on your last birthday, it was obligatory to reciprocate with at least the 
same amount. In many cases, though, much more than the original amount was 
given, thus creating a new and larger debt. 
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Quasi-kin could be of the same subgroup, the same club, or could be members 
of other clubs within Noluthando. This flexibility made it possible for a ‘daughter’ 
to take part in a different ROSCA than that to which her ‘mother’ belonged. This 
system of groups within groups (clubs within Noluthando, for example, and 
subgroups within clubs) gave the organisation room to grow. If too many members 
joined a single club, the cycle of the ROSCA became longer – and a lengthening 
of the cycle has been shown to be erosive to the mechanisms of trust and social 
control within the group (see also Bähre & Smets 1999: 2004). But a subgroup 
could leave the ROSCA and establish a new ROSCA within Noluthando. The new 
ROSCA maintained its reciprocal relations with quasi-kin and other clubs and 
subgroups by attending and giving presents at the appropriate birthday celebra-
tions. Though it was not possible to have more than one ‘mother’, it was possible 
for a member to leave her ‘mother’ in order to become the ‘daughter’ of another 
member. Though rare, this did happen, and it caused considerable difficulties. 
Another way to contribute to a participant’s birthday celebration was by 
‘playing’ money. This could be done by anyone, and most of the time the amounts 
of money in question were relatively small (such as R2, although amounts up to 
R40 were also played). When the money was given, an announcement was made, 
such as, ‘With this money, I want to say happy birthday’, or ‘With this money, I 
want the guests to start a song’. This played money was also registered by the 
secretaries and entered the ledger of social obligation and reciprocity. 
Although the ability to accumulate large amounts of money and goods within a 
short time was a major attraction of the organisation, there were still risks attached 
to this fortune. One member confessed having sleepless nights because she had 
received money and presents worth far more than what she could afford to 
reciprocate within a year. She had expressly asked for small presents, but her 
‘mother’ in particular gave much more than she could have imagined. Members 
tried a couple of different strategies to prevent such sleepless nights and to manage 
their obligations within Zolani Club, but these strategies were not always 
successful. For example, it was possible to limit the number and costs of group 
relationships by not taking any ‘daughters’ or by giving small presents or no 
presents at all. Indeed, some members only contributed the minimum ‘stage 
money’ necessary and, most of the time, abstained from ‘scoring’ and visiting 
other clubs. The consequence of this cautious engagement with group exchange 
was that one had fewer and less intensive reciprocal obligations – and, therefore, a 
minor status within the group. Another strategy to limit one’s obligations was to 
save the money that had been given on a birthday. Instead of spending the money, 
some immediately put it aside, to be used for another member’s birthday. To keep 
the money until later, though, required not only a safe place to keep the money, but 
also a substantial level of restraint on the part of the individual. For those on 
formal incomes it was also possible to purchase a gift on credit. However, the high 
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interest rates in South Africa (which, at the time of the research, were approaching 
an annual rate of 24 percent) meant that such a gift would be far more expensive 
than its immediate price tag. Buying gifts on credit was a high risk strategy, for if a 
loan was not paid off regularly, the ever-accruing interest on the borrowed amount 
could easily become unmanageable. 
Another strategy to prevent the increase of one’s money circulating in the 
organisation was to talk with the ‘birthday girl’ before the celebration. The con-
cerned member could explain her financial problem and try to make a deal – 
perhaps to pay later, or to pay back the debt over two birthdays without receiving a 
birthday present in the interim. If an agreement was reached, the debtor had to 
explain at the birthday meeting why she had no money, apologise for the situation, 
and promise that the present would come later. At one meeting of Zolani Club that 
I observed, a woman could not afford to pay the R600 she owed her ‘mother’. She 
told the members and her ‘mother’ in particular: ‘I am sorry, sorry. She/you4 [her 
‘mother’] made it possible for me to have some education and for me to say “good 
morning umlungu”. [Umlungu means ‘white person’. By saying this, she was 
explaining that she now knew some English (‘good morning’) and could therefore 
interact with white people.] I can only give R30 and will give the rest of the money 
at her next birthday.’ This situation was an embarrassing one that elicited sym-
pathy from others in the group. Because of the shame involved in not being able to 
pay, participants often went to great lengths (and great costs) to avoid such a 
situation. 
Yet another strategy for managing one’s finances within the organisation – and 
even to benefit from it – was used by Nokwanda. She had been a member since the 
beginning of the group in 1984 and, with her twenty-two ‘children’, she was a 
well-known and respectable woman whose presence in the group was always felt. 
Together with her husband, she lived in an eight square metre room in her 
employer’s premises. She used her ROSCA money to lend to her neighbours, who 
were also from Qumbu in the former Transkei. During an interview, someone 
interrupted to repay her R1,300 she had previously borrowed. This repayment 
included the 30 percent monthly interest (generally regarded as a fair rate). 
Nokwanda told me: ‘This is how I keep my money.’ 
In addition to the measures that individual members took in order to manage 
financially, the organisation deducted R500 from the money that was collected at 
the birthday celebration. The R500 was collateral and could be used to settle 
outstanding debts. In general, these measures worked well. Default was rare, debts 
were mostly settled and, if problems occurred, they involved individual members 
and did not damage the future of the organisation as a whole. The dense web of 
                                                          
 
4 In Xhosa the noun u signifies both she/he and you singular. 
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financial obligations strengthened the organisation’s survival and it was actually 
difficult to stop giving and receiving and leave the organisation. 
Some financial strategies were clearly unattractive and expensive. The fact that 
people nevertheless resorted to such strategies reveals how important the social 
relationships established through the ROSCA were and how powerful the bonds 
were between members. From its financial role alone, one could see that the 
organisation gave mutual support and cemented social relations via money and 
presents. But these ties could gag as well as they could bind. The organisation and 
its criss-crossing obligations came to be, for some members, a source of stress, 
sleepless nights, and indebtedness. 
 
History 
In order to acquire a better understanding of Zolani Club and its network of people 
and organisations, I spoke with Nokwanda. The way in which she conveyed the 
history of this financial mutual revealed how important the gift of money and 
consumption was for the establishment of close relations. Nokwanda told me the 
following story: 
‘The umgalelo was established in 1984. We started in a small group and 
attended meetings at the member’s room. Some members were sleep-in domestic 
workers, so there could be no singing because of the noise. The umgalelo was very 
popular and we started growing, so we called a meeting. This was in 1986. They 
gave permission to meet at a hostel in Langa,5 the oldest township in Cape Town. 
We started with R12 stage money per month. A year later, in 1987, we called the 
organization Nompulelelo, meaning something like ‘the improvers’. We could 
really see the improvement. If you had R500 that was a lot of money in those days. 
Things went up, including the stage money, which was set at R22. Prices also went 
up. In those days the maximum amount payable on someone’s turn was R1,000. 
In 1988, the connection to Bhayi (Port Elizabeth) developed. It went via Radio 
Bantu, now called Radio Umhlobowene. You give regards or dedications to 
friends in other parts of the country via the radio. You can send a postcard or letter 
to the radio, which they read during broadcasting. After regards and dedications 
had been sent between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, we asked the radio station 
for telephone numbers from the people in Port Elizabeth. We didn’t know each 
other at all. We had the phone numbers and we started to send each other 
dedications by phone and started talking to each other. We started talking about 
imigalelo and we gave each other advice. We still haven’t met. 
Mother Nomfuneko Godana, who lives in Port Elizabeth, was fifty-two years 
old at the time. She proposed having ‘children’. She phoned the radio and said that 
                                                          
 
5  In 1986, a state of emergency was declared. This severely restricted meetings and 
one needed permission from the authorities to get together. 
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she was looking for ‘children’. We were a bit confused. When one is at school one 
would play at having schoolmates who are your mothers and children, so we knew 
about it. But still it was confusing to us what it had to do with imigalelo. At a 
meeting with members of her organisation in Port Elizabeth, she explained how it 
works. You give your ‘children’ a lot of money and the money comes back. It lets 
the family grow. We thought, if it works in Port Elizabeth, we also have to try it 
here in Cape Town. Via Radio Bantu the people in Port Elizabeth started to 
announce the birthday of their members. We were surprised and Nomvumekaya, 
one of the members of the organisation in Port Elizabeth, said on the radio: ‘I 
would like you, Nokwanda, to be my child.’ She had left her telephone number at 
the radio station. After I phoned the radio to ask for Nomvumekaya’s number I 
phoned her in Port Elizabeth. Nomvumekaya explained to me about the ideas 
Nomfuneko Godana had and what she said about quasi-children and mothers. I 
liked it and I called a meeting in Langa to inform the members of our organisation. 
They had also heard about it on the radio and they were curious and very 
interested. 
It was going to be member Sowati’s turn on the second of March 1989. 
Everybody was looking forward to see what would happen and if she really would 
send presents and visit her from Port Elizabeth. Nomvumekaya was her ‘mother’ 
and she phoned us to let us know that she would go to Cape Town for Sowati’s 
birthday. Unfortunately, she couldn’t come as one of her children was ill, but she 
had sent a present by mail. At Sowati’s birthday, the chairlady opened the present: 
everybody was curious as it came from far. It was a dress and R50. Now every-
body wanted a ‘mother’! Mother Sowati phoned to Port Elizabeth to thank 
Nomvumekaya and she told her that the other members in Cape Town also wanted 
a ‘mother’. At that time, people from Port Elizabeth were proposing and wel-
coming ‘children’ from Cape Town. But still we had not met each other. 
After three years, everyone had ‘mothers’ and ‘children’ and ‘grandchildren’ 
and people from Port Elizabeth would contribute. That’s how we got to know each 
other and bring money. We gave birth to many ‘children’. Our organisation, 
Nompumelelo, grew much bigger. I decided to take some people to start my own 
group called Nanoxolo, meaning ‘bright place’. This was on 17 February 1990. I 
also had grandchildren and my grandchildren started Zolani Club. There are now 
many different clubs such as Mazizake Club, meaning ‘Let’s build ourselves’, 
Sinethemba, meaning ‘Let’s have hope’, Siyathemba I and II, meaning ‘We have 
hope’, each with different uniforms. 
Every member has a mother, but even if you are not a member, you can have a 
mother. On your birthday, your real one, they will come to your place and give 
money and presents until you become interested in the organisation and will join. 
Before I joined this organisation, I had two rondawels [huts] at home in the 
Eastern Cape. Now I have a nice place with furniture. Before I have my birthday, 
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my twenty-two ‘children’ get together and contribute and buy something I want. 
They pay cash at the store and if they don’t have enough money they have to buy 
on credit. If the amount the children collect is not enough, one ‘child’ opens an 
account for hire purchasing with, let’s say R400. The ‘child’ pays the instalments. 
Then, if it is the mother’s turn to give her daughter she will give R400. The extra 
expense the child had, because she bought on credit and had to pay interest, is the 
child’s responsibility. This helps a child to buy a nice present, but the danger is 
that you make too many debts and get yourself into financial problems.’ 
Nokwanda was very pleased with the intimate relations that she had with her 
twenty-two ‘children’ and many other members. Her status in the financial mutual 
contrasted sharply with her status as a semi-skilled worker sharing a room with her 
husband that barely fitted anything more than a bed, a wardrobe, and a colour 
television. The presents of the members were so important that, in one instance, 
the gift was the relation. The members of the financial mutual did not even know 
the quasi-kin in the Eastern Cape and they already started to exchange presents. 
Nokwanda’s account of the history of this financial mutual shows how important 
these relations were and the trouble people went through to get in touch with each 
other, against the grain of apartheid policy, in order to create affective bonds that 
were modelled after kinship ties. 
 
Friendship and support 
Thandi lived with her three children in Khayelitsha, site B, in a three-room shack 
made of wood and corrugated iron. She had applied for a government housing 
subsidy and received a ‘site and service plot’ – with a toilet, a running-water tap, 
and a pre-paid electricity connection – on which she could build her shack. The 
plots were quite small, and between the plots were dirt roads that filled with 
muddy pools in the rainy season. We first met Thandi in December, when it was 
dry and hot. Thandi worked part-time as the housekeeper for a doctor. She had a 
problem with her leg (caused by several car accidents) so she received a disability 
grant. She was married, but had left her husband because she felt that men in 
general, especially husbands, were troublemakers. He was violent, and he had held 
her at gunpoint several times. This was a bit too much for her and she eventually 
left him: ‘That’s why most women only want a boyfriend. It is easier to leave them 
than to leave a husband. That’s why you become a member of a club like Zolani. 
Men only cause problems.’ 
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Photo 6.2 Bookkeeping at Zolani 
 
 
Thandi was the ‘daughter’ of Nokwanda and had ‘daughters’ herself – Linda, 
Nobuntu, and Bukelwa.6 Thandi and I met for the first time on her birthday in 
early December 1997, at which she was given a total of R7,931. She also received 
presents such as a two-door refrigerator, a room divider, a stove with cooking 
plates, cupboards, cutlery, soap, a salad bowl, a duvet cover, and many smaller 
items. She was proud of her possessions, and saw them as proof of the supportive 
and respectful relations between the participants. All in all, she received about 
R20,000 worth of goods and money at the celebration. Considering her meagre 
income, this amount was incredible. Her job as a cleaner and her disability grant 
could have been no more than R1,000 per month. She admitted that she had not 
expected this many presents – especially not from her ‘mother’, Nokwanda. 
Because of the quantity of gifts, she had many a sleepless night after her birthday. 
                                                          
 
6  It was difficult to gain insight into these relationships. They were, of course, per-
sonal relations and loyalty between quasi-kin made research difficult. The advantage 
of my situation was that Thandi and Edith Nokwanele Moyikwa used to be neigh-
bours in the past. Moreover, they belonged to the same clan, which made it easier to 
get to know and trust each other. However, that also meant that Thandi’s ‘children’ 
associated us primarily with her, a view that Thandi actively supported by trying to 
attend all the interviews we had with her ‘children’. Certain information was there-
fore difficult to collect and this specific social constellation influenced the things 
that people did, gossiped, or kept quiet about. 
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On many of the occasions that we went to visit Thandi, she was not at home 
because she was working or visiting her ‘daughters’, who lived in the neighbour-
hood. If she was home, friends from the Zolani Club were often visiting her. It was 
obvious that the financial mutual and her ‘children’ within it were very important 
to her. She had only been a member for one year, but already most of her spare 
time was taken up by visiting ‘daughters’ and other group members, attending the 
meetings of ROSCAs, buying presents, and engaging in other similar activities that 
were part of her overall participation. 
One day, en route to a meeting, we began to compare Thandi’s quasi-family to 
her real family. To her, an advantage of the quasi-kinship was the absence of 
affines in the ROSCA. She explained that the most important difference between 
quasi-family and real family was that, in the quasi-family situation, jealousy was 
absent and individuals could trust one another. She was often aware of distrust 
within her real family and saw that people could, and often did, treat each other 
badly. This was not the case in Zolani Club. In contrast to the situation with real 
family, one could leave Zolani. Thandi explained that the members realised that a 
member could leave and therefore had good reasons to treat members nicely. In 
Zolani Club, everyone cared for each other and helped each other out. All of this 
enthusiasm, she insisted, was not only rhetoric since it could be readily witnessed 
in practice. When one of the members of Zolani Club lost all her belongings 
because her shack had burned to the ground, for example, sympathetic members 
offered household items and helped her re-establish her household.  
Linda (Thandi’s ‘daughter’ and Nokwanda’s ‘granddaughter’) had three ‘child-
ren’. Like Thandi, Linda had moved to Khayelitsha, site B, about two years earlier, 
and Thandi and Linda often visited each other. However, unlike Thandi, Linda 
lived in an area in which there was no subsidised RDP housing – which meant that 
there were no individual plots with private toilets, water, and electricity. She lived 
with her two children and her sick husband, Benjamin, who worked as a security 
guard when his swollen legs permitted him to work at all. In early 1998, Linda 
began working as a cleaner in a hospital in Cape Town. It was a part-time, 
temporary position, but Linda hoped that she would be appointed on a permanent 
basis once her initial probation period was over. 
Although one was not really supposed to switch ‘mothers’, Thandi was not 
Linda’s first ‘mother’. Linda had had a previous ‘mother’ in Noxolo Club – who 
had also been Bukelwa’s ‘mother’ – but neither ‘daughter’ was happy with her for 
long. They felt that she favoured some of her other ‘children’ more than them. 
With regard to birthdays, for example, this ‘mother’ would ask some of her 
‘children’ exactly what they wanted, while Linda and Bukelwa would receive 
anything their ‘mother’ felt like giving, without the luxury of being asked. After a 
little more than a year, both women confronted and then abandoned their ‘mother’. 
In July 1997, both women became Thandi’s ‘daughters’ and joined Zolani Club. 
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Because they became Thandi’s ‘daughters’ on the same day, they considered 
themselves ‘twins’. Thandi, in contrast to their previous ‘mother’, was good, kind, 
and worthy of respect. 
 
 
Linda’s birthday 
 
On Sunday 8 March, Linda’s birthday celebration took place in Zolani Club. As 
always, the meeting was held in a classroom at a high school in the township 
Kayelitsha. The celebration was to last all afternoon. There were about forty to 
fifty people in attendance at the beginning of the celebration (almost exclusively 
women), and more arrived during the course of the meeting. Manxoto chaired the 
meeting. The first meeting that I attended, I was dazzled by all the action. People 
were constantly arriving, speeches were held, songs were sung, and people danced 
in circles, as is sometimes done at the independent churches. Often, attendees lined 
up to give presents to, and speeches about, Linda. Though the scene appeared 
chaotic at first, after some time the authority of the chairperson became apparent 
through the din. 
The basic structure of the ceremony was provided by a succession of speeches 
by individual members, combined with songs – mostly church songs – accom-
panied by lively clapping and dancing. There was a clear order governing the 
groups and people who could, in turn, come forward to offer money and presents 
to Linda. Even in the midst of all the rumours and excitement, the chairperson was 
well able to provide everyone their turn while at the same time she supervised the 
secretaries, and made sure the correct amounts were recorded in the notebooks. 
When, at one point, the atmosphere of the birthday celebration became too hectic, 
the chairperson adopted the manner of a judge, forcefully slamming an empty 
Coke bottle on the table before her while shouting ‘Silence in the court!’ 
When a number of women had arrived, one of Linda’s ‘daughters’ started a 
song about God’s protection. Everyone joined enthusiastically in the singing, while 
dancing and clapping their hands. In the middle of this performance, another 
group, visitors from Hout Baai who had also come to celebrate Linda’s birthday, 
entered the classroom. They joined in the singing and later started their own song, 
clapping and dancing as well in accompaniment of the expanded group of partici-
pants. There was constant emphasis on the fact that the meeting was for Linda. The 
chairperson addressed the group from Hout Baai who, of course, already knew it 
was Linda’s birthday: 
I greet the organisation that just came in. I just saw an organisation coming in and I was 
surprised. We welcome you. Stay and enjoy with us. We are playing here, we are 
playing for Linda Masekwana, Thandi Sodinga’s daughter under the word of God that 
is written in the book of Psalms Chapter 31, Verse I, ‘In thee, O Lord, do I seek refuge; 
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let me never be put to shame’. I ask you to share with us what you have been eating on 
your way here. 
The group members introduced themselves and then another song began. After 
some time, Manxotho again hit the table with her Coke bottle to silence the group: 
‘I stop you for the people’s reports. Anyone who has a report from someone else 
should say it now. We’ve just started, there were no announcements yet.’ Various 
women stepped up and apologised on behalf of those who were not present, 
‘Mandisa will be late, but she is coming’; ‘Nomava is not feeling well’; ‘Nobanzi 
too’; ‘Peter is also coming but you all know he has a problem [often, having a 
problem means a death in the family]’; ‘Nosandise said she will be late or maybe 
won’t make it. She has a problem’. Manxotho then said, ‘I mean, I’m doing this to 
keep the people calm in spirit. Now let us sing.’ Pinky began clapping and singing 
a song that, like the previous one, emphasised protection: 
So I wish I could walk 
with you, king who has sympathy 
to go up the hills 
and the deepest darkness 
Ma ma ma ma, etc. 
When the song had finished, Linda kissed some of the participants (I was 
surprised by this display of affection because one never sees individuals kissing 
one another in public). The whole meeting very obviously revolved around Linda. 
Most of the time, she stood near the window and watched what was going on. just 
like most of the other women on their birthdays, she did not directly participate in 
the singing and talking, nor did she receive the money and gifts directly. The 
participants in the celebration expressed warmth, comfort, and protection by com-
paring Linda with a baby. One member provided this image: ‘I greet the woman 
who is bathing [Linda]. I also saw her. Do not worry. I picked this money up, but 
the Lord loves me.’ After saying this, she kissed Linda as another song started, 
‘Mercy came from Golgotha’. 
The chairperson’s language also cast Linda in the role of baby: ‘Now, I am 
asking [sub] group A to come and wish the baby a happy birthday. I repeat, group 
A must come forward. Time goes quickly and we started late today.’ After a song, 
the chairperson continued, ‘Is this everyone from group A? Here is a paper with 
names of the people who owe. Come, group A. I do not even have money to 
prepare a place (ukundlala) for you guys.’ To ‘prepare a place’ meant that one 
gives a small amount of money, mostly a few rand, before the bigger present was 
given. One by one, the members of group A came forward to prepare a place and 
to praise one another. For example, Pinky approached and offered R2 while 
reflecting on the importance of the group: ‘With R2 I am asking everyone here to 
look at group A and their relationship with me. They are everything.’ Having said 
this, Pinky then kissed all the members of group A. In addition, Nombuyiselo gave 
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R2 to prepare a place and she also kissed the members of group A. The mini-
ceremony of ‘preparing a place’ was considered a game and a form of competition, 
with people trying to outdo one another in their contributions or the level of 
silliness of what they had to say. One member of group A, for example, 
approached and said: ‘With R20, I will shake your hand.’ 
At last, all of the members of group A had made their contributions. Manxotho 
said: ‘A is finished. Let us clap hands.’ Hands were clapped in a pattern: two sets 
of three claps followed by a single clap. After group A had receded, the members 
of group B came forward. One of the members said she would not bathe Linda. 
Instead, she would pamper her and also take care of her like a baby. Nomyameko, 
also a member of group B, came forward with R40 and said: ‘With R20 I shake a 
hand and with R20 I pay back. You [Linda] helped me so much.’  
After group B had finished their offerings, the other groups contributed in the 
same way, so that all of the groups had their turns to offer praise and money to 
Linda. For example, a member of group D came forward to prepare a place and 
said: 
 
The people are surprised to see someone who is loved by many people. My name is 
Pamela Cwabe. Now I can feel that, oh God. My ‘mother’ is not here but my ‘grand-
mother’ is here. I am a ‘granddaughter’ of Nokoyo Nowethu. Oh! How beautiful my 
‘mother’ is. Oh no, I don’t want to mention my beloved ‘grandmother’. When they said 
‘Happy’ [the speaker’s nickname], I thought they were going to read from the bible. I 
turned around to look and I felt I was myself. Noonde Dubisiko, Nokwanda, Sowati, 
and Mildred Mbhalo. I am Happy to my ‘grandmother’ Linda Notwala. Oh, oh, I hear 
your words. I wanted to preach but my ‘mother’ is gone with my spirit. I love my 
‘mother’. I cannot control myself. She is quiet, like me, and well structured, like me. I’ll 
pay back an amount of R16 and enter with R5. You have helped me. 
 
The whole meeting took more than four hours and constituted a stream of 
mutual compliments and a showy collection of money and presents for Linda. In 
this way, money was used to create and to demonstrate intimate relations of friend-
ship between members, as well as to support the impression (or the ‘illusion’, it 
might be ventured) that all is safe for members of the Zolani Club. 
However, the finale was still to come. While a ‘child’ was welcomed by her 
new ‘mother’, Thandi and a few other women entered the classroom and began to 
sing about the power of the blood of the lamb. During the song, some women drew 
up sheets and moved school desks in order to uncover Thandi’s ‘birthday present’ 
in the corner of the classroom. It was a suite of furniture that included a double bed 
with a headboard, a bedside table, a dressing table, a mirror, and a duvet cover. 
Participants were astonished by this great present. Some of the women went to sit 
and recline on the bed while Thandi accompanied Linda to the bed and urged her 
to sit on it as well. Linda’s ‘sister’ gave her a hug while Linda’s husband, Ben-
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jamin, approached and sat next to Linda. Many cheered, screamed, and some even 
climbed on the school tables to make sure that their admiring view of the new bed 
was not obscured in any way. After some time, the chairperson provided the neces-
sary closure: ‘With one rand I want to say something. My stomach is sore. Let me 
say it again. My stomach is sore. Please, sit – like that. My stomach aches; these 
are my ‘children’. This is my ‘son’ [referring to Linda’s husband].’ Thandi added: 
‘All organisations in the house and all our visitors, I thank you.’ 
More people arrived, though, and joined in the excitement. Another song 
began, ‘Jesus cried tears’. The chairperson shouted to the newcomers: 
People and the organisation that come in now, we are playing here. We are playing for 
Linda Masekwana. Linda, come to your place [in front of the room] now so that the 
people can see you. Come, let us build the wall of Jerusalem’. The chairperson held up 
a birthday card that had been written for Linda and read it aloud, ‘Again, a word from 
her daughter. Isaiah, Chapter 41, Verse 10: “Happy birthday, mum. Do not be afraid, 
for I am with you. From your child Mayoli”. 
‘Now, let us ask what you have been eating on the road’, she asked the newly 
arrived people. The crowd started singing again, but after some time the chair-
person stopped them – again, by hitting the table loudly with her bottle. Many 
wished to say something, but now it was Thandi’s turn. Before she could say 
anything, however, a ‘child’ prepared a place for Thandi to speak with an offering 
of R10: ‘I want to prepare a place with R10 for the mother who is going to talk 
here.’ It was very noisy, so the chairperson again had to urge people to be quiet: ‘I 
am asking the dishes [in the back people were preparing a meal] not to make a 
noise when the ‘mother’ of the ‘child’ is going to speak. She is going to speak until 
blood comes out. I ask you and the chairs to be quiet!’ 
Thandi was at last allowed to speak: 
People, I greet the visitors. I greet Erik, my best friend. I greet Nokwanele, my child. 
Visitors, I have already greeted you and the club. At this moment my child [Linda] is 
standing in front of you. I am your mother. There is nothing I brought you except love. I 
only brought you love. You know that I love you. Listen to the words written in the 
book of Neimiah 2: 17. Those words, my child, are asking for help from you my 
children: “Come let us build the walls of Jerusalem”. My mother [Nokwanda] is not 
here. With R100 I prepare for that thing I saw you were in need of. 
After some interruptions – including that by the chairperson herself, who said 
‘you should know that person [Thandi] loves you’ – Thandi continued: ‘This 
present is from Nokwanda. Do not open it. You will open it at home.’ While 
Thandi kissed and hugged Linda, the chairperson added, ‘This is a present from 
your ‘mother’. She wrote: “Happy birthday, my child”. She really loves you.’ 
The celebration was almost finished. Participants admired the bed as they stood 
in line for the food and drinks that were offered (paid for by Linda and prepared by 
the group members). The secretaries were counting the money collected that day, 
and the chairperson announced the total amount: 
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We are finished now! Listen now, do not make a noise! Sit down, I am going to talk to 
you inside the house and those who are outside. I will not speak loudly. I will use my 
normal voice, so please, do not make a noise, please, be quiet because I will not scream 
for those who are outside! It is R4,123. Okay, in the meantime we are finished, aren’t 
we? Linda Masekwana’s ‘sister’, stand up and come near me please. Please, give this 
money to Linda and tell her the members of Zolani Club have lent it to her. 
Linda’s ‘sister’ carried the money bowl to Linda while saying: ‘I greet the orga-
nisation. I was sent by the organisation to give you this money. They said they 
lend you the money so please use it carefully.’ The chairperson then took the 
money bowl from her and spoke again: ‘To everyone including the visitors: Here 
is your money. I will not talk too much because I know you know you have to pay 
the people’s money back. Linda, you are a housewife and do not let us hear that 
you are fighting with my son7 because of this money. This is my son, do not play 
with him, do not fight over this money. This is other people’s money. Do impor-
tant things with this money.’ She handed over the dish with the money to Linda 
who began singing of compassion and the end of sin. 
For the first time that day, Linda had an opportunity to say something: 
I greet the club of Zolani and all my visitors inside and everyone in the house. I thank 
you. I won’t cry today as I used to do. I thank you and next week I will do the same for 
someone else. Thank you, I will not cry. What you are doing is very nice and you must 
never change because when I joined this organisation I liked you. When I visited this 
organisation I saw this is an organisation that does not choose people but sings for 
everyone. I joined this organisation because I liked it and I will not leave it. Thank you. 
Now, everyone was permitted to begin eating, drinking, and chatting and over 
the next few hours people began slowly to leave for their homes. Some, though, 
had to hurry home, because transport was difficult and dangerous, especially after 
seven o’clock in the evening. 
In the ROSCA, money was constantly being changed into smaller coins and 
this allowed frequent, and relatively small, donations to be made regularly. This 
permitted maximum performance and attention within the ceremony with a 
relatively small amount of money (cf. Kiernan 1988: 460). The above account of 
this meeting shows that money in Zolani was used for mutual support. The quasi-
kinship ties, the celebration of Linda’s birthday, the constant gifts of money and 
presents, the metaphor of Linda as a baby surrounded by caring ‘mothers’ – it all 
demonstrated the mutual importance people felt for one another. If one limits the 
analysis to the activities at the meeting and what people would explicitly give as 
their reasons for participation in the activities, one does get the impression that the 
ROSCA is a socially constructive force. From this account, then, it is clear that 
poor African migrant women establish a home, a substantial sense of security, and 
                                                          
 
7  Linda’s husband was the chairperson’s ‘child’. 
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perhaps even a touch of euphoria, even as they reside in a new and dangerous city. 
Consumer products and money were pivotal to the creation of such an environ-
ment. 
 
After Linda’s birthday 
A few days after Linda’s birthday celebration, we heard from a member of Zolani 
Club that Linda was ill. She was hesitant to talk about the issue, but she suspected 
that Linda had been bewitched. The first question that came up was, of course, ‘By 
whom?’ She thought it might have been someone from within Zolani Club itself.  
We visited Linda the very same day at her home. The place was very crowded 
with people – her husband, Benjamin, and her children, two of Linda’s brothers, 
Benjamin’s sister, and Thandi were all there. Linda was very confused. Her eyes 
blinked nervously, and – something highly unusual for her – she was moody and 
argued constantly with her husband. She told us that, at times, she was so happy 
and full of love, while, at other times, she was angry and used abusive language. 
Crowds especially made her cry and she had lost the desire to eat. She wanted to 
listen to gospel radio all the time and insisted on praying for people. She told us 
that she could see who needed help. At work, she would place her hands on 
colleagues and patients in order to pray for them. She almost lost her job because 
she had suddenly covered her supervisor’s eyes with her hands while her 
supervisor was driving the company car. 
After Linda had received the money from Zolani at her birthday celebration, 
she had lent money to anyone and everyone who asked for it. The amounts lent 
were as high as R500, and she hardly knew some of the borrowers. Because of her 
illness, she had even forgotten, in some cases, to whom she had lent the money, 
and it appeared that a lot of it would probably never be given back. Linda went to a 
doctor for medication.8 He wrote a note, for the purposes of her employer, that 
Linda was suffering from anxiety and depression. Linda also consulted a diviner 
(igqirha), who indicated that there might be two causes for her illness. It might 
have been jealousy that made her ill (possibly the jealousy of a neighbour), or the 
illness/crisis could be a sign from the ancestors who wanted to urge Linda to 
become a diviner. 
In the course of the next few weeks it became clear that there were a number of 
versions of what might be the problem with Linda and who might be responsible. 
In the rumours and gossip that circulated, notions of witchcraft were prominent. 
People started to wonder about who could be jealous of Linda and who might have 
harmed her. It became apparent that various individuals had different versions of 
                                                          
 
8  He prescribed her Betapan for sleeping, Ethipromine, and multivitamin pills. To me, 
the symptoms suggest that Linda was suffering from bipolar mania, also known as 
manic depression. 
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the truth according to their relationship with Linda. In many versions, the bed 
played a central role in explaining Linda’s misfortune. 
 
The neighbour? 
In the past, Benjamin had had affairs with Linda’s neighbour. It was not exactly 
clear, though, if the affair overlapped with, or was exclusive of, Benjamin’s 
relationship with Linda. In any case, the tensions that this affair had caused 
between Linda and her husband had been expressed mostly indirectly. Now that 
Linda was ill, she insisted on medical attention, but her husband felt that this idea 
was nonsense. Instead, Benjamin proposed moving to another place (probably to 
avoid a sticky confrontation with the neighbour). However, Linda wanted to stay 
and, in my presence, told her husband the following: 
No. You are diabetic, you are sick. I am not going to Valkenburg Hospital [a mental 
hospital]. I will only go to the clinic, Lentegeur Hospital. I am not mad. I don’t want to 
leave this place. I don’t want to talk about it. I love my husband. The girls at work hate 
me because I tell them about Jesus. 
Later she argued with her husband and told him, ‘You shut up. Just go to your 
girlfriend’, to which he replied: ‘Stop it, else I might even go to her.’ 
That same day, Linda’s brother shared an experience he had had. Linda had left 
the room when Linda’s brother explained why he was temporarily staying at 
Linda’s place. He had a fight with his wife, as well as with his girlfriend: 
I had a fight with my girlfriend who pressed charges against me. But when the police 
came to see me I was not at home. I was not hiding and I did try to find the inspector 
that handled the case but the case number was lost. They think I am running away, but I 
am not. I also had a fight with my wife. I took R15 from a vase, but my girlfriend said 
that I took R65. I did not, but when I took the R15 a R50 note fell out of the vase on the 
floor. I found it later and put it back in the vase, but my wife refuses to believe me: She 
insists on saying that I took R65 and returned the R50 later. 
After having listened to the story, Thandi said that it was very bad to be 
married and also have a girlfriend and Linda’s husband added: ‘Your girlfriend is 
trying to end your marriage’, which Linda’s brother agreed with. Linda’s brother 
tried to convey diplomatically to Linda’s husband that he was also destroying his 
marriage because of his affair with the neighbour. 
The suspicions of the affair were confirmed by an incident involving a radio. In 
December the previous year, Benjamin had sold the couple’s radio to their neigh-
bour without the consent or knowledge of his wife. I was told that this kind of 
transaction was unheard of because if a woman wanted to have something, she was 
supposed to ask another woman. Asking Benjamin for the radio – and especially 
keeping quiet about the transaction to Linda – was regarded as positive proof of a 
sexual relationship between them. The neighbour not only had the motive for 
bewitching Linda, but also had the opportunity to make Linda ill. She came to 
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admire Linda’s new bed, and she told Linda that she would have liked to buy it. 
But Linda and her husband refused to sell it because they wanted the bed for their 
place in Emaxhoseni. Some of Linda’s friends pointed out that it was exactly at 
this point that Linda became ill. 
Tension with the neighbours also became clear when Edith and I left after one 
of our visits. A group of young men were standing in front of the suspected 
neighbour’s shack and one of them shouted: ‘This white man should not come 
here anymore. Next time we will put a tyre around his neck and burn him.’ Edith 
jokingly replied that they should not think this bothered us. 
It was unclear what Linda thought about the allegations towards her neighbour, 
and her illness certainly did not make it any easier to get information from her. She 
did say that she used to be good friends with her neighbour, but now wanted to 
avoid her; she also added that she was angry about the affair. For a few days she 
stayed with Bukelwa, her ‘twin sister’ who lived a few blocks away, while at other 
times she insisted on staying at her own place. After a few weeks, Linda and her 
neighbour visited each other again and Linda told us she never suspected her 
neighbour of using witchcraft. 
 
Colleagues at work? 
Linda was very happy to start her temporary cleaning assignment at the hospital, 
especially in the light of the fact that local competition for jobs was so fierce. She 
got the job through a fellow member of the Independent Church who was a 
supervisor at the hospital. Linda was acting awkwardly, and bothering colleagues 
and patients alike with her praying, kissing, and talk of witchcraft. The white 
manager of the hospital had to take action so that she did lose her contract, ‘I am a 
Christian myself’, she explained to me when I phoned her, ‘but this really scared 
me’. The manager first dismissed Linda, but was later willing to give her another 
chance to keep her job. 
In the first two weeks of her illness, Linda accused some colleagues at work of 
employing witchcraft in order to take her job away. Linda’s supervisor agreed with 
Linda on this and felt that Linda had a special gift: 
She can predict and see things. Linda told me that she was sure the bus would be on 
time that particular day. This is rare, because most of the time the bus is too late. She 
said she was going to pray for it. And the bus came on time! Also our colleagues at 
work use dirty medicine. 
Linda could apparently see who took along ‘dirty medicine’ to practise their 
witchcraft, but the supervisor told Linda that the accusations she had made caused 
problems. Linda was also accused of using witchcraft, and people suspected that 
she rubbed her own ‘dirty medicine’ on people as she placed her hands upon them 
in prayer. 
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After a few weeks, when Linda had improved and had obtained a permanent 
position, she told us that the problems with her colleagues were now over. She had 
lied to her white manager that the laying on of hands was an old habit from church 
that she had stopped. The problem, Linda explained, was that one of her colleagues 
had a friend who was unemployed. This colleague was envious of Linda because 
of her job, and wanted Linda to vacate her job so that a space would open up for 
her friend. Linda was convinced that this colleague was a witch. 
 
Thandi? 
Implying that a person may be involved in witchcraft is a serious business. Being 
called a witch carries with it a tremendous stigma and the potential for ostracism. It 
can even lead, in some cases, to the accused being killed. Although I use a 
pseudonym in my writings, I still find it difficult to write down the suspicions 
regarding witchcraft that I heard and sensed about someone I know personally, like 
Thandi. The discourse on witchcraft is very powerful and potentially destructive. 
The main current beneath the flow of rumour was this: who might want to harm 
Linda? Thandi told us that she did not believe in witchcraft. Instead, she explained, 
Linda had had a problem with her nerves – not only because of her husband’s 
illness, but also because her sister had died a few weeks before. Thandi told us: ‘I 
have more than Linda, but people are not jealous of me. There are demons of 
witchcraft. If you believe in it, it has power; but if you don’t believe in it, like me, 
it doesn’t have any effect on you.’ Thandi’s denial of witchcraft might be because 
the bed, after all, had been a gift from her. She did not want a diviner to investigate 
Linda’s problems because she did not think witchcraft was the cause. Thandi’s 
evasion of the witchcraft issue might, however, also be interpreted as an attempt to 
conceal her own role. As someone quizzically asked me: ‘Why would Thandi say 
she doesn’t believe in witchcraft?’ My only response to this could be: ‘Maybe 
because she is a witch?’ 
Some people expressed the view that it was someone within Zolani who 
harmed Linda. Such accusations were made very carefully, and no names were 
mentioned because many nearby were friends and quasi-kin. Talking too overtly 
about this would immediately implicate Thandi because she, after all, had given 
Linda the bed. Linda’s sister-in-law thought that my videotaping of her birthday 
celebration had made some people envious and when Linda received the bed, 
many members within the group became emotional, excited, and perhaps even 
envious, as well. Many stood on the desks in the classroom and shouted, sang, and 
clapped. 
A few weeks later, when Linda was feeling better, another link to Thandi 
became apparent. Linda showed us a tea set she had bought for the birthday of the 
Zolani Club’s chairperson, who was also Benjamin’s ‘mother’. ‘Last week’, Linda 
confided to us, 
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It was her birthday, but we couldn’t attend the meeting. We will give her the present 
tomorrow and she will be very happy. People talk a lot and there must be a lot of 
rumours that we have not yet given her a present. People like to gossip, which is very 
irritating. There is also a lot of jealousy because some children are better treated than 
others. Especially ‘mothers’ – they can cause a lot of problems. 
Edith and I both thought she was referring to her own ‘mother’, Thandi, but we 
did not dare ask for verification of our suspicions. The dependencies within Zolani 
Club and the complex quasi-kinship ties made it very difficult to discuss existing 
tensions and possible problems. Linda did say, though, that someone, or maybe 
even more than one person, within the Zolani Club was jealous of her new bed. 
She remembered how everyone had climbed upon the school desks, clapping and 
cheering. ‘I did not feel good when this happened. I know they were jealous’, she 
said. And on the videotape of the event, one could see the rapid flickering of her 
eyes. 
 
Linda’s husband’s family? 
In November 1998, about eight months after Linda’s illness (and after I had 
returned to the Netherlands for four months), I again set out to meet members of 
Zolani. Although Linda’s situation had improved, she was still not well and she 
still had the same symptoms from which she had suffered in March, although they 
had subsided somewhat. She was very quiet and introverted at times, but also 
talked a lot of nonsensical speech, repeating questions and at times rapidly flicker-
ing her eyes. We heard from one of her neighbours – Linda was not supposed to 
inform us of this herself – that her husband, Benjamin, had died the previous 
October due to the complications of his diabetes. We offered our condolences, and 
Linda started to cry (her tears were highly frowned upon by her friends). 
The death of Linda’s husband had led to a renewed round of witchcraft-related 
rumours. Later, at a barbecue attended by members of all of the organisations of 
Noluthando, Thandi assured us that there had been a lot of problems surrounding 
Benjamin’s death. Linda and Benjamin had never been legally married, nor were 
they married according to Xhosa custom. There had never been any lobola 
payments made. However, according to Thandi, Benjamin’s family recognised 
their relationship.9 In any case, Linda was still legally married to the father of her 
two children. Although they had separated many years ago, they never legally 
divorced, and this had been what prevented Linda and Benjamin from marrying. 
After Benjamin’s death, Linda went to Emaxhoseni to attend the funeral among 
members of his family. This was a horrible experience for her, as they treated her 
badly (even trying to strangle her at one point). They accused her of killing 
                                                          
 
9  From an economic point of view, this makes sense, because the husband’s family is 
burdened with paying lobola. 
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Benjamin for the money. Benjamin’s employer had organised life insurance, 
which was due for payment to Linda upon his death. Linda’s affines accused Linda 
of killing Benjamin for the insurance money, and claimed that the money was 
rightfully theirs. They forced her to go to the bank and withdraw money. They got 
hold of a total of R10,000, after which Linda managed to get word to the employer 
to stop depositing money in her account until she was back in Cape Town.10 
Linda’s affines also wanted the celebrated bed that Linda had received from 
Thandi during her birthday celebration at Zolani. Benjamin’s father’s younger 
brother (utata uncinci, meaning ‘little father’) was especially aggressive towards 
Linda. Although previously Thandi had strongly denied any role possibly played 
by witchcraft, she was now convinced that Benjamin’s family, fatally jealous of 
Linda and her new bed, had bewitched her. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Together, participants in Zolani Club attempted to realise their desires, namely to 
have wealth and luxury, to be a baby, a caring mother, to have society without 
affines, to live in the solidarity and protection offered by ‘the walls of Jerusalem’, 
even in the midst of a dangerous and unstable society. The Zolani Club used 
money and consumption to create a social space where, even if only temporarily, 
women could forget the pains of their sometimes violent lives on the socio-
economic margins. As the name suggests, the financial mutual was a place for 
ukuzola – ‘to stay cool, to stay relaxed’. In the state of crisis experienced by many 
South Africans, an oasis of relaxation is a necessity rather than a luxury – a much-
needed refuge that helped participants to manage their lives financially and 
socially. 
In a situation of poverty, violence, and hardship, hope for a better future 
seemed to be important. The purchasing of consumer products that represented an 
affluent lifestyle, such as refrigerators, status furniture, cutlery, duvet covers, or 
body lotions revealed the ambition for a better future. The consumer products 
provided social and economic upward mobility and everybody who was in a 
position to buy these products would do so. Through consumption, the destitute 
and uprooted Xhosa migrants could distinguish themselves from the more 
desperate migrants around them. Consumption provided respect, prestige, and self-
confidence to people who had to do without this most of the day. In line with 
                                                          
 
10  I have heard more often about struggles over money after a death and the money 
always seemed to disappear or was appropriated by other kin. It was impossible for 
me to check this story and find out to what extent it was truth or more of a fantasy 
(about kin hiding money and wealth). 
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Bourdieu’s argument, participants in financial mutuals forced each other into a 
consumption pattern associated with a higher class and comfortable life. 
One needs, however, to sensitise a theory of consumption as well as financial 
mutuals to possible conflicts between people and the micro-political problems of 
distinction. While there is ample attention for conflict concerning the distribution 
of resources or productive forces of the economy, no theory on conflict and con-
sumption has been properly developed. For example, Bourdieu’s (1984) seminal 
work on consumption and distinction does not devote much space to an under-
standing of conflicts relating to consumption, reputation, and status.11 Among the 
members of the financial mutuals, consumption was part of social conflict and 
competition between neighbours, kin, colleagues at work and fellow members of 
the organisation. Status and prestige were forms of inequality and could therefore 
cause social tensions. Furthermore, sharing and giving away consumer items could 
turn out to be a form of rivalry and competition. These two functions of consumer 
products – possessing and giving – were closely intertwined with financial 
mutuals. Possessing consumer products meant they could not be given away or 
shared, which could be regarded as selfish, unhelpful, and a form of distinction 
that was not appreciated. Giving away could also increase status and respect, but 
the objects of desire were lost, possessed by someone else, and giving was a way 
to gain power over others. The rumours surrounding Linda’s illness revealed that 
power over others could be destructive and not necessarily constructive. 
Linda’s bed was the central focus of the accusations circulating about witch-
craft. The bed was the most expensive present offered and it summarily became 
Linda’s most valuable possession. The bed can be interpreted here as a symbol of 
intimacy – the intimacy between husband and wife, between Benjamin and his 
neighbour, between Linda and her neighbour, and between Linda and her quasi-
kin, particularly her ‘mother’, Thandi. The intimacy of the object coincided with 
the intimacy at the core of both the positive and the negative in social relationships 
– in other words, mutual support and understanding as well as jealousy, envy, and 
rivalry.12 
                                                          
 
11  An important exception is the rather philosophically oriented work on consumption 
by Bataille (1991). 
12  Comaroff & Comaroff (1999: 288) highlight the fierce generational opposition 
where the young are anxious about the wealth of the older generation and accuse 
them of witchcraft. Generational opposition, rivalry, and anxiety also exist among 
quasi-kin. ‘Mothers’ have to be careful to treat their ‘daughters’ in the right way and 
‘daughters’ keep an eye on their ‘mother’ to make sure no ‘daughter’ is favoured 
above the others. However, among Xhosa migrants in Cape Town, generational 
opposition among quasi-kin is only one dimension of the witchcraft rumours. Witch-
craft rumours also examine other dependencies, such as those between neighbours, 
‘siblings’, in-laws, and colleagues at work. 
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However comforting it may be at times, the sense of protection and solidarity 
provided by these groups is far from all embracing. On the contrary, even these 
groups could only temporarily keep the dangerous outside world at bay. For some, 
the financial obligations stemming from membership of Zolani Club caused in-
debtedness and sleepless nights. This led, for example, to Linda’s illness. Money 
and consumption were desirable, but also dangerous because they emphasise the 
inequalities between people who nonetheless depended on each other and invested 
in intimate mutual relationships. Rivalry among quasi-kin was a constant possi-
bility, and ‘mothers’ had to be extremely careful not to evoke envy among their 
‘children’. The ambivalence of the quasi-kinship relations meant that within the 
organisation gossip and envy were just as likely as mutual support and under-
standing. Although consumption made it possible to create bonds of friendship and 
feelings of self-worth, it simultaneously led to envy, jealousy, and tensions among 
interdependent people. Consumption, therefore, could only partly fulfil people’s 
hopes and dreams, only temporarily allowed for a boundary with the violence of 
the outside world, and meant that conflict was part of the acquisition of status and 
respect. 
  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transformations 
 
A study of financial mutuals among Xhosa migrants captures pivotal changes in 
post-apartheid South Africa. It reveals the consequences of liberation from 
apartheid, such as massive migration, the state in its guise of development, and the 
formation of a neighbourhood by people who, during apartheid, were forced to live 
outside of the state in Bantustans. I examined the way in which destitute and 
uprooted people dealt with what which they lacked most, and which compelled 
them to go to South Africa’s urban and industrial centres, namely money. They 
organised financial mutuals in order to manage money vis-à-vis kin, neighbours, 
and home-people. To women migrants it was essential – and more so than for the 
men – to influence the flows of money because these had such severe conse-
quences for their relationships. 
Flows of money had become part of interdependencies even during the colonial 
conquest. The introduction of the capitalist economy, along with diseases and 
natural disasters, virtually destroyed the Xhosa subsistence economy. Apartheid 
led to a further incorporation of Africans into a society in which they were forced 
to be marginal and were denied socio-economic and political freedoms. Money 
was introduced through wage labour, labour migration, taxation, and new forms of 
consumption, which subsequently altered kin relations. 
From the 1980s onwards, popular protest, ongoing migration, and the limita-
tions of state control made it possible for more Africans to live in industrial areas 
and cities such as Cape Town. In-between jobs and during vacations, migrants 
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returned home with money and beautiful stories of Cape Town’s wealth and 
riches. Even if people knew better than to believe such stories, poverty caused ever 
more people – women in particular – to earn some money in Cape Town to survive 
and to support kin. The change from a subsistence economy to an economy in 
which the capitalist mode of production was pivotal had drastic effects on people’s 
relationships. Kinship dependencies changed because new sources of wealth chal-
lenged existing hierarchies. Conjugal, affinal, as well as consanguineal relations 
were full of tensions that frequently focused on the allocation of money. Flows of 
money played a pivotal role in the maintenance of sound relations. The lack of 
money therefore made it impossible to fulfil obligations and establish enduring 
satisfactory relations. Fatherhood was heavily contested, women’s relations with 
affines were full of tensions concerning money, and intimate relations between 
men and women were mostly short-lived, unstable, and violent. 
Labour migration led to a new type of identification centred on migrants from 
one area (abakhaya) who used to establish financial mutuals together. Unlike 
many other contemporary African societies (see for example Kane 2001b), the 
establishment of financial mutuals among fellow migrants became less important. 
The reason for Xhosa migrants to stop creating new financial mutuals among 
abakhaya was that abakhaya were not neighbours anymore. Apartheid legislation 
forced abakhaya to be neighbours. This, in turn, meant that there was sufficient 
social constraint among them to establish financial mutuals together. With the 
breakdown of apartheid legislation, abakhaya were no longer necessarily neigh-
bours, which made it difficult for them to establish financial mutuals. 
In the townships of post-apartheid South Africa, such as Indawo Yoxolo, 
neighbours – although they were new and unknown – could establish financial 
mutuals because of the physical proximity that was needed for social constraint. 
‘Neighbourhood’ had become a social configuration that was distinct from kin and 
abakhaya relations. These three relationships (kin, abakhaya and neighbour) were 
precisely the relationships that people attempted to maintain, negotiate, or discard 
through participation in a financial mutual. By saving, accumulating, and sharing 
money in financial mutuals, the participants could negotiate flows of scarce 
amounts of money within and among their personal relationships. In other words, 
the neighbours established relations in financial mutuals that offered social con-
straint. This configuration ensured that a large sum of money was available at a 
specific time, which the participant could use for his or her own purposes and 
share with people she or he felt were important. 
The circumstances in which neighbours established financial mutuals were far 
from favourable. One key problem was violence. A major cause of violence, 
although it was not the only one, was the presence of the post-apartheid state in its 
guise of development. The ideology of development differed vastly from its 
practices. The ANC wanted to overcome some inequalities of apartheid by 
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developing housing, education, health, and so on. Development was an attempt to 
include into society those who had been excluded and marginalised in the past and 
to let them share in the joys of liberation. Instead of to liberation, the development 
processes, at least in Indawo Yoxolo, led to a system of control of ‘communities’, 
which policymakers falsely envisioned as homogenous and harmonious. A few 
‘community representatives’ locally known as ‘the Big Five’ were in charge of the 
development projects and resorted to intimidation, corruption, and violence to get 
their work done and remain in power. Unsatisfied residents organised – fairly 
limited – opposition but, due to the continuous support the ‘big men’ received 
from the development institutions and political factions, this opposition was 
largely unsuccessful. It might be the case that the incorporation of some of the Big 
Five into local government, as has already taken place, eventually will cause a shift 
towards patronage in the future. Local political leaders may then attempt to bind 
clients by distributing resources in exchange for political support and not rely 
anymore on Mafia-style rule. However, it does not appear that the incorporation of 
‘big men’ in local government will cause the violence to decrease. 
What do these changes have to do with financial mutuals? The incorporation of 
colonial conquest, apartheid, violence and local politics into the analysis revealed a 
central reason for people to establish financial mutuals. Xhosa migrants made 
efforts to create an ‘island’ where one could feel secure, be appreciated as a fellow 
human being, and where it was possible to behave respectfully towards each other. 
The confinements of the relatively small, close-knit groups could function, at least 
to some extent, as a shield against the outside world and as a way to establish some 
kind of freedom through the management of scarce money. 
It helps to compare relations with rubber bands tied in knots (see Goudsblom 
1974 who uses the image of the air cushion). By establishing a new knot of rubber 
bands (a financial mutual) these rubber bands pull, as it were, on the members and 
force them to put the money in the group and put stress on other rubber bands 
(certain kin or neighbours). This, in turn, urges other people to do likewise. A 
person thus influences the strength of, and stress on, her or his ‘rubber bands’. By 
allocating money (received from the financial mutual) to specific people, for 
specific purposes, and at specific times, ‘rubber bands’ are used to strengthen or 
stretch other ‘rubber bands’, and some might even snap altogether. This limited 
‘pulling’, ‘stretching’, and ‘snapping’ of relations is the limited freedom that the 
management of money in mutuals provides for. 
Unlike the Tswana independent church that Comaroff (1985) studied during the 
apartheid days, financial mutuals should not be regarded as a form of political 
resistance. Financial mutuals were migrants’ attempts to withdraw from political 
life and to escape from the hostile environment, even if only temporarily, and deal 
with immediate concerns. The group had to provide protection against the hostile 
outside world, and to some extent it managed to do so. The close-knit web of 
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relations in financial mutuals made it possible to separate oneself from the hostile 
world of political conflict, assault, unsatisfactory relations, and poverty. The 
density of the network also provided social constraint to self-constraint in that the 
participants ‘forced’ each other to hand over a contribution to the financial mutual. 
This made it possible to influence flows of money and relationships, and thus 
separate oneself from certain people. 
Withdrawing into close-knit networks that deal with immediate concerns is not 
unique to the Xhosa migrants in Cape Town. Kiernan (1974: 82) found among 
Zulu Zionist churches that ‘one of the foremost concerns … is to protect … against 
the township as an African community by drawing and maintaining boundaries 
setting off its membership from the rest of the population’. Similar contractions of 
relations around immediate concerns have been found in Brazil (Reis 1998), com-
munist Poland (Sztomka 1999), and the DDR, as well as post-communist eastern 
Germany (Völker & Flap 1995). 
What is typical for the Xhosa migrants in Cape Town was the particular 
concern around which these social configurations could emerge. In places such as 
Indawo Yoxolo there were virtually no churches and no sense of belonging. 
Rituals all took place in Emaxhoseni and male migrants, in particular, had to miss 
out on the status and sense of belonging that rituals provided. In Cape Town, 
people’s kin were absent and kin were not a social configuration that was part of 
day-to-day life. Fatherhood was heavily contested and mothers often had to send 
their children to kin in Emaxhoseni. Local politics were characterised by violence 
and did not provide prestige or a dense social network in which daily concerns 
could be managed, at least for most migrants. The migrants organised themselves 
around money because it was so important to their lives and because nothing else 
was available. There were no unions or other workers’ organisations, no age-based 
groups or ethnically based societies, and no soccer clubs. The migrants worried 
about money and money was the main resource around which they organised their 
lives. 
The lack of alternatives was also evident in the migrants’ morals. Money was 
so pivotal to the lives of Xhosa migrants that values, morals, social boundaries and 
interdependencies could only crystallise around money. It was for money that the 
migrants had come to Cape Town, it was money which they lacked most, and it 
was money that was at the core of their relations. 
 
 
Ambivalence 
 
There was an innate downside to the way in which the Xhosa migrants managed 
money and social relations. They tried to close themselves off from the threats and 
dangers surrounding them by establishing close-knit networks in financial mutuals. 
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The close-knit networks increased the interdependencies of the members, which 
made these relations prone to ambivalent feelings. Such strong and contradictory 
feelings – friendship, support, warmth, but also rivalry, jealousy, and distrust – 
meant that there were also conflicts between members. Many of people’s problems 
that participation in a financial mutual was supposed to solve – such as poverty, 
insecurity, uprootedness, violence, and people’s claims on money – were thus 
reproduced within the group and around the group’s participants. If one looks 
beyond the ideology of financial mutuals, and instead examines specific cases, it 
becomes apparent that tensions, rivalry, competition, and jealousy were inherent in 
this social configuration. Participants who, in many respects, care for one another 
and like one another had simultaneously harboured hostile feelings towards one 
another. In her study of ROSCAs among Surinamese Creole women in Amster-
dam, Van Wetering (1999: 73) rightly poses critical questions on the interpreta-
tions of cultural practices as ‘resistance’ and instead reveals the ambivalences em-
bedded in these relations. 
That contradictory feelings were part of financial mutuals comes to the fore in a 
wide array of relations and social situations. These are the dynamics of gender, 
women’s participation and kin, the establishment of social boundaries in relation to 
three core values (helping each other, taking care of oneself, respect), the inability 
to trust others – and oneself – completely, and the mixed feelings that accom-
panied consumption. If one closely examines these dimensions of financial 
mutuals, it becomes clear that all these dimensions of financial mutuals were 
fraught with ambivalence. 
Financial mutuals allowed women in particular to control their money and thus 
have power over relations. They had to deal with the demands of boyfriends or 
husbands, with needs of, and claims by, the extended family, with the responsi-
bility over children and with requests for money from neighbours. These claims 
were mostly legitimate, but they just did not have enough money. Because money 
had an impact on the kind of relationships migrants had, redirecting flows of 
money created tensions. The social constraint to self-constraint vis-à-vis the other 
financial mutual members made it possible to ignore certain claims. One could not 
share because the money was ‘locked up’ in the financial mutual. At a certain time, 
money became available and one could have some say as to what, with whom, and 
when to share. The money could be spent with people with whom one wanted to 
associate and invest in particular relationships. Women spent money on their own 
children and first-degree female relatives, while they tried to avoid claims from 
within their own extended kinship network, claims by boyfriends/husbands, and by 
in-laws. The women’s attempts at managing flows of money were not unchal-
lenged and contributed to ambivalent, and sometimes outright hostile, feelings vis-
à-vis kin and neighbours.  
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The three key values (helping each other, taking care of oneself, and respect) 
that were central to the creation of social boundaries, were just as ambivalent. In 
order to establish and maintain proper relationships, it was of the utmost impor-
tance to show respect. For some people, however, it was very difficult to recipro-
cate respect. The very poor and marginal had to live off begging and cheating, deal 
with violence and alcoholism, and frequently suffered from mental problems. In 
such circumstances, it was impossible to show respect. The poorest did not form a 
separate class, and were not even very different from other neighbours. Maybe 
some slightly better off neighbours had once been exactly like these bothersome 
and destitute neighbours, or realised that they might well become like them should 
misfortune cross their paths. This identification process meant that the ‘irritating 
poor’ were not completely neglected, but somewhat included and taken care of. 
But this solidarity had its limitations. 
In addition to disidentification – a contempt towards the poorest neighbours – 
(de Swaan 1997) people had only few financial means for solidarity. They were 
unable to treat everybody respectfully or help them all the time. There were too 
many people with severe problems and too little money to help them, while people 
also needed to take care of themselves. The choices were difficult, stressful, and 
contestable. The identification and disidentification processes with the neighbour-
ing poor led to ambivalent social configurations and reluctant solidarity. 
Ambivalence was also important in order to understand trust. Participants 
entrusted their money to fellow members and knew that they risked not receiving it 
back. The threatening triad of violence, economic insecurity, and volatile relations 
meant that there was a great deal of distrust in society. Members tried to contain 
risks in financial mutuals and tried to establish trust within the financial mutuals. 
Nevertheless the risks for default, or theft, could never be avoided completely. 
Members did not co-operate because they entirely trusted each other and it was 
often violence, rumour, confiscation of property, and social constraint that limited 
the risks. Financial mutuals did not have the capacity to create trust beyond the 
vicinity of the neighbours whose door one could see. Even those living only a few 
dozen metres away, at most, were not trusted completely. 
The participants co-operated without much trust in each other because they 
realised that it was their only option. They were aware of their own capability to 
support as well as harm others. They knew that there was always the risk of 
witchcraft, jealousy, and envy within interdependencies. The few, yet significant, 
cases of self-confessed witchcraft revealed that people knew that they themselves, 
maybe without wanting to do so, could be evil and harm others. Distrust was 
inevitably part of life because people were aware that relations encompassed good 
and evil. The ambivalent relations meant that trust could never be established 
completely and participants co-operated in financial mutuals without completely 
trusting others, and even themselves.  
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The phenomenon of consumption was also vulnerable to social conflict, 
jealousy and rivalry. Through consumption, made possible by financial mutuals, 
people could strive for a better lifestyle, self-worth and respect. A bigger house, a 
cellular phone, or furniture showed that one belonged to ‘a higher class’, as 
neighbours told me. Consumption at funerals and initiations, just like the many 
goods that migrants took along on their visits home, were part of a person’s status 
in society, and evoked respect. For that reason – i.e. using consumption to increase 
one’s status – it led to social tensions. Accumulation was at odds with sharing, 
which evoked friction among interdependent people. Moreover, the act of giving 
consumer products and money could be an aggressive one. It forced the fellow 
member to reciprocate with a counter gift of at least the same value, even if that 
person could not afford it. The interdependencies that were established by giving 
and receiving created not only friendship, solidarity and self-esteem, but also 
jealousy, rivalry and rumours about witchcraft. 
To sum up, financial mutuals were an attempt by Xhosa migrants to close 
themselves off from the violence, economic insecurity, and anxiety that sur-
rounded them. By withdrawing into a close-knit web of relations, they hoped to 
keep the outside world at bay and create positive relations. They used money, 
being the reason why they had come to Cape Town, to increase their control over 
their lives, to create social boundaries, intimacy, solidarity, self-worth and friend-
ship. However, the interdependencies that were part of financial mutuals, and 
actually needed for social constraint, meant that aspects of the ugly outside world 
were incorporated into the financial mutual. The interdependencies within the 
financial mutuals, as well as the influence of financial mutuals on the migrants’ 
interdependencies with kin and people living in proximity, gave rise to ambivalent 
relations. It was not possible to completely control money, or have complete power 
over relations with others, or over oneself. Financial mutuals were, therefore, the 
backdrops to rivalry, distrust, jealousy and frictions as well as islands of solidarity, 
trust, and friendship. Thus, poverty did not result in extensive unifying bonds of 
solidarity, but in small bonds of ambivalence. 
 
 
Experience as methodology 
 
Research among uprooted African migrants who lived in violent and insecure 
circumstances had its obvious methodological constraints. It is important to reflect 
on these methodological constraints because they are so much part of the insights 
that emerged during the course of the research. Methodology is not simply a ‘tool’ 
that can be separated from the insights that it generates. The reason for focusing on 
methodology in the conclusion is that it is intrinsically linked to the insights that I 
was able to gain during the research. 
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Instead of ignoring such constraints, or even worse, ignoring the many Africans 
that try to make a life in South Africa’s urban and industrial centres, these 
methodological issues have to be made explicit. Quantitative ways of gathering 
information, such as surveys, were impossible because of the level of distrust and 
my inability to move about freely. Qualitative research methods were also limited. 
The extent to which I could participate in the lives of Xhosa migrants was severely 
restricted. I was often dependent on a few people, particularly on my research 
assistant, and although I could not do the research without them, these dependen-
cies also had their drawbacks. Due to violence and my dependency on people, I 
had to adjust the course of the research, not always advantageously. 
In a world where violence and conflict are part of the lives of many, the 
methodology issues of research in dangerous situations have to be addressed more 
thoroughly than is currently the case. If social sciences fail to address these issues, 
they will leave substantial parts of the world population aside and neglect a broad 
array of social phenomena. Research institutes have to pay more attention to the 
repercussions of neglecting violence, or of restricting one’s academic interest to 
studying only a limited number of places and phenomena in the world. My 
experience was that the budgetary constraints of researchers and research 
institutions make it difficult to uphold necessary standards of safety. For example, 
it was difficult for me to negotiate funds to ensure that I had a car and did not need 
to do research on the scooter that I was initially offered. In research institutes, it 
should be common practice to concentrate on safety and security in a structured 
way and learn from the experiences of fellow researchers. Consultation or 
‘debriefing’ of those returning from the field is a service which is not provided at 
universities and research institutes, unlike other professional organisations that 
have people working in (potentially) violent circumstances. Moreover, I was 
initially inclined to downplay the risks of the research myself, so that it would not 
be branded unfeasible. Instead of avoiding these issues and restricting the scope of 
social sciences, a lively debate on methodological issues and responsibilities is 
needed. 
Notwithstanding the constraints that violence imposed, the qualitative research 
that I did, particularly case studies and limited participant observation, was well 
suited to bringing the dynamics of financial mutuals to the fore. Especially my 
own experiences as a researcher, which I have tried to make explicit, provided 
central insights. Let me clarify how experiences drew my attention to the migrants’ 
attempts to close themselves off from society, as well as the ambivalence within 
interdependent relations. 
During the research I started to perceive my environment differently. As Green 
(1995: 108) aptly put it: 
Gradually I became to realize that terror’s power, its matter-of-factness, is exactly about 
doubting one’s own perceptions of reality. The routinization of terror is what fuels its 
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power. Routinization allows people to live in a chronic state of fear with a facade of 
normalcy at the same time that terror permeates and shreds the social fabric. 
I realised that I tried to distinguished between ‘real risks’ and ‘acceptable risks’, 
and tried to identify unjustified paranoia. Although some places and situations 
surely were more dangerous than others, I started to realise that ‘real risks’, 
‘acceptable risk’, and ‘safety’ were socially constructed categories. Conversations 
about risks, dangers, and safety were actually an attempt to control the dangers and 
imagine that there were spaces that were not violent. As became apparent during 
my work on this thesis, these spaces did not exist, at least not for Xhosa migrants, 
but the distinctions were nevertheless important. For me, as a fairly well protected 
researcher, it was also a relief to be able to envision spaces and situations that were 
safe. It helped me to legitimise the research to others and provided a sense of 
security, which to some extent was false. 
This experience allowed me to appreciate the fact that migrants used financial 
mutuals in a similar fashion. They were a way to construct a safe and secure 
environment, even if that was to a large extent imagined. It was part of the 
management of normality (see De Swaan 1990 on the concept in a different 
context). Through my definitions of ‘safety’, ‘real risks’, and ‘acceptable risks’, I 
was doing the same as Xhosa migrants. The realisation that feelings of safety were 
largely a social construction, albeit a vital one, allowed me to enquire further along 
these lines and appreciate what the consequences of violence were for the 
migrants’ life. 
Furthermore, I initially found that the politics and violence in Indawo Yoxolo, 
as described in chapter three, put severe constraints on the research. It was an 
obstacle that prevented me from studying financial mutuals. In retrospect, how-
ever, I wonder how I could even have attempted to neglect the importance of 
violence for the organisation of financial mutuals. It was actually a defensive 
strategy against anxiety-inducing experiences (see Devereux 1967: 83). I tried to 
ignore violence because it was unsettling and disturbing. Just like the Xhosa 
migrants, I attempted to shut out violence and politics. The residents of Indawo 
Yoxolo did the same and had even more reasons to try and shield themselves 
against the horrific living conditions and the fears and anxieties that these brought 
about. They also tried to use financial mutuals for that purpose. Conceptually, I 
could turn the obstacles of violence and political manoeuvring – that were 
preventing me from studying financial mutuals – around and regard them as key 
sources of information about these mutuals. The importance of violence in the 
analysis of financial mutuals initially revealed itself through experience. My 
experience – of my own attempts to isolate from violence and unsettling events – 
made me sensitive to a major function of financial mutuals for Xhosa migrants and 
enabled me to pursue this theme in conversations and case studies. 
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The pivotal place of ambivalence for the analysis of financial mutuals was also 
apparent from my own experiences. The constraints that violence put on my 
research consequently meant that I was very dependent on others. I could not 
decide for myself where to walk, nor whom to talk with and at the time of day that 
was convenient to me. The violence made me more dependent on others than 
fieldwork under safe and relaxed circumstances would have done. Some also 
depended on me, and through this I experienced the ambivalent feelings that were 
part of such interdependencies. I was sometimes irritated by the way Africans 
perceived me, or tired of trying to challenge racial boundaries, just like the 
migrants in Cape Town sometimes expressed their feelings of resentfulness to me, 
a White, rich, and nosy man with a car. At the same time, my dependency on the 
people among whom I did the research meant that I really appreciated their 
willingness to help me with the research and cherished their friendship and 
support. This was particularly so vis-à-vis my research assistant Edith. This 
inspired me to wonder whether participants of financial mutuals had to deal with 
feelings of ambivalence towards each other. The interdependencies meant that 
sometimes I would irritate them, and they would irritate me. After all, that was 
what co-operation, even for this thesis, was all about. Even if I liked certain people 
very much and valued the relationship, I could still have mixed feelings towards 
them. Conversations and case studies revealed that this was central to their 
organisations and understanding of social relations in a hostile environment. 
These experiences were a useful start, but not enough in themselves. They 
allowed me to explore avenues that, had I not undertaken fieldwork or ignored 
uncomfortable experiences, would have remained indiscernible. Experiences, 
therefore, have to be made explicit – and all too often they are not – and the 
researcher should reveal how they provided insight into people’s actions, and their 
motives (cf. Devereux 1967; Hastrup 1993, 1995; Jenkins 1994; Van de Port 1998; 
1999; Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1991; Thoden van Velzen 1995). The 
scope of social science is limited if experiences are disregarded, neglected, or 
concealed. Experience is a precious methodology that needs to be developed 
further because, if one fails to do so, particular dimensions of social phenomena 
will be left unexamined. 
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